




TRANSLATING REINFORCER DIMENSIONS AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC DEMAND TO 





Amy Jessica Henley 
 
 
Submitted to the graduate degree program in the Department of Applied Behavioral Science and the 
Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 




































The Dissertation Committee for Amy Jessica Henley  
certifies that this is the approved version of the following Dissertation: 
 
 
TRANSLATING REINFORCER DIMENSIONS AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC DEMAND TO 




















Recent research has effectively translated behavioral economic demand curve analyses 
for use with work-related behavior and workplace incentives (e.g., Henley, DiGennaro Reed, 
Reed, & Kaplan, 2016). The present experiments integrated a hypothetical and experiential 
demand preparation into a computerized task for use with Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers to 
evaluate the effects of parametric manipulations of reinforcer dimensions on performance using a 
behavioral economic demand framework. The first experiment examined the effects of three 
incentive magnitudes ($0.05, $0.10, and $0.20) on performance assessed with a progressive ratio 
schedule. Results indicate responding on the hypothetical and experiential demand assessments 
was sensitive to incentive magnitude, with higher responding in the higher incentive magnitude 
conditions. Participant responses on the hypothetical assessment were in general agreement with 
observed responding in the experiential assessment. The second experiment extended the 
methods of Experiment 1 to evaluate the effects of three parametric values of reinforcer 
probability (10%, 50%, and 90% probability of earning incentives). Responding was generally 
comparable for all three probability conditions. Experiment 3 evaluated the effects of three 
delays to incentive receipt (1, 14, and 28 days). Responding was higher in the condition in which 
incentives were delayed by 1 as compared to 28 days. Results of the current studies may inform 
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Translating Reinforcer Dimensions and Behavioral Economic Demand to Inform Incentive 
Delivery in Organizational Behavior Management 
Applied behavior analysis is a scientific discipline that uses the principles of behavior to 
identify practical strategies for improving socially significant behavior (Baer, Wolf, & Risley, 
1968). Behavior analysts have made impressive advancements in numerous areas including 
autism treatment, addiction, educational practices, public health, parent training, and others. A 
sub-discipline of applied behavior analysis, known as organizational behavior management 
(OBM), has a rich history of changing behavior of individuals and groups in the workplace 
(Wilder, Austin, & Casella, 2009). The importance of targeting efforts in the workplace may not 
be immediately obvious until one considers that work is the single activity to which Americans 
allocate the most time and the workforce accounts for 60% of Americans over the age of 16 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014, 2016a). The workplace is also affected by a host of pressing 
issues including job dissatisfaction among more than half of U.S. workers (Ray, Rizzacasa, & 
Levanon, 2013) and employee turnover rates that are often highest in human service and 
education settings where skilled employees delivering quality services are essential for consumer 
and learner outcomes (Dib & Sturmey, 2007; Gresham, Gansle, Noell, Cohen, & Rosenblum, 
1993; Ingersoll, Merrill, & Stuckey, 2014; Strouse, Carroll-Hernandez, Sherman, & Sheldon, 
2003). Moreover, nearly 5,000 work-related fatalities and 3 million injuries and illnesses occur 
annually (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016b) and over a quarter of Americans have been bullied 
at work (Workplace Bullying Institute, 2014). The workplace is paramount to our daily lives, 
increasing the need for strategies to alleviate the many issues faced by organizations, employees, 
and consumers of the goods and services they produce.  
When one considers the central role work plays in our lives and the many workplace 
issues, it is not surprising that a specialized sub-discipline of applied behavior analysis was 
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established to address behavior in the workplace. The burgeoning of OBM since its beginning in 
the 1960s may be attributable, at least in part, to the robust results the field has achieved in 
diverse industries, with organizations of all sizes, and in addressing issues of varying complexity 
(Dickinson, 2001). The expansion of OBM has resulted in the development of three sub-
disciplines within the field: behavioral systems analysis, behavior-based safety, and performance 
management.  
Behavioral Systems Analysis 
Behavioral systems analysis is an approach to evaluating organizational performance that 
integrates traditional behavior analytic principles with general systems theory (Diener, McGee, 
& Miguel, 2009; Von Bertalanffy, 1950). Behavioral systems analysis views the organization as 
a whole and evaluates the interaction between the components (e.g., departments) and processes 
within the system (e.g., hiring practices, product development) and between the organization and 
external environment (e.g., consumers and competition; Johnson, Casella, McGee, & Lee, 2014). 
The overarching goal of behavioral systems analysis is to increase an organization’s ability to 
adapt to and meet the needs and pressures of a dynamic and an ever-changing environmental 
context in which the organization exists (Diener et al., 2009; Johnson et al., 2014). Behavioral 
systems analysis focuses on changing organizational systems, processes, and individual 
employee performance to accomplish this goal. Typical procedures in behavioral systems 
analysis include, but are not limited to, process design, policy changes, organizational 
restructuring, and re-allocation of resources and individual employee performance. The 
substantial resources needed to carry out behavioral systems analysis is a noted disadvantage. In 
fact, it can take several weeks or even months to pinpoint organizational issues and identify a 
change strategy (Johnson et al., 2014). Although advocates of behavioral systems analysis report 
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numerous successful applications in practice, to date there is limited published empirical or 
experimental evidence evaluating and consequently supporting its use (Johnson et al., 2014; 
Sigurdsson & McGee, 2015). Clearly more research is needed; however, the molar approach to 
improving organizations taken by behavioral systems analysis may ultimately prove propitious.  
Behavior-Based Safety 
As previously noted, work-related injuries and illnesses are a pervasive problem (e.g., 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016b). In addition to personal and emotional harm, work-related 
injuries have tremendous financial ramifications. The National Safety Council (2015) estimates 
that medical costs, administrative expenses, and losses in wages and productivity totaled over 
$206 billion in 2013. In fact, Loafman (1996) argues the costs of work-related injuries and 
illnesses is one of the nation’s largest avoidable expenditures. Although some instances may be 
unavoidable, many injuries result from unsafe behavior of staff. Traditional approaches to 
decreasing injuries involve reducing or eliminating physical hazards in the environment by 
developing equipment or mechanical safety devices that physically block contact with dangerous 
machines or to unsafe spaces (e.g., hard hat, safety goggles, railings). Unfortunately, preventable 
injuries continue to occur at unacceptable rates despite impressive advances in safety equipment. 
In many cases, safety equipment is not permanently affixed and requires behavior for safe use—
this fact necessarily requires behavioral approaches to ameliorate workplace injuries.  
Thus, behavior-based safety involves the application of behavioral principles and 
environmental manipulations to reduce the occurrence of preventable work-related injuries and 
illnesses (Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000). Grindle, Dickinson, and Boettcher (2000) suggest that 
close consideration of the consequences for safe and unsafe behavior may provide insight into 
the causes of work-related injuries. Specifically, they note: 
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… natural consequences may support and encourage unsafe behaviors because: (a) 
performing in a safe manner results in immediate, probable, negative consequences such 
as discomfort and increased effort or time; while (b) performing in an unsafe manner 
rarely results in an injury but does result in immediate, probable positive consequences 
such as savings in time and effort and avoidance of discomfort. (p. 34) 
The inadequacy of natural consequences operating in the workplace to evoke and maintain safe 
behavior is supported by the findings of Grindle and colleagues. In their review of behavioral 
safety interventions, Grindle et al. found that consequent interventions proved more effective 
than antecedent interventions for safety behavior. In this context, antecedent interventions 
include environmental modifications and other strategies (e.g., altering motivating operations) to 
change working conditions before workers emit behavior (Cooper, Heron, & Heward, 2006). 
Whereas consequent interventions involve contingent manipulations of stimuli that follow a 
behavior (i.e., modifying consequences). The findings of Grindle et al. suggest delay to 
reinforcement, probability of reinforcement, and effort required for safe behavior are important 
considerations to supplement inadequate natural contingencies when designing behavior change 
procedures for safety and potentially other behavior in the workplace. 
Performance Management 
The third OBM sub-discipline—performance management—involves the analysis and 
direct manipulation of antecedents and consequences to improve individual or group 
performance within an organization (Daniels & Daniels, 2006). In contrast with the relatively 
specific nature of behavior-based safety, performance management targets a wide variety of 
employee behavior including absenteeism (e.g., Camden & Ludwig, 2013), cleaning (e.g., 
Clayton & Blaskewicz, 2012; Doll, Livesey, McHaffie, & Ludwig, 2007), implementation of 
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behavior support plans or teaching procedures (e.g., Miller, Carlson, & Sigurdsson, 2014), 
customer service (e.g., So, Lee, & Oah, 2013), identification-checking (e.g., Downing & Geller, 
2012), and numerous others. Performance management procedures are a necessary component of 
behavioral systems analysis and behavior-based safety, rendering continued efforts to evaluate 
and maximize the effectiveness of performance management interventions of particular 
importance to OBM.  
Within performance management, employee performance problems are frequently 
classified as either a skill or motivational deficit (Mager & Pipe, 1970). A skill deficit refers to 
performance problems that are a function of insufficient knowledge or practice necessary for 
correct performance to occur. In contrast, when an individual can correctly demonstrate a 
behavior but does not, the problem is likely attributable to a motivational deficit, wherein the 
consequences for correct performance are inadequate to maintain behavior. Accordingly, 
performance management interventions are often classified as antecedent- or consequent-based 
to address skill and motivational deficits, respectively (Mager & Pipe, 1970; Wilder et al., 2009). 
Common antecedent interventions in OBM include staff training, goal setting, instruction, and 
task clarification. Consequent-based interventions in OBM consist of performance feedback, 
incentives (monetary and non-monetary), and—although they are infrequently evaluated in the 
literature—other types of consequences including promotion and progressive discipline.  
VanStelle et al. (2012) conducted a review of empirical research articles published in the 
Journal of Organizational Behavior Management (JOBM) between 1998 and 2009 to evaluate 
the types of performance issues researchers targeted for change as well as intervention strategies 
used. VanStelle et al. found that 78% of performance problems were due to a motivational 
deficit. The frequency of performance problems that are a function of motivational deficits 
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underscores the importance of continued research examining consequent interventions. 
Performance feedback and incentives were the most frequently employed consequent 
interventions VanStelle and colleagues reported, used in 68% and 26% of studies, respectively. 
The importance of high-quality staff training and appropriate antecedents cannot be discounted; 
these components are necessary for correct performance. However, as evidenced by the greater 
relative frequency with which performance problems are a function of motivational deficits, 
antecedent-based interventions are not sufficient to maintain performance over time. 
Examination of consequences may shed light on specific consequence properties that support 
desirable and undesirable employee behavior, similar to the explanation proposed by Grindle and 
colleagues (2000) with respect to safety behavior. Thus, continued evaluation of consequent-
based interventions that OBM researchers use most frequently (i.e., performance feedback and 
incentives) is a worthwhile endeavor.  
Performance Feedback  
Performance feedback—hereafter referred to in short as feedback—is the provision of 
information about performance that allows an individual to adjust his or her behavior (Daniels & 
Daniels, 2006; Prue & Fairbank, 1981). Feedback is the most frequently used of any 
performance management technique, including antecedent interventions (VanStelle et al., 2012). 
Although it is classified here and elsewhere as a consequent-based intervention (e.g., Wilder et 
al., 2009), feedback may also function as an antecedent for correct performance the next time an 
employee performs a task (Daniels, 2000). Numerous literature reviews and component analyses 
have evaluated various feedback characteristics in an effort to identify the method of delivery 
and content that maximizes feedback effectiveness (e.g., group vs. individual, weekly vs. daily, 
objective vs. evaluative; Alvero, Bucklin, & Austin, 2001; Balcazar, Hopkins, & Suarez, 1985; 
7 
 
Henley & DiGennaro Reed, 2015; Johnson, 2013, 2015; Pampino, MacDonald, Mullin, & 
Wilder, 2004; Prue & Fairbank, 1981; Reid & Parsons, 1996). The cumulative research 
examining feedback characteristics has provided valuable insight regarding effective delivery 
methods. In a review of the feedback literature published between 1985 and 1998, Alvero and 
colleagues found that only 47% of studies resulted in consistent performance improvements 
when feedback was the sole behavior change procedure. The inconsistency with which feedback 
interventions result in performance improvements is a noted disadvantage. However, feedback 
remains a valuable method because it is a flexible and cost-effective means for changing 
employee behavior that can be adapted for use in most organizational settings. Organizational 
behavior management would benefit from continued research on the characteristics and function 
of feedback to improve its effectiveness and consistency.  
Incentives  
Incentives are rewards delivered to an individual or group contingent on the occurrence 
of a desired behavior or reaching a performance criterion (e.g., fire drill completion, number of 
hours billed). Incentives may include money or other tangible or intangible items (i.e., non-
monetary incentives) such as time off from work (Austin, Kessler, Riccobono, & Bailey, 1996), 
food (Kortick & O’Brien, 1996), gift certificates (Miller et al., 2014), and numerous others. The 
use of incentives to improve employee performance in OBM dates back to the early 1970s (for a 
review of the history of OBM see Dickinson, 2001). Incentives have documented advantages 
including reliable increases in net profits as well as improvements in performance, however 
measured (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001). Furthermore, monetary and non-monetary incentives 
have been shown to be effective in both laboratory (e.g., Oah & Dickinson, 1992) and applied 
settings (e.g., Luiselli et al., 2009), when delivered alone (e.g., Lee & Oah, 2015) or in 
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combination with other performance management procedures (e.g., Goomas & Ludwig, 2007), 
with lottery or probabilistic arrangements (e.g., Alavosius, Getting, Dagen, Newson, & Hopkins, 
2009; Orpen, 1974), and with varied behaviors in diverse industries (for a review see Bucklin & 
Dickinson, 2001). The robust findings have resulted in sustained interest in incentives as an 
attractive and viable performance management procedure.  
Like feedback, numerous methodological variations in the delivery of incentives exist. 
Empirical evaluations of incentive variations are important because effectiveness may depend, at 
least in part, on the method with which they are delivered. Unfortunately, experimental 
evaluations of methodological variations are relatively infrequent. Of the extant literature 
comparing individual incentive arrangements, several lines of inquiry have emerged (Bucklin & 
Dickinson, 2001).  
Reinforcement schedules. One area of investigation popular in the 1970s and 1980s 
concerned experimental evaluations of reinforcement schedules for incentive delivery. Roughly 
half of these studies were conducted in the laboratory (Berger, Cummings, & Heneman, 1975; 
Lee & Oah, 2015; Pritchard, DeLeo, & Von Bergen, 1976; Pritchard, Hollenback, & DeLeo, 
1980; Yukl, Wexley, & Seymore, 1972) and the remaining were conducted in the workplace 
(Latham & Dossett, 1978; Saari & Latham, 1982; Yukl & Latham, 1975; Yukl, Latham, & 
Pursell, 1976). Eight of the nine studies involved comparisons of continuous and variable ratio 
(VR) schedules of reinforcement on performance. For example, in an early applied investigation, 
Yukl and Latham evaluated the effects of three schedules of monetary incentives on bags of 
seedlings planted by 38 tree planters using a between groups design. In addition to a fixed $2 
hourly wage, incentive amounts were $2, $4, and $8 for the groups that received incentives on a 
continuous reinforcement, VR2, and VR4 schedule, respectively. The authors also included a 
9 
 
control condition in which planters earned fixed pay only in the amount of $3 per hour. Relative 
to baseline, performance in the continuous reinforcement condition increased by 33%, decreased 
by 8% in the VR2 condition, and increased by 18% in the VR4 condition. Performance in the 
control condition was unchanged. Although Yukl and Latham’s results demonstrate 
differentiated performance in the incentive conditions with the highest performance in the 
condition with the highest rate of reinforcement (i.e., continuous reinforcement), their results 
should be interpreted with caution because of at least two limitations. Several participants in the 
VR2 condition had difficulty understanding the procedures and objected to the method for 
determining incentive receipt (i.e., correctly guessing a coin toss), potentially accounting for 
performance decreases. Relatedly, because incentive receipt was based on a coin toss, Dickinson 
and Poling (1996) estimate that the reinforcement schedule participants actually experienced was 
a VR1.75 rather than a VR2. The collective findings of research evaluating reinforcement 
schedules indicate performance was generally higher when participants earned incentives as 
compared to hourly pay. However, results comparing different schedules of incentive delivery 
were idiosyncratic.  
Percentage of incentive pay. A second line of inquiry involves evaluations of varying 
percentages of incentive pay (Dickinson & Gillette, 1994; LaMere, Dickinson, Henry, Henry, & 
Poling, 1996; Matthews & Dickinson, 2000; Oah & Lee, 2011; Riedel, Nebeker, & Cooper, 
1988). To examine percentage of incentive pay, researchers constrained total compensation and 
manipulated the proportion of pay available through incentives relative to base pay (i.e., 
guaranteed wages). Incentive pay ranged between 0% (i.e., no incentives) and 100% (i.e., piece-
rate pay only) with higher percentages constituting a higher proportion of pay dependent on 
measureable performance. Although arrangements in which pay is primarily earned through 
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incentives provide the strongest contingent relation, performance compensation is subject to vary 
across pay periods and may increase the unpredictability of pay. The potential outcome includes 
difficulty budgeting individual income and aggregate labor costs for employees and employers, 
respectively, which may be perceived as riskier and less preferred relative to fixed wages for 
both parties. In light of the large body of research revealing superior performance when 
individuals earn incentives, research examining the percentage of incentive pay sought to 
evaluate whether there was an optimal percentage that balances the advantages (performance 
improvements) with the disadvantages (risk) of incentive systems.  
Despite what one might predict given contingent relations, all but one study evaluating 
the percentage of incentive pay found performance to be comparable across varying percentages 
of incentive pay. One criticism of this body of literature is the limited ecological validity of 
laboratory settings. Specifically, many of the contingencies for engaging in on- and off-task 
behavior, motivating operations, and competing response alternatives present in the workplace 
are often lacking from laboratory-based studies despite researchers’ best efforts. To increase 
ecological validity, Oah and Lee (2011) used a modified experimental preparation by recruiting 
individuals with a three-year history of socializing with one another to jointly participate and 
increasing the number and length of sessions to better approximate the workplace (30 sessions 
each lasting 6 hr conducted 5 days a week). The authors found consistently higher productivity 
and duration of time working when participants earned 100% of their pay from incentives 
relative to conditions in which participants earned 10% and 0% of their pay from contingent 
incentives. Productivity and work duration did not differ between the 10% and 0% conditions. 
Although more research is needed, these initial findings suggest that higher percentages of 
incentive pay may result in higher levels of performance and that percentages at or below 10% 
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incentive pay may not be sufficient to generate meaningful performance increases. Additionally, 
the findings suggest OBM researchers can modify the laboratory setting to better approximate a 
workplace. 
A possible explanation for the inconsistent findings across studies evaluating 
reinforcement schedules for incentive delivery and the percentage of incentive pay may involve 
the difficulty simulating complex and competing contingencies operating in the workplace. 
Results of studies evaluating reinforcement schedules appear initially to be idiosyncratic 
(Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001; Dickinson & Poling, 1996). Upon further inspection, an interesting 
pattern emerges. Performance was generally equivalent under fixed and variable schedules for 
studies conducted in a simulated work setting but differentiated in studies conducted in a real 
workplace. With respect to the line of research evaluating the percentage of incentive pay, 
LaMere and colleagues (1996) were the only researchers to evaluate this topic in an applied 
setting. Although LaMere and colleagues did not find differences in performance among 
percentages, the authors evaluated percentages of incentive pay below 10%, which may not be 
sufficiently high to result in performance differences revealed by Oah and Lee (2011). The 
inconsistent findings between laboratory and applied studies highlights a common and prominent 
limitation of laboratory-based OBM research; namely, the limited ecological validity associated 
with many simulated workplaces.  
Based on findings from the basic literature, Bucklin and Dickinson (2001) argue, “the 
work environment can be viewed as analogous to a behavioral choice situation where multiple 
concurrent schedules of reinforcement exist” (p. 65) and individuals in this situation will 
maximize reinforcement. For that reason, even when the percentage of incentive pay is small or 
the reinforcement schedule is lean, performance may be undifferentiated across conditions when 
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no alternative sources of reinforcement are available or when the reinforcing efficacy of 
concurrently available alternatives is low relative to the experimental task. For example, to 
simulate the presence of alternative activities present in real work settings, Matthews and 
Dickinson (2000) provided participants with the opportunity to engage in off-task behavior. 
During a single 70-min experimental session, a computer program provided either two or four 
prompted opportunities to play one of three computer games for a maximum of 5 min. The 
ecological validity of these procedures are questionable because the session duration, prompts to 
engage in off-task behavior for a finite duration, and limited available alternatives are not 
representative of the workplace. Oah and Lee (2011) evaluated the same percentages of incentive 
pay as Matthews and Dickinson (i.e., 0%, 10%, and 100% incentive pay), but Oah and Lee’s 
experimental preparation produced performance differences. In addition to the features noted 
previously, participants in Oah and Lee were allowed to take breaks within or outside of the 
laboratory at any time and had unrestricted access to all computer features including high-speed 
internet. The presence of known peers with whom to socialize likely served as an additional 
alternative source of reinforcement (perhaps with high relative reinforcing efficacy) and the 
quantity and duration of sessions may have functioned as a motivating operation for engaging in 
off-task behavior over time. The features Oah and Lee included to increase simulation fidelity 
may better approximate the workplace and enhance the external validity of the findings. Despite 
the advantages, the financial resources needed to adopt Oah and Lee’s preparation limit 
widespread use of this method. Researchers who wish to study variables relevant to the 
organization may need to identify an alternative analog setting that is sensitive to resources, but 
better approximates the workplace than the laboratory.  
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Preference assessments. Although not a variation of delivery, methods for selecting 
stimuli for use in an incentive arrangement is a related and imperative research area for incentive 
effectiveness. Preference assessments include a variety of methods for identifying stimuli likely 
to function as a reinforcer. Monetary incentives may obviate the need for organizational leaders 
to conduct preference assessments because money functions as a generalized conditioned 
reinforcer and is relatively independent of motivating operations. However, the financial and 
human resources needed to implement an incentive system may preclude the use of monetary 
incentives. Non-monetary incentives are a popular method to help mediate budgetary 
restrictions. The myriad types of non-monetary incentives are an advantage of their use, but can 
make it challenging for organizational leaders or managers to accurately select preferred 
incentives for employees; a supposition supported by recent empirical work (Wilder, Harris, 
Casella, Wine, & Postma, 2011; Wilder, Rost, McMahon, 2007). The inadequacy of manager 
selection underscores the need for the development and evaluation of methods to identify 
preferred incentives in organizations. Fortunately, interest in employee preference assessments is 
emerging.  
Several studies have compared various preference assessment methods for use in the 
workplace (Waldvogel & Dixon, 2008; Wilder, Therrien, & Wine, 2006; Wine, Reis, & Hantula, 
2014). In the most recent example, Wine and colleagues evaluated three preference assessment 
methods. For the multiple stimulus without replacement, Wine et al. asked participants to select 
the most preferred stimulus from an array after which the experimenter removed the selected 
item and presented the remaining stimuli. The experimenter repeated this process of elimination 
until all the stimuli were assessed. The survey method asked participants to rate each item on a 
scale of how much work they would be willing to complete for an item. Response options for the 
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survey method included: (1) none at all, (2) a little, (3) a fair amount, (4) much, and (5) very 
much. Lastly, the stimulus ranking procedure asked participants to order the items (provided 
textually on index cards) from most to least preferred. After completing the preference 
assessments, Wine and colleagues conducted a reinforcer assessment to evaluate whether high-
preferred stimuli functioned as reinforcers and low-preference stimuli did not function as 
reinforcers (i.e., accuracy). Reinforcer assessment results indicate the survey method consistently 
classified reinforcing stimuli as high-preferred whereas the multiple stimulus without 
replacement and ranking methods identified some but not all reinforcers as high-preferred. 
Wilder et al. obtained similar findings when comparing the survey method to a paired stimulus 
assessment in which each item assessed was paired with every other stimulus and participants 
selected the more preferred item of the two. Wilder and colleagues found the survey method to 
be more accurate than the paired stimulus procedure. Incorporating the amount of work an 
individual is willing to complete to earn an incentive is a distinguishing feature of the survey 
method from the other methods Wine et al. and Wilder et al. assessed. Although the survey 
method uses a subjective (e.g., “a fair amount” of work) rather than objective (e.g., reporting a 
quantity) measure of work output, the survey method is nonetheless an improvement over 
methods in which reinforcers are identified at low work requirements or without consideration of 
the work requirement, which is not representative of conditions employees will actually 
experience in the workplace to earn incentives. The results of Wine et al. and Wilder et al. 
suggest preference assessment methods for use in organizations may benefit from incorporating 
the work requirement needed to earn an incentive. 
Prevalence of incentive use. DiGennaro Reed and Henley (2015) evaluated staff training 
and performance management practices offered to individuals certified by or seeking 
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certification from the Behavior Analyst Certified Board® and working in applied settings. 
DiGennaro Reed and Henley found that just 8% of respondents reported receiving incentives 
contingent on performance more than twice per year. When considering the effectiveness of 
incentives and the frequency with which they are evaluated in the OBM literature, incentives 
appear to be used with relative paucity in applied settings employing board-certified staff.  
The infrequent use of incentives observed by DiGennaro Reed and Henley (2015) 
suggests there may be a gap in the literature that serves as a barrier to incentive use in practice. 
Conceivably, the numerous possible incentive delivery methods may pose a challenge to their 
use. The literature comparing delivery methods only covers a modest portion of possibilities. It 
may be difficult for organizational leaders to draw clear conclusions from the extant literature 
comparing incentive delivery variations needed to guide the design of an empirically supported 
incentive system, particularly when one considers the conflicting findings noted previously. As a 
result, incentives may be delivered in ineffective and/or cost-prohibitive ways. For example, 
leaders must select an appropriate incentive amount for use in a system. Erring on the side of 
providing larger incentives may not be financially sustainable and organizational leaders could 
be forced to discontinue the program before obtaining the desired behavior change. Incentives 
that are too small may not be sufficient to motivate employees to change their behavior and 
leaders risk expending valuable resources on an ineffective system. Leaders must also select the 
work requirement needed to earn an incentive, the frequency of delivery, delay to delivery, and 
incentive type, as well as make decisions about many other variables. Decisions such as these 
can be detrimental if made arbitrarily. The numerous logistical questions that remain unanswered 
suggests that, although incentive effectiveness was established over 40 years ago, since then 
research has generated limited information to guide their use in the workplace. A general lack of 
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helpful information to guide effective incentive delivery likely contributes to their lack of use or 
short half-life when used (DiGennaro Reed & Henley, 2015; Huselid, 1995).  
In the present context incentives are, generally speaking, reinforcers delivered in the 
workplace. Comparisons or parametric analyses of basic reinforcer dimensions to effectively 
improve and maintain desired performance in a way that is appealing for employees and 
sustainable for the organization—factors that ultimately dictate whether an incentive system is 
used in the short- and long-term—are largely absent from the literature. Therefore, an 
understanding of how reinforcer dimensions influence incentive efficacy is important to guide 
their efficient and effective delivery in practice.  
Reinforcer Dimensions 
Reinforcers may vary along a number of dimensions that influence their efficacy 
including delay, response effort, magnitude, probability, quality, and rate of reinforcement. The 
experimental analysis of reinforcer dimensions has a long and rich history of study culminating 
in an extensive empirical literature. The findings of both laboratory (e.g., Chung & Herrnstein, 
1967) and applied (e.g., Neef, Mace, & Shade, 1993) studies consistently demonstrate systematic 
changes in responding with changes in reinforcer dimensions. These findings have led to the 
successful application of numerous interventions that manipulate reinforcer dimensions of 
response alternatives to increase the frequency of desired behavior (e.g., Horner & Day, 1991). 
Reinforcer dimensions are therefore an important consideration that warrant attention in the 
OBM literature. Experimental investigations evaluating how reinforcer dimensions differentially 
affect performance may provide a better understanding of the variables that influence employee 
behavior in the workplace and help inform the development of behavior change procedures for 
promoting desired performance.  
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Reinforcer delay. Delay of reinforcement refers to the duration between behavior 
producing a reinforcer and subsequent reinforcer delivery (Mazur, 1993). A large literature base 
has shown that reinforcer efficacy systematically decreases as a function the delay to its receipt 
(Mazur, 1993). An understanding of how delayed reinforcement affects behavior may be of 
particular relevance to OBM because of practical restrictions that constrain the immediacy with 
which reinforcers may be delivered in the workplace (e.g., payroll processing). Such constraints 
render many delays in the workplace of greater duration than those observed in non-human 
animal studies of reinforcement. Malott (1993) suggests delay to reinforcement in the workplace 
is too great to directly control behavior. As a result, Malott makes an important distinction 
between direct- and indirect-acting contingencies. A direct-acting contingency is “a contingency 
for which the outcome of the response reinforces or punishes that response” (p. 46) and an 
indirect-acting contingency is “a contingency that controls behavior indirectly rather than 
through the direct action of reinforcement or punishment by the outcome of that contingency” (p. 
46). Malott suggests most behavior in the workplace is controlled by indirect-acting 
contingencies and mediated by rules describing those contingencies, whereas non-human operant 
studies rely on direct-acting contingencies to control behavior. An understanding of how 
reinforcer dimensions, including delay, influence behavior governed by indirect-acting 
contingencies is less understood and represents a valuable area for future research. Although 
several OBM researchers have evaluated the effects of delayed feedback (Krumhus & Malott, 
1980; Mason & Redmon, 1992; Reid & Parsons, 1996), this analysis has not been sufficiently 
extended to incentives.  
Response effort. Response effort (referred to hereafter as effort) involves the type or 
amount of behavior required to access reinforcement. Effort encompasses various facets of a 
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response including difficulty, physical exertion (e.g., weight, force required, distance traveled), 
or time necessary to successfully perform a behavior. Research manipulating response effort 
reliably demonstrates an inverse relation between effort and response rate, with higher rates 
associated with lower effort responses (Friman & Poling, 1995). Therefore, careful consideration 
and evaluation of response effort is warranted (DiGennaro Reed, Henley, Hirst, Doucette, & 
Jenkins, 2015). With respect to the workplace, employees have multiple job responsibilities that 
differ in the amount of effort required by an employee. The effort needed may influence the tasks 
to which employees allocate their time, and could result in allocation to irrelevant, inappropriate, 
or unsafe tasks or behaviors. A strategically delivered incentive contingent on completion of 
high-effort responses could help ameliorate this issue. Effort may also influence whether 
employees engage in a desired behavior. In one of the only published experimental accounts of 
an effort manipulation in JOBM, Shook, Johnson, and Uhlman (1978) slightly improved the 
frequency direct care staff graph client behavior by moving the necessary materials closer to the 
location in which graphing was to take place, thereby reducing the effort required to perform this 
job responsibility. Unfortunately, further evaluations of response effort in OBM are well 
overdue.  
Reinforcer magnitude. Also commonly referred to as amount, reinforcer magnitude is 
the quantity of a reinforcer and can be measured in terms of number or duration of access. 
Research has consistently documented that magnitude influences reinforcer efficacy with 
reinforcers of greater magnitude being relatively more efficacious (Fantino, 1977). Although 
money is generally assumed to be an effective reinforcer for humans, Daniels (2000) suggests 
the reinforcing efficacy of money may still depend on amount. The reinforcer magnitude 
necessary to evoke behavior change is important to organizations because it must be financially 
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feasible to implement any incentive system involving reinforcers that cost money, directly or 
indirectly (i.e., personnel time to implement the system). Identifying the lowest-magnitude 
reinforcer that can effectively maintain behavior may be especially important for human service, 
educational, or nonprofit organizations where finances are often limited.  
Reinforcer probability. Probability of reinforcement is the likelihood, on a given 
schedule, a reinforcer will be delivered (Ferster & Skinner, 1957). Numerous studies have 
demonstrated incentive effectiveness when delivered in a probabilistic or lottery arrangement 
(e.g., Alavosius et al., 2009; Orpen, 1974; Reed, DiGennaro Reed, Campisano, LaCourse, & 
Azulay, 2012). However, many of these studies do not specify the programmed and/or 
experienced probability. For example, Cook and Dixon (2006) evaluated the effects of a $50 
probabilistic incentive on the percentage of completed forms for three supervisors working with 
individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities. All participants had the opportunity 
to earn the incentive each week regardless of performance; however, the experienced probability 
varied weekly because it was determined based on performance of all three participants. The 
highest performer had a 50% chance of earning the incentive, the second and third highest 
performers had a 33% and 17% chance, respectively. If two participants completed an equal 
percentage of forms for a given week, both participants had a 40% probability, whereas the 
lowest performer had a 20% probability of earning the incentive. Although performance was 
highest for all participants during the lottery incentive system, the probability associated with 
performance gains remains unclear. Research evaluating incentive probability may help mediate 
budgetary restrictions associated with delivering higher magnitude or more frequent incentives.  
Reinforcer quality. Reinforcer effectiveness depends in part on the relative preference 
for a reinforcing stimulus, referred to as quality (DiGennaro Reed et al., 2015). As previously 
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discussed, OBM researchers are beginning to develop preference assessment methods that will 
provide useful information about reinforcer quality (e.g., Wine et al., 2014). Research has also 
demonstrated that quality is influenced by other reinforcer dimensions such as magnitude 
(Trosclaire-Lasserre, Lerman, Call, Addison, & Kodak, 2008). Because reinforcer dimensions 
may interact and influence quality in unpredictable ways, leaders would benefit from having 
reliable and efficient methods to assess reinforcer preference in OBM. Despite a robust literature 
examining methods for identifying preferred reinforcers with individuals with intellectual and 
developmental disabilities (see Cannella, O’Reilly, & Lancioni, 2005 for a review), research in 
OBM has only just started to evaluate methods for identifying reinforcers in the workplace. 
Rate of reinforcement. Lastly, rate of reinforcement refers to the number of reinforcers 
per unit of time (DiGennaro Reed et al., 2015). Because rate of reinforcement is influenced by 
the schedule of reinforcement, investigations of reinforcement schedules involving incentives 
may provide insight to the effects of reinforcement rate on work-related behavior. Features of the 
organizational setting make it challenging to experimentally investigate this dimension despite 
its relevance to leaders and employees. For example, restrictions associated with how often 
reinforcement can be delivered in an organization—payroll processing, duration of job 
responsibilities for which reinforcement is contingent—constrain the strategic use of 
reinforcement schedules. Unfortunately, response alternatives unrelated to job responsibilities 
may provide higher rates of reinforcement for off-task behavior (e.g., engaging social media 
several times during a work day). These and other variables emphasize the importance of 
identifying ways to maximize the effects of other reinforcer dimensions (e.g., probability, delay) 




The wealth of basic behavioral research demonstrates that variations in reinforcer 
dimensions modulate reinforcer efficacy. Much of the research, however, has been conducted 
with non-human animals in highly controlled settings using choice procedures in which an 
animal responds to two concurrent alternatives. The workplace is replete with innumerable 
contingencies associated with consequences that vary asymmetrically in terms of the dimensions 
reviewed in the preceding discussion. Moreover, reinforcer efficacy is modulated by the context 
and concurrent response options. Therefore, it is important for incentive efficacy that reinforcers 
are delivered in a way that effectively competes with alternative sources of reinforcement 
available in the workplace. The translation of basic literature to inform an understanding of 
dimensions influencing reinforcer efficacy and performance in organizations is vital for the 
effective use of incentives.  
Reinforcer Dimensions and OBM 
As part of a comprehensive review of the literature (Appendix A), I identified 75 
experimental studies that evaluated the effects of incentives on work behavior.1 Seven studies, 
discussed previously, compared the effects of different schedules of reinforcement (i.e., rate; 
Berger et al., 1975; Latham & Dossett, 1978; Pritchard et al., 1976; Saari & Latham, 1982; Yukl 
& Latham, 1975; Yukl et al., 1976; Yukl et al., 1972). One study evaluated the effects of two 
probabilistic arrangements (Evans, Kienast, & Mitchell, 1988). No studies examined reinforcer 
magnitude, reinforcer quality, or response effort. Therefore, outside of evaluations of 
reinforcement schedules, only one published study has systematically manipulated and directly 
evaluated the effects of varied features of reinforcer dimensions on work performance (i.e., 
                                                
1 Although researchers in the field of industrial-organizational psychology frequently study incentives, much of this 
research is correlational in nature and—despite being identified in the early stages of the literature review—did not 
meet the inclusionary criterion outlined in Appendix A requiring that researchers manipulate a reinforcer dimension.  
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Evans et al., 1988). Evans and colleagues evaluated the effects of two probabilistic incentive 
arrangements on performance of 18 automobile service mechanics across two dealerships. For 
each service repair, the experimenters measured the difference between standard repair duration 
indicated in the automobiles’ service manual and observed participant repair time, referred to as 
time saved. Following a baseline period in which service mechanics earned hourly pay only, the 
experimenters implemented one of two incentive arrangements for eight weeks. In both incentive 
arrangements, participants could draw a token for every hour of time saved during the previous 
workday. Drawings occurred every morning. Tokens were worth zero, one, two, or five 
Washington State Lottery Tickets. In the first arrangement, 100% of tokens were worth at least 
one lottery ticket delivered immediately. In the second arrangement, only 10% of tokens resulted 
in the receipt of at least one lottery ticket. In the second arrangement only, all tokens were 
entered into a weekly drawing for the chance to win $150 regardless of whether the participant 
received any lottery tickets. Winners of the weekly drawing were then entered into a second 
drawing for $350, conducted every four weeks in lieu of the weekly drawing. Participants could 
collect monetary earnings in the form of a check immediately after the weekly and four-week 
drawings. The authors found that both incentive systems increased performance above baseline 
(hourly pay), however, there were no differences between the two incentive arrangements.  
Despite empirically evaluating two incentive probabilities, several features of Evans et 
al.’s (1988) experiment preclude any conclusions about the influence of probability level on 
performance. First, participants in the second arrangement were entered into two additional 
drawings for which the probability of reinforcement was unknown. The additional drawings also 
differed in magnitude and delay making it difficult to isolate the effects of probability on 
performance. Moreover, the authors found that both incentive arrangements were less effective 
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as compared to seven comparison dealerships with “traditional” incentive programs and there 
were no significant differences in cost-effectiveness from baseline to intervention for either 
group or between groups. The authors failed to specify what “traditional” incentive programs 
were; thus, this comparison provides little if any new information about the effects of incentives 
on work behavior. Because Evans et al. did not provide a rationale for the reinforcer magnitude 
selected, perhaps the amount was selected arbitrarily and may have been too expensive to offset 
the savings resulting from performance improvements. If this was the case, the program may 
have been cost-effective if the authors had made decisions about the incentive system 
arrangement based on empirical evidence. Unfortunately, as previously noted, such empirical 
evidence is lacking.  
The paucity of OBM research evaluating reinforcer dimensions is concerning. 
Additionally, of the research that has manipulated and compared reinforcer dimensions, the most 
recent was conducted nearly 30 years ago (Evans et al., 1988). Although reinforcer dimensions 
received some limited interest early in OBM’s history, manipulations of reinforcer dimensions 
based on extrapolations from laboratory findings with non-humans have dwindled. 
Consequently, incentive applications arguably stand decades behind basic behavior analytic 
developments (Poling & Braatz, 2001).  
A possible explanation for the disconnect between OBM and basic behavior analytic 
research may be, broadly speaking, a function of the reinforcement history of OBM applications. 
After all, scientific behavior is subject to operant contingencies (Skinner, 1956). Poling and 
Braatz (2001) argue OBM interventions are often “without fine-grained analysis of the variables 
controlling behavior… or of the behavioral mechanism through which an intervention works” 
(pp. 44-45). Despite this observation, OBM interventions have produced desired changes in 
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performance on an assortment of socially important behaviors, irrespective of the procedure 
used. Poling and Braatz further submit that the effectiveness of such “crude” applications was 
likely possible because many procedures and contingencies operating in organizations were 
arranged by organizational leaders who have limited knowledge of controlling variables. As a 
result, it is “not terribly difficult for a behavioral technician to make reasonable suggestions for 
improvement” (p. 45) based on a knowledge of operant behavior and contingencies—even 
without an understanding of the function of target behavior or a proposed intervention. It is 
therefore conceivable that the disconnect between basic research findings and OBM is partly 
attributable to early researchers having contacted punishment when extrapolating from basic 
non-human animal findings (as evidenced by the incongruous findings of evaluations of 
reinforcement schedules) but contacted reinforcement for implementing interventions not 
directly derived from the basic behavioral literature. Poling and Braatz caution that the 
challenges associated with keeping up with competition and managing expenses in a tough 
economic climate will in turn demand a higher level of analysis for understanding, predicting, 
and managing employee behavior.  
Considering the incentive literature is insufficient to guide data-based decisions when 
organizational leaders are tasked with designing a system, perhaps the contingencies operating in 
many workplaces no longer support haphazardly selecting the reinforcer type, magnitude, rate, or 
probability, providing a possible explanation for the lack of incentive use in organizations. 
Incentives may be more popular—and possibly more effective—if the extant literature better 
guided leaders on the successful application of incentives. To remain relevant and advance the 
field, OBM researchers must identify and apply techniques that allow for greater precision in the 
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prediction and control of employee behavior. Fortunately, such a method may already exist in the 
basic behavioral literature.  
Quantitative Analyses  
Over the last several decades, basic behavioral research has developed and popularized 
techniques that use mathematical and statistical modeling (i.e., quantitative analyses; Nevin, 
2008). Quantitative analyses in the basic literature frequently include matching (e.g., Baum, 
1979), discounting (e.g., Bickel, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, Koffarnus, & Gatchalian, 2012), 
behavioral momentum (e.g., Nevin, 1988), and demand (e.g., Hursh & Silberberg, 2008). One 
important advantage of quantitative analyses is that they measure higher-order dependent 
variables that capture changes in behavior among varied situations; a feature that may be 
advantageous in applied settings in which numerous variables may differ between any two 
instances of a given behavior (Critchfield & Reed, 2009). Quantitative analyses also allow for 
more nuanced measurement and prediction of the direction and degree of behavior change. This 
advantage is particularly relevant because organizational viability depends on employee 
performance and the careful and appropriate allocation of resources. Therefore, a priori 
understanding of the costs and benefits of an intervention is critical to organizational success. 
Researchers have successfully applied quantitative analyses in organizations (e.g., Manevska-
Tasevsk, Hansson, & Labajova, 2016; Moncrief, Hoverstad, & Lucas, 1989), however, they are 
relatively underexplored in OBM. Behavior analytic researchers have investigated the utility of 
quantitative models in other applied areas such as with individuals with intellectual and 
developmental disabilities (e.g., Neef, Shade, & Miller, 1994; Waltz & Follette, 2009) and 
athletic performance (e.g., Reed, Critchfield, & Martens, 2006). The translation of novel 
quantitative analyses for evaluating staff performance and reinforcer efficacy in organizational 
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settings may serve to facilitate scientific progress and stimulate research to improve application 
technology ultimately advancing the field of OBM. 
Behavioral economics. Behavioral economics is a specialized sub-field within behavior 
analysis that seeks to understand and improve the human condition by blending and applying 
principles from microeconomics with behavioral science (Hursh, 1980). Behavioral economics 
consists largely of two major quantitative models, discounting and demand, both of which have 
been suggested for use in OBM.  
Discounting. Discounting describes a pattern of responding in which contextual factors 
associated with a reinforcer reduce its value (Reed, Niileksela, & Kaplan, 2013). Research has 
most commonly assessed discounting within the context of reinforcer delay (see Madden & 
Bickel, 2010 for a comprehensive review). Although less common, researchers have also focused 
on discounting of other contextual factors and behaviors such as probabilistic outcomes and 
sexual behavior (Johnson & Bruner, 2012; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991). Higher rates of 
delay discounting have been associated with numerous maladaptive behaviors of social 
significance including obesity, drug abuse, gambling, and risky sexual behavior (Bickel et al., 
2012). Although researchers have evaluated discounting with non-human animals using actual 
reinforcers, most preparations for evaluating discounting with humans rely on hypothetical 
procedures (Odum, 2011). In a typical delay discounting experimental preparation with humans, 
participants are presented with a series of choices between two alternatives that vary along the 
contextual feature of interest (e.g., delay). For example, participants may be asked to choose 
between the receipt of $100 now or $200 in one year. Over successive presentations the amount 
and/or delay are manipulated until researchers identify the point at which the two alternatives are 
subjectively equivalent, referred to as an indifference point. Indifference points can then be used 
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to obtain the rate at which an individual subjectively discounts the value of a delayed outcome. 
Despite a reliance on hypothetical questionnaires, research evaluating the correspondence 
between responding to procedures using hypothetical and real reinforcers suggests the degree of 
discounting is similar across methods (Odum, 2011). 
Discounting and OBM. Many of the contextual variables assessed in discounting, such as 
delay and probability, may influence behavior in the workplace. Although discounting has 
implications for OBM, research in this area is sparse. In one interesting application to work 
behavior, Sigurdsson, Taylor, and Wirth (2013) evaluated the relation between discounting of 
risk and effort in occupational settings to understand safety-related decision-making using a 
hypothetical task with undergraduate participants. The hypothetical scenario described a job in 
which participants were working on the roof of a building. Across a series of questions, 
participants selected in which of two situations they would be more likely to wear safety 
equipment. Based on participant selections, the distance from the roof to the ground and the time 
needed to put on a safety harness was adjusted. The authors found that increased effort 
associated with engaging in safety behavior contributes to riskier decision-making. Specifically, 
participants discounted the risk associated with working at a given height as the effort to engage 
in safe behavior increased. Research has also begun to evaluate discounting of the availability of 
alternative off-task activities in the workplace such as cell phone use (e.g., Hirst & DiGennaro 
Reed, 2016). Findings of initial discounting investigations make a compelling case for continued 
scholarly attention in this area. Choice, as assessed via discounting, undoubtedly plays an 
important role in work behavior and it is possible that measures of delay discounting correlate 
with other behaviors of interest to the organization.  
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Demand. Although others had suggested the utility of economic demand theory for 
behavior analysis (e.g., Lea, 1978), the use of demand curve analyses in behavioral economics 
was more formally introduced by Hursh in the early 1980s (1980, 1984). Demand curve analyses 
are predicated on one of the most fundamental economic concepts, the law of demand, which 
states that as the price of a commodity increases consumption of that commodity decreases 
(Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1985). A demand curve graphically depicts the relation between 
consumption and price by plotting changes in consumption across a range of increasing prices—
on the y- and x-axes, respectively (Figure 1). Demand curve analyses then, quantify the 
sensitivity of consumption to increases in price for a given commodity. Hursh noted overlap 
between economic and behavior analytic concepts and subsequently operationalized economic 
terminology for use within a behavior analytic framework. In the case of behavior analysis, a 
commodity refers to a reinforcer. Because reinforcers encompass edible (e.g., food), inedible 
(e.g., stickers, fuel), and even intangible goods (e.g., attention), consumption can refer to the 
amount (in terms of quantity or duration of access) of the commodity obtained or consumed for a 
given unit of time (i.e., rate of reinforcement). Price is the combined cost and benefit of a 
commodity wherein cost is an environmental constraint imposed on obtaining a commodity and 
benefit is the amount of commodity available at a given cost. Price can refer to a variety of 
environmental constraints such as effort, time, or money required to produce a reinforcer, delay 
to reinforcement, and others. Price is often used interchangeably with unit price which is a cost-
benefit ratio. Demand curve analyses have received considerable attention in the literature and 
behavior analysts have successfully used them to evaluate a wide range of commodities with 
diverse populations (for a review see Reed, Kaplan, & Becirevic, 2015). 
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Several features of demand curves—illustrated in Figure 1—are worthy of note. First, 
demand intensity is equal to the level of consumption when the commodity is available for free 
or at a near-free price. Intensity is the maximum level of demand, or the level of consumption the 
organism behaves to defend as price increases. Breakpoint is the highest price the organism will 
tolerate to access the commodity. In accordance with the law of demand, consumption decreases 
as price increases along the x-axis such that demand curves necessarily slope downward; the 
slope is therefore always negative. Elasticity is an index describing the degree to which 
consumption is sensitive to increases in price (Hursh, 1984). When the curve is inelastic, 
consumption declines slowly with increases in price, meaning the organism increases 
expenditure to access an equal or similar rate of consumption. Specifically, when demand is 
inelastic, a 1% increase in price results in a less than 1% decrease in consumption, resulting in a 
slope greater than -1. However, because (according to the law of demand) consumption does not 
increase with price increases, the slope of the inelastic portion of the curve, although greater than 
-1, should theoretically also be less than zero. Unit elasticity is the point at which the curve shifts 
from inelastic to elastic. At this point, a 1% increase in price is met with exactly a 1% decrease 
in consumption, resulting in a slope equal to -1. At prices higher than the point of unit elasticity, 
the curve becomes elastic wherein price increases result in a greater than 1% decrease in 
consumption with a 1% increase in price and the slope is less than -1. Lastly, demand curves are 
plotted in log-log coordinates to facilitate visual inspection of the proportional changes in 
consumption and price (Hursh, Madden, Spiga, DeLeon, & Francisco, 2013).  
Factors influencing elasticity. Several variables have been found to modulate demand 
elasticity, including economy type, the availability of substitutes and complements, the species 
of the consumer, and the type of commodity (Hursh, 1984). Economy type ranges along a 
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continuum from open to closed (Hursh, 1984). In an open economy, an organism has some 
degree of access to the target commodity outside of the experimental or target environment. 
Access may be concurrent or delayed, such as post-session feeding to maintain the organism at 
80% of free-feeding weight. In a closed economy, access to the commodity is restricted to the 
environment being studied and all reinforcers in the experimental setting are earned (i.e., 
contingent on behavior). All else being equal, research generally suggests demand is more elastic 
in an open economy than in a closed economy. Manipulations of economy type may have 
important applications outside of the laboratory (e.g., animal training, treatment of problem 
behavior). Johnson, Mawhinney, and Redmon (2001) suggest the effects of economy type may 
be an important variable of interest for future OBM research. For example, piece-rate pay 
systems in which employees earn a fixed monetary incentive for each pre-specified unit of work 
completed may closely approximate a closed economy. However, the economy type may not be 
exclusively closed as employees could still have access to outside sources of income such as that 
of a spouse or from a second job. A pay system in which compensation is relatively less 
dependent on actual work output (e.g., hourly or salaried pay) may be more analogous to an open 
economy. A reasonable postulation is that pay arrangements in which employees earn a 
proportion of pay through contingent incentives are effective because they shift the economy 
type towards the closed end of the continuum. Presently, however, the influence of economy 
type on behavior in organizations remains to be explored.  
Another variable influencing demand elasticity that has implications for the workplace is 
the availability of other reinforcers. The relation between two reinforcers varies along a 
continuum between perfect substitutes and complementary reinforcers, with partial substitutes 
and independent reinforcers falling intermediary. Substitutable reinforcers are functionally 
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similar stimuli that individuals will readily consume interchangeably. For example, a gift card 
may function as a partial substitute for a cash incentive of equal value. When substitutable 
reinforcers are available concurrently or delayed, consumption decreases and elasticity increases 
regardless of whether the alternative reinforcer is a perfect or partial substitute; although perfect 
substitutes influence consumption and elasticity of the target commodity to a greater extent than 
partial substitutes (Hursh, 1980). Independent reinforcers are functionally unrelated and do not 
influence elasticity. Complementary reinforcers are those that are typically consumed together. 
In contrast with substitutes, concurrently available complementary reinforcers increase demand. 
That is, the efficacy of a reinforcer decreases when the complement is unavailable or price is too 
high (e.g., music and headphones in a shared office space). 
 Linear elasticity model. Since the introduction of demand curve analyses to operant 
behavior, several equations have been proposed to quantify elasticity. In 1989, Hursh, Raslear, 
Bauman, and Black introduced the first widely used equation, the linear elasticity model of 
demand: 
ln	 ln	 ln	    Equation 1 
where Q is the quantity consumed, L is the level of consumption when the commodity is free or a 
near-zero price (i.e., intensity), b is the slope of the demand curve after an imperceptibly small 
increase in price from a zero level price, P is price, and a is a coefficient. Though providing an 
indispensable first step towards a quantitative analysis of reinforcer efficacy, the linear equation 
relies on two parameters to model demand (i.e., a and b). If, as Hursh (1980) proposes, reinforcer 
efficacy is captured in the rate of change in elasticity as price increases, a model that 
incorporates multiple parameters obviates a single molar metric of reinforcer effectiveness. 
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Instead, Hursh et al. (1989) provided an equation to solve for elasticity at specific price points, a 
relatively more molecular measure of efficacy:  
	     Equation 2 
Equation 2 could also be used to derive the price at which consumption shifts from inelastic to 
elastic, by setting elasticity to the point of unit elasticity (i.e., -1), which Hursh et al. refer to as 
Pmax. Although Pmax is not a measure of overall elasticity, its identification allows researchers to 
classify demand at prices lower and higher than Pmax as inelastic and elastic, respectively, which 
has value.  
Exponential demand equation. In 2008, Hursh and Silberberg modified the demand 
equation to include a single quantitative measure of an organism’s defense of consumption. The 
exponential model is as follows:  
log log e ⋅ 1    Equation 3 
where Q is consumption and C is cost. Similar to the L parameter in the linear elasticity model, 
Q0 is equal to consumption when the price is free or near-free (i.e., intensity), and k is the scaling 
constant equal to the range of consumption in log units. Hursh and Silberberg recommend setting 
k to a common constant value to facilitate comparisons between or among commodities. Lastly, 
alpha (α) is a rate constant equal to the rate in change in elasticity across the entire range in 
prices. Alpha is inversely related to reinforcer efficacy; larger α values reflect steeper (i.e., more 
elastic) demand curves. Therefore, the equation allows for an evaluation of reinforcer efficacy 
using a single parameter. Additionally, by placing Q0 and C in the exponent, the exponential 
equation controls for scalar differences of a reinforcer by standardizing the cost of obtaining 
baseline levels of reinforcer consumption (Q0). Although other models have been suggested (e.g., 
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Koffarnus, Franck, Stein, & Bickel, 2015), the exponential equation is generally accepted as the 
contemporary standard model of demand.  
Several other indices of demand may be derived from α including essential value (EV), 
Pmax, and Omax. Essential value is a quantitative index of the relative reinforcing efficacy of the 
commodity calculated using the following equation (Hursh, 2014): 
⋅ ⋅ .
      Equation 4 
Essential value may be a more intuitive metric because, unlike α, EV is directly related to 
reinforcer efficacy. That is, larger EVs indicate relatively greater reinforcing efficacy. Pmax is 
also directly proportional to reinforcer efficacy and represents the point of unit elasticity, or the 
highest price participants will tolerate before the curve becomes elastic and consumption 
declines markedly. When derived using α, Pmax is calculated using the following equation 
introduced by Hursh in 2014:  
	
⋅ ⋅ .
 , where  = 0.083k + 0.65.    Equation 5 
Pmax is also the point at which expenditure or responding is greatest, referred to as Omax, which is 
equal to the product of Pmax and predicted consumption at Pmax. Omax is plotted on the work 
function (also referred to as an expenditure curve); a graphic depiction of how expenditure, 
rather than consumption, changes as a function of price. Expenditure is calculated by deriving 
the product of consumption and price. The general shape of the work function is that of an 
inverted U with expenditure increasing along the left limb until peak expenditure at Omax, 
followed by a decline along the right limb of the curve. Regardless of the equation used, research 
has consistently demonstrated a robust relation between consumption and price with a wide 
range of commodities and populations (Reed et al., 2015). 
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It is important to note that, in addition to the derived measures just described, Pmax and 
Omax can be determined empirically (i.e., observed). This can be accomplished by creating an 
expenditure curve and finding the maximum output value (Omax) and its associated price (Pmax). 
Obtaining these parameters empirically may have particular value because they can be 
determined without the need for nonlinear regression. Individuals wishing to use demand 
analyses for applied purposes in real world settings may not have the resources to purchase 
software or employ an individual capable of performing complex nonlinear regression 
techniques. Murphy and MacKillop (2006) have found a high correlation between empirical and 
derived measures for Omax and Pmax. However, they suggest the empirical parameters are more 
reliable than their derived counterparts (MacKillop & Murphy, 2007). The latter statement was 
unfortunately based on unpublished data and it is not clear what factors may be compromising 
the reliability of derived metrics. Given the applied value of obtaining these measures without 
the need for nonlinear regression, continued evaluation of the relation between observed and 
derived demand parameters is a worthwhile endeavor.  
 Application of demand curve analyses. Although much of the behavioral economic 
demand research has been conducted in highly controlled laboratory settings (Hursh & 
Silberberg, 2008), demand analyses may have important practical utility in applied settings. For 
example, determining the degree to which responding is sensitive to price increases for a range 
of commodities may help practitioners select the reinforcer that is likely to produce persistent 
responding. In fact, researchers have effectively used demand curve analyses to inform complex 
issues of societal concern including assessments of the abuse liability of drugs (e.g., Hursh, 
Galuska, Winger, & Woods, 2005), responsiveness to treatment for addiction (Bickel, Johnson, 
Koffarnus, MacKillop, & Murphy, 2014), and the relative efficacy of therapeutic reinforcers 
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(Roane, Lerman, & Vorndran, 2001). The benefit of demand curve analyses to inform applied 
issues of social significance is rarely disputed. However, there have been noted concerns 
regarding the viability of assessing demand in applied settings (e.g., Hursh et al., 2013). 
Generating the data needed for a full demand curve requires exposing an organism to long 
sessions at several prices in which an organism may consume large quantities of a commodity. 
This experimental arrangement may have negative outcomes depending on the applied context, 
target problem, and commodity. For example, when working with individuals with intellectual or 
developmental disabilities, time spent assessing consumption may delay treatment or reduce time 
spent engaging in educational activities. Additionally, the extensive financial (e.g., cost of 
commodity or equipment) and time (e.g., staff to conduct sessions) resources necessary to carry 
out such a study further limits the feasibility. Researchers examining the effects of addictive and 
illicit substances have raised similar concerns (Jacobs & Bickel, 1999). Providing long-duration 
access to an illegal drug at a nominal price to individuals who abuse substances raises obvious 
ethical concerns.   
Though the possible outcomes may not be as grave, similar logistical and ethical 
restrictions in the workplace may preclude a researcher’s ability to generate demand curves in a 
real organization. First, as it is, OBM researchers often battle financial pressures from 
organizations. Researchers may experience considerable difficulty convincing organizational 
leaders that the information gained from a demand analysis justifies the needed resources to 
conduct the analysis. In addition, common workplace reinforcers may complicate demand curve 
analyses. For example, employees are unlikely to satiate even over long duration sessions (an 
important feature for analysis; Hursh et al., 2013) when the commodity of interest is a monetary 
incentive. It may also be difficult to measure repeated instances of consumption for a number of 
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non-monetary incentives (e.g., access to a preferred parking spot). Importantly, to measure 
changes in consumption, researchers would need to systematically increase the work requirement 
necessary to access an incentive. Even if a researcher identified an organization in which labor 
laws, unions, or employee contracts permitted such manipulations of compensation, it is easy to 
imagine the employee reprisal this analysis might cause. Clearly, it is ethically questionable to 
impose such conditions on employees. The difficulty assessing demand in applied contexts—
despite undeniable utility—does not obviate the need for demand analyses but instead raises 
methodological questions about effective, practical, and resource-efficient methods for making 
use of a model with wide-reaching benefits (Jacobs & Bickel, 1999).  
Hypothetical purchase tasks. In light of the aforementioned ethical and practical 
constraints associated with experiential preparations, hypothetical purchase tasks (HPT) were 
proposed to efficiently assess reinforcer demand without the need for individuals to experience 
the outcomes (Jacobs & Bickel, 1999). Hypothetical purchase tasks are a simulation procedure 
for assessing demand in which researchers provide individuals with a vignette describing the 
commodity of interest and the context under which purchases and consumption are to take place. 
Participants then report an estimation of the amount of the commodity they would consume 
across increasing prices. Prices commonly range from free or near-free prices (demand intensity; 
Q0) to prices that are sufficiently high to suppress an individual’s demand for the commodity to 
zero, thus allowing for evaluation of changes in consumption across a broad array of prices. 
Additionally, the information described in the vignette can be used to control for extraneous 
factors (e.g., deprivation, income, economy type) providing researchers access to variables that 
are often difficult to manipulate or control in applied contexts.  
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In a seminal HPT study, Jacobs and Bickel (1999) evaluated self-report consumption 
patterns of heroin and cigarettes with 17 opioid-dependent participants. The contextual features 
in the vignette indicated that (a) there were no legal consequences for using heroin, (b) 
participants were not currently in treatment, (c) participants had no access to other drugs, and (d) 
any purchases had to be used by participants alone within a 24-hour period. The purchase tasks 
asked participants to report the number of bags of heroin or cigarettes they would hypothetically 
purchase across 15 prices ranging from $0.01 to $1,120. The authors found demand for heroin 
was more inelastic than demand for cigarettes. Consistent with previous human operant studies 
using real consequences, the demand curves were a positively decelerating function of price and 
were well accounted for by the linear elasticity model and later the exponential model of demand 
when Hursh and Silberberg (2008) reanalyzed the data. The method Jacobs and Bickel used 
provided valuable insight to purchasing and consumption patterns in a time- and cost-efficient 
manner. The finding that elasticity varied in expected ways—with higher demand for heroin 
given its greater abuse liability as compared to cigarettes—provides some initial, albeit limited, 
evidence of the validity of the HPT despite the hypothetical nature of the data. Similar results 
with HPTs have been obtained with other drug reinforcers including alcohol (e.g., Murphy & 
MacKillop, 2006), cocaine (e.g., Bruner & Johnson, 2014), and marijuana (e.g., Collins, Vincent, 
Yu, Liu, & Epstein, 2014). Hypothetical purchase tasks therefore provide insight to questions 
that may be difficult or even unanswerable using traditional operant techniques.  
Although much of the research has focused on illicit and addictive substances, 
researchers are beginning to examine the utility of HPTs with non-drug reinforcers including 
snack foods (Epstein, Dearing, & Roba, 2010), chocolate (Chase, MacKillop, & Hogarth, 2013), 
fuel (Reed, Partington, Kaplan, Roma, & Hursh, 2014), and luxury goods/activities (Roma, 
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Hursh, & Hudja, 2016). The numerous commodities and experimental questions that can been 
evaluated make HPTs a versatile methodology worthy of continued research interest. In addition 
to mediating the above-referenced restrictions, purchase task methodology has allowed for 
extensions and adaptations of demand preparations, thereby allowing researchers to assess a 
wider range of reinforcers and contextual factors. For example, Roma et al. evaluated 
commodities, such as refrigerators, that are typically only consumed in small and/or infrequent 
quantities. Rather than asking participants to report the number of refrigerators they would 
purchase across a range of prices, as had been done in previous purchase task preparations, 
Roma and colleagues asked participants to report probability of purchase, which extends the 
literature by providing a measure that may be more representative of a typical purchasing 
situation for certain commodities.  
Critics have argued that HPT responses are self-reports of consumption and may not 
reflect behavior that would be observed in an actual situation. A growing body of literature has 
sought to evaluate the reliability and validity of purchase task methodology as a result of this 
criticism. In one example, Madden and Kalman (2010) asked 60 smokers to complete two 
purchase tasks, one during intake and one completed after one week of treatment. Treatment 
consisted of one counseling session and one week of taking either Bupropion or a placebo. The 
HPT asked participants to report the number of cigarettes they would purchase for themselves 
alone and smoke each day at 26 prices that ranged from $0 to $1,120 per cigarette. Participants 
returned after 10 weeks of treatment to evaluate their smoking status. Despite no significant 
differences in elasticity at intake between those who did and did not quit smoking, Madden and 
Kalman found that changes in elasticity between intake and one week of treatment predicted 
treatment success, regardless of whether participants received Bupropion or the placebo. That is, 
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individuals with a greater increase in elasticity (i.e., less demand) from intake to one week of 
treatment were significantly more likely to successfully quit smoking at a 10-week follow-up. 
The results of Madden and Kalman demonstrate the predictive validity of purchase tasks. 
Researchers have demonstrated other psychometric properties of HPTs including construct 
validity (e.g., MacKillop et al., 2010), concurrent validity (e.g., Murphy & MacKillop, 2006), 
convergent validity (e.g., MacKillop et al. 2008), divergent validity (e.g., Murphy, MacKillop, 
Tidey, Brazil, & Colby, 2011), test-retest reliability (e.g., Murphy, MacKillop, Skidmore, & 
Pederson, 2009), and inter-method reliability (Reed, Kaplan, Roma, & Hursh, 2014).  
Other procedures for evaluating HPTs have examined the correspondence between 
responding on a purchase task and observed behavior (e.g., Amlung, Acker, Stojek, Murphy, & 
MacKillop, 2012). In one of the most comprehensive measures of HPT validity to date, Amlung 
and MacKillop (2015) evaluated the correspondence between self-report responses on a purchase 
task with actual consumption of alcohol during a laboratory self-administration period with 19 
heavy drinkers. The alcohol purchase task indicated participants (1) had $15 to purchase “mini” 
alcoholic beverages that were approximately half the volume of a standard drink, (2) could 
purchase a maximum of eight mini-drinks of their typical alcoholic beverage, and (3) could keep 
any money not spent on alcohol. Participants then reported their estimated consumption across 
22 prices ranging from $0.01 to $15 per drink presented in a random order. Participants 
completed two versions of the alcohol purchase task, hypothetical and incentivized. In the 
hypothetical condition, the instructions indicated participants would not receive any alcohol or 
money from their choices. The incentivized purchase task informed participants that the 
experimenter would randomly select one of their choices and provide participants with the 
quantity indicated on the purchase task during a self-administration period. Amlung and 
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MacKillop found a significant positive correlation between participant responses on the 
hypothetical and incentivized purchase tasks. Additionally, participants who received alcohol 
during the self-administration period consumed an average of 89% of provided alcohol—a 
significant positive correlation—suggesting self-report responses on the purchase task have 
strong correspondence with observed consumption.  
However, the $15 budget and maximum of eight mini-drinks is a noted limitation of 
Amlung and MacKillop (2015). For the $2, $3, $4 to $5, and $6 to $7 price points, the maximum 
possible drinks participants could purchase were seven, five, three, and two, respectively. At the 
eight prices lower than $2 and higher than $7, participants could purchase a maximum of eight 
and one drink(s), respectively. Providing a budget and capping consumption effectively 
restricted the range of drinks participants could purchase and consume at each price, thereby 
artificially forcing decreases in consumption with increases in price. Forced decreases in 
consumption resulted in elastic demand that may not represent participants’ actual demand for 
alcohol if purchases were not restricted. This limitation underscores the practical and ethical 
constraints researchers face when examining demand for addictive substances, which highlights 
the need for purchase tasks to facilitate continued experimental investigation of this important 
area of study. Regardless, the collective literature suggests HPT methodology is a promising 
method for evaluating demand. The increased feasibility of assessing demand afforded by 
purchase task methodology has opened the possibility for evaluating the utility of demand curve 
analyses in other settings, including organizations.  
Demand and OBM. Demand curve analyses applied to the organization may help identify 
the extent to which employees will work to obtain a given incentive as well as the highest price 
(or work requirement) employees are willing to complete to access that incentive. This 
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application of demand would help inform durable resource-efficient interventions capable of 
maintaining high levels of responding. Purchase task methodology may be especially well suited 
for examining reinforcer demand in the workplace to circumvent issues that may arise when 
assessing demand in applied contexts or undifferentiated responding in contrived laboratory 
workplaces. Despite recent calls from researchers in both OBM and behavioral economics 
(Hursh & Roma, 2016; Roma, Reed, DiGennaro Reed, & Hursh, 2017; Jarmolowicz, Reed, 
DiGennaro Reed, & Bickel, 2015; Johnson et al., 2001; Roma et al., 2016; Sigurdsson et al., 
2013; Wine, Gilroy, & Hantula, 2012), the generality of behavioral economic methodology and 
demand curve analyses to the organizational setting remains largely unexamined. This translation 
can lead to a greater understanding of behavior and motivation in the workplace and offer a 
unique approach for evaluating the dimensions of reinforcement to inform incentive delivery and 
ultimately address workplace challenges experienced by many organizations. Although a 
relatively new line of inquiry, several studies have begun to examine evaluations of reinforcer 
dimensions by investigating the applicability of demand curve analyses to work-related behavior.  
One of the first experiments to apply behavioral economic demand curve analyses to 
OBM evaluated the applicability of purchase task methodology to work-related behavior and 
workplace reinforcers. In a two-part study, Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Kaplan, and Reed (2016) 
used a hypothetical work task (HWT) with undergraduate participants to assess the effects of 
experience on responding and the effects of delay of monetary compensation on demand. The 
HWT, a variation of the hypothetical purchase task adapted for work behavior, described a job in 
which students were hired to pass out flyers on campus for 1 hr in exchange for $10. Similar to 
Roma and colleagues (2016), participants reported the likelihood they would distribute a given 
number of flyers across an increasing work requirement (i.e., number of flyers passed out to earn 
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pay). The first study compared responding of individuals with and without actual work 
experience distributing flyers to evaluate the influence of a pre-experimental history of engaging 
in the behavior-for-hire on responding. Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Kaplan et al. found no 
difference in demand at the group or the individual level suggesting individuals without formal 
experience completing the work task responded comparably despite not having directly 
contacted the contingencies under investigation.  
In the second study, participants completed two variations of the HWT that differed only 
in the duration to payment. The short delay condition indicated participants would receive 
payment immediately after working and the long delay condition indicated payment would be 
delayed by four weeks. Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Kaplan et al. (2016) found a statistically 
significant difference in demand at the group and individual levels, with higher demand for the 
short delay condition. At the group level, the difference in the amount of work completed at Pmax 
was equal to a 45% increase in the number of flyers participants would be willing to distribute 
when compensation was delayed by 1 hr as compared to 4 weeks. In both studies, distribution 
likelihood was a positively decelerating function of the work requirement and the exponential 
demand equation provided an excellent fit to the data (minimum R2 values of .94). Adequacy of 
the model fit in combination with the finding that contextual variables in the HWT vignette (i.e., 
delay) modulated participant responding in ways that are consistent with previous research on 
delay of reinforcement (e.g., Grace, Schwendiman, & Nevin, 1998; Hursh & Fantino, 1973; 
Woolverton & Anderson, 2006) suggests that demand analyses using hypothetical procedures 
have merit in evaluations of reinforcer efficacy in the workplace.  
Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Kaplan et al. (2016) discuss several areas in which demand 
analyses may have utility in OBM. For example, they note that the HWT could serve as a novel 
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method for assessing employee preference for incentives. Moreover, Pmax may help 
organizational leaders identify appropriate employee goals and work requirements because it 
specifies the highest work requirement that employees will tolerate before performance rapidly 
declines. The external validity of these findings is limited, however, because participants were 
not employees and did not experience the outcomes of the study. Therefore, questions regarding 
the correspondence of responding on the HWT to actual behavior remain unanswered. Because 
of the difficulties assessing demand for workplace reinforcers in applied contexts and arranging 
laboratory settings that simulate complexities of the workplace (Oah & Lee, 2011), it may be 
necessary to identify an alternative setting that allows for the manipulation of reinforcers and 
better simulates the organizational environment to examine the predictive validity of the HWT.  
In an attempt to identify a novel solution for conducting OBM research, Henley, 
DiGennaro Reed, Reed, and Kaplan (2016) used Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.mTurk.com) 
to extend their evaluation of demand curve analyses to work-related behavior. Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (mTurk) is an online crowdsourcing site in which requesters post brief 
computer-mediated tasks (referred to as Human Intelligence Tasks or HITs) to the online 
platform for individuals (referred to as Workers) to complete in exchange for monetary 
compensation. Several features render mTurk propitious for OBM research. First, because 
“employers” are requesters posting HITs, the requester (i.e., researcher) functionally serves as 
the employer. Therefore, researchers do not need to compromise experimental control as a result 
of financial pressures from an organization to improve performance or concerns about how 
manipulations may influence productivity and profit. Amazon Mechanical Turk has fewer 
restrictions with respect to manipulating pay that may allow researchers to answer questions that 
may be unethical in the workplace when adopting a demand assay. This flexibility is possible in 
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part because participant’s livelihood is not dependent on a single work task, Workers choose 
which HITs to complete and can discontinue at any time to begin another paid HIT in a matter of 
seconds; in the workplace employees cannot easily change jobs without considerable burden 
(e.g., searching and interviewing). Next, Workers complete HITs in the “natural” environment. 
Regardless of location—mTurk Workers can complete HITs while sitting in a coffee shop, in a 
home office, or in an airport terminal—there are undoubtedly alternative sources of 
reinforcement that compete with performance on the work task similar to traditional work 
environments. Finally, the several hundred thousand mTurk Workers boast unprecedented 
geographic and demographic diversity when compared to typical university-based populations 
used in laboratory OBM research (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). Presumably, mTurk Workers 
have longer and more varied work histories and may be more representative of the American 
workforce. These collective attributes may provide a beneficial balance between the pros and 
cons of applied and laboratory OBM research settings and render mTurk well-suited for OBM 
research, a hypothesis Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Reed et al. (2016) explored.  
To this end, Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Reed, et al. (2016) used a novel experiential 
procedure to evaluate the effects of two incentive magnitudes on performance using a between 
groups design. To accomplish this aim, the authors integrated a human operant preparation, in 
which participants expended effort in exchange for monetary incentives, into a computerized 
format for use with mTurk Workers. The simulated work consisted of a match to sample task. 
Participants were asked if they would like to complete a given work requirement in exchange for 
a monetary incentive across a progressively increasing response requirement ranging from one to 
256 work tasks. Participants then completed the ratio if they selected yes, or exited the survey if 
they selected no. Completion of each ratio resulted in a fixed monetary incentive in which half of 
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the participants had the opportunity to earn $0.05 per ratio requirement completed and the other 
half could earn $0.10 for each ratio completed. This method differed from traditional demand 
analyses in several ways. First, responding at each price was dichotomous. Participants either did 
or did not complete the ratio, as compared to measuring the quantity consumed or probability of 
consumption at each price. Additionally, participants experienced each ratio requirement just 
once. Third, because these experimental features precluded demand curve analyses of individual 
performance, the authors translated a market percent consumption approach (Greenwald & 
Hursh, 2006) and the Kaplan-Meier estimate of survival (Kaplan & Meier, 1958) to convert 
individual dichotomous choices at each price into a group level demand curve. Henley, 
DiGennaro Reed, Reed et al. found a significant difference in elasticity with greater inelasticity 
in the smaller magnitude. Although participants completed slightly more work in the $0.10 
condition, participants in the $0.05 condition completed more work per penny, suggesting the 
smaller magnitude was a more efficient use of resources.  
The results of Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Reed et al. (2016) demonstrate responding is 
sensitive to incentive amount, revealing that magnitude is an important reinforcer dimension 
deserving of consideration for effective incentive delivery for which no guidelines currently 
exist. Additionally, mTurk proved to be a promising platform for OBM research. Henley, 
DiGennaro Reed, Reed et al.’s experimental preparation provides a possible method for 
evaluating the correspondence between self-report responses on a HWT and actual behavior, an 
important research area noted in previous work by these authors (Henley, DiGennaro Reed, 
Kaplan et al., 2016). Two limitations are worthy of note. First, the authors examined a limited 
range of incentive magnitudes. Next, Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Reed et al. only evaluated the 
quantity of work participants completed. Many work settings rely on several important 
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performance indices, such as accuracy. Because the simulated work task required participants to 
respond correctly to progress through the ratio requirements the extent to which reinforcer 
magnitude influences other performance indices is unknown.  
Purpose 
A greater understanding of the relative efficacy of reinforcer dimensions and how 
parametric manipulations of their values differentially influence performance could lead to 
effective strategies for predicting and managing employee behavior. Moreover, a method for 
quantifying the relation between reinforcer dimensions and performance may provide greater 
precision to guide behavior change strategies. Therefore, the present studies served to extend the 
prevailing literature applying behavioral economic demand curve analyses in two ways. First, 
these studies evaluated the effects of parametric manipulations of reinforcer dimensions on 
performance. Second, they evaluated the predictive validity of the HWT. These aims were 
investigated using a crowdsourced human operant procedure adapted from Henley, DiGennaro 
Reed, Reed et al. (2016). Experiment 1 replicated and extended Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Reed 
et al.’s findings by examining the effects of three incentive magnitudes ($0.05, $0.10, and $0.20) 
and incorporating a HWT to evaluate the correspondence between self-report responses on the 
HWT and observed responding on the experiential procedure. Using a similar experimental 
preparation, Experiments 2 and 3 examined the effects of three parametric values of reinforcer 
probability (90%, 50%, and 10% probability of earning incentives) and delay (incentive receipt 
following 1, 14, and 28 days). Additionally, all three experiments employed an adapted version 
of the simulated work task to allow for evaluations of the accuracy with which participants 




Experiment 1: Reinforcer Magnitude  
Method 
Participants. To recruit participants, I posted three HITs to the mTurk platform 
containing inclusion criteria, a brief description of the study, compensation amount, instructions 
for receiving compensation, and a link to the study. The HITs, featured in Appendix B, contained 
identical study descriptions but each HIT presented a unique survey URL corresponding to one 
of three conditions assessed. I required Workers to meet four criteria for inclusion: (1) reside in 
the United States, (2) have greater than 1,000 previously approved HITs, (3) have a 95% or 
above approval rate on completed HITs, and (4) submit a unique access code within 3 hr of 
selecting the survey link. The HIT informed Workers they would receive $0.25 for participation 
and involved an academic survey about monetary rewards, which was created using Qualtrics 
Research Suite® (http://www.qualtrics.com). Note “survey” in this context refers to the various 
activities comprising the experimental preparation hosted by an online survey software program. 
Lastly, the HIT instructed Workers to enter a unique access code into the textbox below the 
survey link following survey completion to receive compensation. The survey generated and 
displayed the unique 17-character alpha-numeric access code. After selecting the link, the survey 
presented Workers with an information statement. Workers who agreed to participate and 
submitted an access code to the HIT within 3 hr served as participants.  
A total of 324 unique access codes were submitted. For Workers who completed the 
study more than once, I retained the first attempt completed by a participant. As a result, I 
excluded 35 responses ($0.05 condition = 6; $0.10 condition = 8; $0.20 condition = 21); 289 
participants remained and served as participants. Participant ages ranged between 20 and 72 (M 
= 36, SD = 11.6) and were primarily Caucasian (n = 243, 84.1%). Participants indicated living in 
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43 of the 52 states and territories with the highest concentration of participants residing in 
California (n = 26, 9.0%), Pennsylvania (n = 25, 8.7%), and Texas (n = 23, 8.0%). Half of the 
participant sample was female (n = 146, 50.5%). Participants reported a wide range of education 
and income levels; a four-year college degree (n = 115, 38.9%) and an annual household income 
of less than $30,000 (n = 90, 31.1%) had the highest frequency. For participants who indicated 
having a disability, a physical disability was reported with the highest frequency (n = 18, 6.2%). 
When asked to indicate if they are currently or have ever been a smoker, more than half of 
participants reported “No – Never” (n = 158, 54.7%) and 25% of participants indicated “Yes – 
Previously.” Table 1 summarizes participant demographic variables, separated by condition, in 
more detail.  
Simulated work task. The present study adapted the simulated work task used by 
Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Reed et al. (2016), illustrated in Appendix C. Specifically, the work 
task contained a visual analog scale that displayed a number line ranging from -100 to 100. The 
scale contained 11 evenly spaced labels designating the numerical values along the scale. The 
manipulandum default start position was always zero (i.e., centered on the scale). For each work 
task, the survey displayed a target value on the far-left side of the scale. As participants moved 
the manipulandum, the survey displayed a second value located to the far right of the scale, 
opposite the target value. This second value represented the integer at which the manipulandum 
was located on the scale. Participants were instructed to move a manipulandum along the scale to 
match the value on the right side of the visual analog scale with the target value on the left. The 
work task was referred to as a “slider question” in the instructions to participants. A single slider 
question is hereafter referred to as a work unit.  
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The work task also included a progressive ratio (PR) schedule in which the ratio 
requirement increased after the delivery of each reinforcer (Hodos, 1961). The PR schedule 
contained the following 15 ratio requirements: 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 32, 48, 64, 96, 128, 
and 256 work units presented in an ascending order. To select target values, I first generated a 
list of random values for each ratio requirement using Microsoft Excel’s (2013) random between 
function, which populates selected cells with random integers between a specified upper and 
lower boundary, in this case between -100 and 100. Next, I removed target values equal to the 
manipulandum start point (i.e., zero). The remaining target values were adjusted such that for 
each ratio requirement, the target values equaled zero when summed to equate effort across 
ratios. This summation was not possible for the first ratio requirement or the practice trial, each 
of which contained only one work unit. As a result, the first ratio requirement and practice trial 
values equaled zero when summed. Therefore, target values were selected in a pseudorandom 
fashion. 
The survey required participants to provide a response for each work unit in the ratio. If 
participants selected the “next” button without moving the manipulandum from the start point, 
the survey displayed the error message, “Please answer this question” in red text above the 
unanswered work unit. However, the survey did not require responses to be accurate. That is, 
participants could continue to the next work unit as long as they provided a response, regardless 
of the correspondence between the response and target value.  
Experimental conditions. Using a between-groups design, I evaluated the effects of 
three incentive magnitudes on performance. The incentive magnitude conditions included $0.05 
(M05, n = 99), $0.10 (M10, n = 95), and $0.20 (M20, n = 95).  
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Procedure. The survey contained six sections presented in the following order: (1) 27-
item monetary choice questionnaire (MCQ; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999), (2) behavioral 
inhibition system/behavioral activation system scales (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994), (3) 
demographic questionnaire, (4) practice trial, (5) hypothetical work task (HWT), and (6) 
experiential work task (EWT).  
Monetary choice questionnaire. After reviewing an information statement, participants 
completed the 27-item MCQ (Kirby et al., 1999; Appendix D). The MCQ is a method for 
assessing rates of delay discounting with demonstrated test-retest reliability (Intraclass 
correlation coefficient [ICC] = .56) and internal consistency scores (Kuder Richardson 20 [KR-
20] = .94 to .96) in previous research (Black & Rosen, 2011). The purpose of the MCQ was to 
provide preliminary information evaluating the relation between discounting and more traditional 
performance measures (work output). For each question, participants were asked which of two 
outcomes they would rather have: a smaller immediate reward or a larger delayed reward. For 
example, “Would you rather have $11 tonight or $30 in 7 days?” All 27 questions were 
displayed on a single screen.  
Behavioral inhibition system/behavioral activation system. The BIS/BAS scale 
evaluates the extent to which behavior is motivated by achieving positive consequences or by 
avoidance of loss (Carver & White, 1994). Carver and White demonstrate acceptable test-retest 
reliability and validity of the BIS/BAS. Alpha reliabilities range from .73 to .76 for the BIS, 
BAS-RR, and BAS-D. Reliability for the BAS-FS is lower (α = .66). The BIS/BAS was included 
to evaluate its relation to objective performance measures. The BIS/BAS contains 24 items and 
is comprised of four subscales listed in Appendix E. The BIS scale asks participants to rate the 
degree to which they perceive their behavior as being governed by or sensitive to punishment 
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(seven items). The BAS comprises the remaining three subscales. The drive (BAS-D; four 
items), fun seeking (BAS-FS; four items), and reward responsiveness (BAS-RR; five items) 
subscales assess the extent to which participants report (1) they engage in behavior to access a 
reinforcer, (2) their behavior is influenced by novel reinforcing stimuli and events, and (3) their 
behavior is sensitive to reinforcement, respectively. The survey also includes four filler 
questions. For each item, participants read a statement describing behavior and indicated the 
degree to which the statement is representative of their behavior on a four-point Likert scale 
(strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree).  
Demographic questionnaire. Next, participants completed an eight-item demographic 
questionnaire (Appendix F). The demographic information included: (1) age, (2) gender, (3) 
ethnicity, (4), state or territory of residence, (5) highest level of education completed, (6) 
combined annual household income, (7) disability status, and (8) smoking status.  
Practice trial. During the practice trial, participants read instructions describing how to 
perform the simulated work task (Appendix G). The survey then provided participants with the 
opportunity to complete one work unit. The practice trial was included so all participants had an 
understanding of and experience with the simulated work before completing the HWT and EWT.  
Hypothetical work task. After completing the practice trial, the survey presented 
participants with instructions for the HWT (Appendix G). The purpose of the HWT was to assess 
the amount of work participants reported they would hypothetically complete in exchange for 
monetary incentives. The HWT was also used to evaluate the correspondence between self-
reported and observed performance on the EWT. The instructions informed participants that on 
the following page they would be asked to indicate their willingness to complete a given number 
of work units to receive an incentive if provided the opportunity. The term “bonus” rather than 
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incentive was used throughout the survey to remain consistent with mTurk terminology when 
communicating with participants. However, I will use the term incentive here to remain 
consistent with the OBM literature. The instructions also asked participants to answer honestly 
and thoughtfully as if they were in the situation. After selecting the next button, the survey 
presented the first ratio requirement (i.e., one work unit). For each ratio in the progression, 
participants were asked, “Would you complete XX slider question(s) in exchange for a YY cent 
bonus?” with XX corresponding to each of the ratio requirements in the PR schedule. The value 
of YY varied and was equal to the incentive magnitude condition to which the participant was 
assigned ($0.05, $0.10, or $0.20). Each question contained a dichotomous yes/no response 
option. Participants could select yes, indicating they would be willing to complete the ratio, or 
no, they would not complete the ratio if given the opportunity. Participants were unable to 
continue until they selected a response option. The survey displayed the following error message, 
“please answer this question” above any question for which a participant failed to provide a 
response. If the participant selected yes, the survey presented the same question for the 
subsequent ratio. The survey continued to present increasing ratio requirements in accordance 
with the PR schedule until the participant selected no, at which point the HWT ended. Each ratio 
requirement was presented on a separate page. Upon completion of the HWT, the survey 
informed participants they would have the opportunity to earn real incentives in the following 
section. 
Experiential work task. Next, participants completed the EWT. The purpose of the EWT 
was to assess the highest ratio requirement participants complete when given the opportunity to 
earn real incentives. After reviewing the instructions (Appendix G), the survey presented the first 
ratio requirement in the PR progression. Each ratio began with a question reading, “You can earn 
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a bonus of XX cents by completing YY question(s) in this section. Would you like to continue?” 
with the value of XX corresponding to the incentive magnitude condition and YY the ratio 
requirement. If the participant selected yes, the survey displayed the corresponding number of 
work units, with each work unit presented on a separate page. Each work unit was labeled with 
the number in the progression. For example, in a ratio containing 20 work units the fifth unit was 
labeled, “Question 5 of 20.” After completing a ratio, the survey presented the same question for 
the subsequent ratio in the progression. This sequence continued until the participant selected no, 
at which point the survey ended.  
Payment. Participants earned a base pay of $0.25 for completing the MCQ, BIS/BAS, 
practice trial, demographic survey, and HWT. On average, participants required 5 min to 
complete these tasks. Average completion time for the entire battery, including the EWT, was 14 
min and 32 s. Participants in the M05, M10, and M20 conditions earned an average of $0.47 (SD = 
0.13), $0.74 (SD = 0.28), $1.38 (SD = 0.65), respectively. Incentives were delivered 1 to 3 days 
following participation.  
Data analyses. Before performing subsequent analyses, I first examined whether 
participant demographic variables (with the exception of state of residence), BIS/BAS subscale 
scores, and delay discounting rates were evenly distributed among the three incentive magnitude 
conditions using a series of Chi-Square and one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests. To 
evaluate the influence of incentive magnitude on participant responding, I examined several 
performance parameters including: highest ratio requirement completed (i.e., breakpoint), 
accuracy of work unit completion, and group-level elasticity. Additionally, I evaluated the 




Breakpoint. I first obtained a breakpoint for all participants in the HWT and EWT for use 
in subsequent analyses. Breakpoint was defined as the highest ratio requirement participants 
indicated willingness to complete in the HWT or completed in the EWT. Any participant whose 
responding did not break during the HWT or EWT was assigned a value of 256, the highest ratio 
requirement assessed. Responding for one participant in the HWT for both the M05 and M10 
conditions and for one participant in the EWT for the M20 condition did not reach a breakpoint; 
all three were assigned a breakpoint value of 256.  
Based on results of a D’Agostino and Pearson omnibus normality test, the distribution of 
breakpoint deviated from normality for all conditions in the HWT and EWT. Therefore, I used a 
Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA to examine the effects of incentive magnitude on breakpoint 
for the HWT and EWT. To determine for which conditions breakpoint differed significantly, I 
used a Dunn’s multiple comparison test. Additionally, to evaluate within-subject differences in 
breakpoint between the HWT and EWT, I conducted a Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-rank test 
for each incentive magnitude.  
Unit price breakpoint. I also performed similar analyses as those listed above using a 
transformation of breakpoint—referred to as unit price breakpoint—to equate the costs and 
benefits across conditions. Specifically, for analyses involving comparisons of HWT or EWT 
breakpoint among incentive magnitudes, I divided participants’ breakpoint by the incentive 
magnitude to facilitate evaluations of the amount of work performed per unit of compensation 
earned. Unit price breakpoint therefore represents the number of work units completed per 
penny. For example, a participant with a breakpoint of 25 in the M10 condition would have a unit 
price breakpoint of 2.5 work units to earn $0.01. Based on results of a D’Agostino and Pearson 
omnibus normality test, none of the conditions were normally distributed for the HWT or EWT. 
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Therefore, I used a Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA to examine the effects of incentive 
magnitude on unit price breakpoint for the HWT and EWT with a Dunn’s multiple comparison 
test was used to evaluate which conditions differed significantly.  
Monetary choice questionnaire. For all conditions, participants’ rates of delay 
discounting (i.e., k) were derived from their responses on the MCQ by entering their selections 
into a freely available Microsoft Excel-based tool (Kaplan, Lemley, Reed, & Jarmolowicz, 
2014). This tool follows the standard calculation procedures outlined by Kirby et al. (1999; 
presented in Appendix H). Specifically, the 27 MCQ items are assigned one of nine possible k 
values and re-arranged in an ascending order based on k, thereby creating nine groups of three 
questions. The three questions in each group include a small, medium, and large magnitude 
reward. The k value assigned to each group is equal to the discounting rate that would be derived 
given indifference between the smaller-sooner and larger-later options presented in the question. 
That is, an individual with a k of .25 would select to receive $20 tonight and $55 in 7 days with 
equal frequency. Therefore, k can be estimated based on an individual's response pattern such 
that for a given question, selecting the smaller-sooner reward suggests a k greater than the value 
associated with that question, and selecting the larger-later reward suggests a smaller k value. 
Although participants' exact indifference points are not obtained with the MCQ, we can presume 
the value of k is somewhere between the values at which participants switch from selecting the 
larger-later response to the smaller-sooner response. This value is estimated by calculating the 
geometric mean of the k values associated with the two responses at which the switch occurred. 
To identify unsystematic responding, I evaluated the consistency score provided by Kaplan et 
al.’s tool for all participants. The consistency score is a relative measure of the overall 
percentage of an individual’s selections that are consistent with his or her k value. Consistency is 
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calculated by summing the number of larger-later responses before and smaller-sooner responses 
after the switch, and dividing by 27. I selected a minimum consistency score of 75%. 
Consistency scores for two participants in the M05 condition and two participants in the M20 
condition fell below this criterion and were excluded from MCQ analyses. To evaluate the 
relation between rates of delay discounting and quantity of work completion, I conducted a 
Spearman rank-order correlation between k values and EWT breakpoint. A non-parametric test 
was selected because a D’Agostino and Pearson omnibus normality test indicated EWT 
breakpoint was non-normally distributed.  
Behavioral inhibition system/behavioral activation system. For each item on the 
BIS/BAS, apart from two items that were reverse-scored, responses were assigned a value of 
one, two, three, or four, for strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly agree, respectively. I 
then summed participant responses for each item related to the four subscales. I conducted 
separate Spearman rank-order correlations to evaluate the relation between participant scores on 
the four BIS/BAS subscales (BIS, BAS-D, BAS-FS, and BAS-RR) and EWT breakpoint.  
Accuracy. Next, I evaluated differences in accuracy of work completion among 
conditions in the EWT. An inaccurate response was defined as any response value that did not 
match the target value. Because ratio requirements differed in the number of opportunities for 
inaccurate responses, I calculated percentage accuracy to compare relative differences in 
accuracy across ratio requirements. To calculate percentage accuracy, I multiplied the ratio value 
by the number of participants who completed the ratio to obtain the total number of 
opportunities. I then summed the number of inaccurate responses for a given ratio and subtracted 
this value by total opportunities to derive the number of correctly completed work units. Lastly, I 
divided correctly completed work units by total opportunities and multiplied by 100 to obtain a 
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percentage [(Ratio value × Number of participants) – Inaccurate responses ÷ (Ratio Value × 
Number of participants) × 100]. Differences in accuracy among incentive magnitude conditions 
were determined using visual inspection of percentage accuracy across ratio requirements.  
Analog to Demand. The present experimental preparation differs from those typically 
used in behavioral economic demand analyses. Specifically, responding at each price was binary 
(i.e., participants indicated either yes or no) as compared to measuring the quantity consumed, or 
more recently the likelihood of consumption, an element that may be a fundamental feature of 
demand (Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Reed et al., 2016). Additionally, participants in the present 
study only experienced the price sequence once. Although not frequently used, researchers have 
measured the percentage of participants that consume a commodity when presented with a 
dichotomous choice, referred to as market-percent consumption (e.g., Greenwald & Hursh, 
2006). Experiencing a dichotomous choice once at each PR value renders individual data across 
ratio requirements more closely analogous to data used in survival curve analyses than demand, 
and thereby preclude an analysis of elasticity at the individual level. Survival curve analyses 
have been used successfully in the workplace (e.g., Lane & Andrew, 1955; Moncrief et al., 
1989); however, they lack the benefits and application utility afforded by the quantitative metrics 
derived from measures of elasticity (e.g., EV).  
Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Reed et al. (2016) used a novel adaptation of the Kaplan and 
Meier (1958) estimate of survival and the exponential equation to derive a group-level demand 
curve. Given the noted deviations from traditional demand curve analyses, Henley, DiGennaro 
Reed, Reed et al. refer to this measure as an analog to demand (AtD), which is similarly 
appropriate in the present study. Therefore, to compare differences in elasticity among incentive 
magnitude conditions and between the hypothetical and experiential work tasks, I adopted the 
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methods used by Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Reed et al. to convert participant’s binary choices at 
each price into a group-level demand curve, thus yielding an analysis of the elasticity of 
workforce responding across successive ratio requirements. 
To obtain values for use in fitting the exponential demand equation, I first calculated the 
percentage of participants indicating willingness to complete (HWT) or for whom I observed 
completion (EWT) at each ratio requirement (i.e., market-percent consumption). I used two 
methods in fitting the percentage of participants to the data. First, I fit Hursh and Silberberg’s 
(2008) exponential model of demand (Equation 3) to the percentage of participants using the 
ratio requirement as price. Additionally, given the differences in incentive size, I divided the 
ratio requirement by the incentive amount associated with each condition (i.e., $0.05, $0.10, or 
$0.20) to establish a common price across conditions (i.e., unit price). I then used the unit price 
values in fitting the percentage of participants to the exponential demand model. For all demand 
analyses, k was set to a shared constant value of 2, Q0 was set to 100 (i.e., maximum possible 
consumption, 100% of participants), and α was left unconstrained when fitting Equation 3 to the 
data for all conditions. A freely available tool (Exponential Model of Demand template; 
www.ibrinc.org) was used with GraphPad Prism version 7.01 for Windows (GraphPad Software, 
La Jolla, California, USA; www.graphpad.com) to fit the demand equation to the data. Three 
separate Extra sum-of-squares F-tests were used to evaluate whether differences in α differed 
significantly between each condition when compared with every other condition. Additionally, 
an Extra sum-of-squares F-test was used to compare elasticity between the HWT and EWT for 
all three conditions.  
I used Kaplan and Reed’s (2014) Microsoft Excel-based tool to obtain derived 
calculations of EV (Equation 4) and Pmax (Equation 5). However, because consumption was 
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measured in units that differed from traditional demand analyses in the present experimental 
preparation—percentage of participants responding rather than quantity—Omax must be 
interpreted with caution. When consumption is measured as the percentage of individuals, the 
traditional equation for Omax (consumption at Pmax  Pmax) represents peak response output per 
100 individuals because percentage is a relative measure that standardizes quantity out of 100 
and is therefore unaffected by sample size. In other words, Omax is equal to the derived value for 
a sample of 100 individuals even if, for example, the actual sample size is 10 or even 200 
individuals. There are undoubtedly situations in which standardized Omax is a desired and useful 
metric, for instance, when comparing reinforcer efficacy in terms of peak response output with 
groups of unequal size. Nevertheless, because the traditional calculation for Omax reflects 
response output when the sample size is 100, with less than 100 participants per condition in the 
present study, Omax is not an accurate reflection of peak responding.  
Therefore, I used a modified equation to calculate derived Omax. Like the traditional 
method, I first obtained consumption at Pmax by inputting the derived Pmax value into the 
exponent (C) of Equation 3 and solving for Q. After transforming consumption at Pmax into a 
proportion by dividing by 100, I multiplied this value by the sample size to obtain the number of 
participants responding at Pmax. To avoid irrational numbers, I then rounded the number of 
participants responding at Pmax down to the nearest integer. Lastly, I multiplied the number of 
individuals responding by Pmax. Although deviating from the traditional calculation, this 
modified Omax equation quantifies the number of work units completed at Pmax.  
In addition to the derived measures, I generated empirical values for Pmax and Omax using 
observed responding on the HWT and EWT as opposed to estimates of consumption generated 
via nonlinear regression. Therefore, to obtain empirical Omax, I plotted a work function and 
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identified the point at which response output was the greatest. I then obtained empirical Pmax by 
identifying the ratio requirement (price) at which peak responding occurred.  
Researchers often report R2 when conducting demand curve analyses as a measure of how 
well the best-fit curve generated by the exponential demand equation account for the data (i.e., 
goodness of fit; Motulsky, 2013). Although researchers have speculated about the adequacy of 
R2 for a given model (e.g., Shull, 1991)—including its validity with nonlinear models (Johnson 
& Bickel, 2008)—this metric provides some initial indication of how well the model describes 
the data. However, R2 does not provide information on whether the model is appropriate. 
Motulsky and Cristopoulos (2006) suggest a better indication of a model’s appropriateness is 
whether the data are randomly distributed around the best-fit curve. It is possible for a curve to 
deviate in small but systematic ways from the data that are not captured by R2. For example, data 
points could be consistently further from the curve at low prices than at high prices or clustered 
above or below the best-fit line. Careful inspection of residual plots of the AtD curves may be 
especially important for the current experiment given the novelty of this research and the ways in 
which the preparation deviate from more traditional demand curve analyses mentioned 
previously. Therefore, in addition to reporting R2, I also used visual inspection of residual plots 
for AtD curves in the HWT and EWT to examine the distribution and trends present in the 
residuals. This analysis will provide information about whether best-fit curves systematically 
deviate from the data. 
Predictive validity. Two measures were used to evaluate the predictive validity of the 
HWT. First, I conducted a series of Spearman rank-order correlations to assess the relation 
between responding on the HWT and EWT for each incentive magnitude condition. Second, I 
calculated the percentage change in predicted work output (and corresponding cost) based on 
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HWT responses to observed output and cost in the EWT. This analysis was done by subtracting 
the number of participants who indicated willingness to complete a given ratio requirement from 
the number of participants who completed the requirement in the EWT, dividing by the number 
of participants indicating willingness in the HWT, and multiplying by 100 to obtain a percentage 
for each ratio requirement. For example, suppose seven participants completed a ratio of 20 in 
the EWT but 10 participants indicated willingness to complete the same ratio in the HWT [(7-10) 
÷ 10 × 100]. The calculation reveals a 30% decrease in the amount of work (and cost) completed 
from what was predicted based on the HWT.  
Cost-benefit analysis. To compare expected aggregate costs and benefits for the three 
incentive magnitudes, I overlaid the amount paid at each ratio requirement onto the work 
function for the EWT. This depiction allows for visual inspection of the relative changes in cost 
and output between successive ratio requirements and how these changes differ among 
conditions.  
Results and Discussion 
A series of Chi-Square analyses revealed that magnitude conditions did not significantly 
differ for gender, χ2(2) = 1.33, p = .52, ethnicity, χ2(10) = 8.63, p = .57, highest level of 
education, χ2(14) = 19.44, p = .15, smoking status, χ2(4) = 3.75, p = .44, and disability status, 
χ2(2) = 1.08, p = .58. One-way ANOVA results indicate the conditions did not differ in age, F(2, 
286) = 0.78, p = .46, or for scores on the BAS-D, F(2, 286) = 0.70, p = .50, BAS-FS, F(2, 286) = 
1.38, p = .25, BAS-RR, F(2, 286) = 1.19, p = .31, and BIS, F(2, 286) = 0.11, p = .90. Because 
income was broken into nine ranges, when separated by condition several of the categories 
contained too few participants to accurately perform a Chi-Square test. Therefore, to evaluate 
whether conditions differed on income bracket, I combined several income ranges to create five 
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categories (< $30,000; $30,000 - $49,999; $50,000 - $69,999; $70,000 - $89,999; > $90,000). 
Based on this analysis, income did not differ significantly among conditions, χ2(8) = 6.54, p = 
.59. Additionally, results of two Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVAs also indicated the conditions 
did not differ in k, H(2) = .25, p = .88. 
Breakpoint. Figure 2 presents breakpoint for all conditions in the HWT and EWT. I 
observed a positive relation between incentive amount and median breakpoint in the HWT with 
systematic increases in breakpoint with increases in incentive magnitude. Specifically, median 
breakpoint in the M05, M10, and M20 conditions was 4, 8, and 10 work units, respectively. A 
Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA indicated a significant difference in breakpoint, H(2) = 23.09, 
p < .0001. Results of a Dunn’s multiple comparison test revealed breakpoint was significantly 
lower in M05 condition than either the M10 (p = .0031) or M20 conditions (p < .0001). Differences 
between the M10 and M20 conditions were not significant (p = .51). In the EWT, differences in 
median breakpoint were less orderly than the HWT, with values of 8, 8, and 10 for the M05, M10, 
and M20 conditions. Nonetheless, I observed a significant main effect in EWT breakpoint, H(2) = 
7.01, p = .03. However, the only conditions in which breakpoint differed significantly was 
between M05 and M20 (p = .025) with higher breakpoints in the M20 condition. 
Results of the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-rank tests indicated differences in 
breakpoint between the HWT and EWT were significant for the M05 condition, W = 1045, p = 
.0011. Participants in the M05 condition completed higher ratio requirements in the EWT than 
they indicated in the HWT. I did not observe significant differences in breakpoint between the 
HWT and EWT for the M10, W = 207, p = .49, or M20 conditions, W = 366, p = .31.  
Unit price breakpoint. Figure 3 portrays HWT and EWT unit price breakpoints for the 
three incentive magnitudes to compare the number of work units completed per penny earned. 
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For the HWT, median unit price breakpoints were 0.80, 0.80, and 0.50, for the M05, M10, and M20 
conditions, respectively. Results of the HWT Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA showed a 
significant main effect of incentive magnitude on unit price breakpoint, H(2) = 9.8, p = .0074. 
Unit price breakpoint was significantly lower in the M20 condition than the M05 (p = .012) and 
M10 conditions (p = .037). There was no significant difference between the M05 and M10 
conditions.  
Median unit price breakpoints for the EWT were 1.60 (M05), 0.80 (M10), and 0.50 (M20). 
Results of a Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA revealed differences in unit price breakpoint were 
also significant for the EWT, H(2) = 33.59, p < .0001. Based on a Dunn’s multiple comparison 
test, differences in unit price breakpoint were significant among all conditions in the EWT. 
Specifically, unit price breakpoint for the M05 condition was significantly higher than the M10 (p 
= .0075) and M20 conditions (p < .0001). Results demonstrate the M10 condition was also 
significantly higher than the M20 condition (p = .019). These results stand in contrast with the 
results of the traditional breakpoint analyses in that, when controlling for incentive amount, I 
observed a negative relation between incentive magnitude and unit price breakpoint with 
individuals in the lower incentive magnitude conditions completing more work per penny 
earned.  
Monetary choice questionnaire. Results of a Spearman rank-order correlation revealed 
a nonsignificant negative correlation of -.04 (p = .51) between overall k and EWT breakpoint. 
These results suggest the rate at which participants discount delayed monetary rewards is not 
predictive of sensitivity to price in the current experimental preparation.  
Behavioral inhibition system/behavioral activation system. Of the four BIS/BAS 
subscales assessed, the BAS-RR (reward responsiveness) was the only measure found to be 
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significantly correlated with EWT breakpoint, rs(289) = -.13, p = .034. Correlations between 
EWT and BAS-D, rs(289) = .01, p = .87, BAS-FS, rs(289) = .07, p = .21, and BIS, rs(289) = -.06, 
p = .34, subscales were not significant.  
Accuracy. Figure 4 illustrates the percentage of accurately completed work units across 
the 15 ratio requirements for the M05, M10, and M20 conditions. Overall, accuracy was high for 
the three magnitude conditions across all ratio requirements assessed. Relative to other 
conditions, accuracy in the M05 condition was slightly lower for the first ratio with an increasing 
trend for the next three ratio requirements (two, four, and eight). Accuracy stabilized around 
99% for the remaining requirements in the M05 condition. Median accuracy for the M05 condition 
was 99.4% (range: 90.4 to 100.0%). Accuracy in the M10 condition was variable and ranged from 
90.6 to 100.0% with a median of 96.7%. More than half of the errors in the M10 condition were 
committed by one participant, whose highest ratio requirement was 25. When this participant 
stopped responding and exited the study, M10 accuracy improved and stabilized near 99%. I 
observed an increase in accuracy in the M20 condition for the first three ratio requirements, which 
stabilized between ratios four and 15. Variability in accuracy for the M20 condition increased at 
ratio values greater than 15. Median accuracy in the M20 condition was 98.3% (range: 91.4 to 
99.2%).  
Analog to demand. When plotted using the untransformed ratio requirement displayed in 
Figure 5, elasticity increased systematically with decreases in incentive magnitude in the HWT 
(top panel) and EWT (bottom panel). That is, responding was more inelastic in the larger 
incentive magnitude conditions. Similar to the results of the traditional breakpoint analyses for 
the HWT, Extra sum-of-squares F-tests revealed that the M05 (α = 2.9 × 104) condition was 
significantly more elastic than the M10, α = 1.9 × 104, F(1, 28) = 7.6, p = .01, or M20, α = 1.8 × 
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104, F(1, 27) = 16.0, p = .0005. However, there was no significant difference in elasticity 
between the M10 and M20 conditions in the HWT, F(1, 27) = 1.4, p = .25. In the bottom panel of 
Figure 5, the percentage of participants who completed the ratio requirement in the EWT is 
shown for all three incentive magnitudes. I observed a similar pattern in the EWT as the HWT, 
with systematic increases in elasticity with decreases in incentive magnitude. Extra sum-of-
squares F-test results indicated that elasticity differed among all incentive magnitude conditions, 
F(2, 38) = 22, p = < .0001.  
Work functions for the HWT and EWT used to determine empirical demand indices are 
shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. Additionally, all derived and empirical metrics, including 
model fits, are listed in Table 2. Except for empirical Pmax in the HWT which was highest in the 
M05 condition, empirical and derived demand indices—EV, Pmax, and Omax—for both the HWT 
and EWT were lowest in the M05 condition and highest in the M20 condition. It is likely that 
empirical Pmax was inflated in the M05 condition as a result of participants who did not reach a 
breakpoint in the HWT. Given the additive nature of the ratio progression, continued responding 
of just a few participants at the highest ratio requirement may cause the tail end of the work 
function to increase—and in some cases, to increase above the output observed at lower prices. 
To illustrate, three individuals indicating willingness to complete the highest ratio requirement 
(256) would result in a total output of 768, which is higher than if an entire sample of 95 
participants completed ratio 8, totaling 760 work units. This increase along the right tail end of 
the expenditure curve may prove especially problematic in practice because discrepant empirical 
measures could alter important intervention decisions and compromise outcomes. Quite possibly, 
in these instances, inflated empirical measures may be a function of the method with which they 
were obtained (i.e., determining Pmax by identifying peak output) rather than an accurate 
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reflection of the facet of demand they are meant to capture (e.g., unit elasticity). As for the M05 
condition in the HWT, the increase in output at higher ratio requirements resulted in an empirical 
Pmax of 128, which is markedly higher than the derived value of 9.95. Because relatively few 
participants did not reach a breakpoint in the study, the M05 condition was the only condition in 
which the data appear to be affected by this pattern of persistent responding.  
Figure 8 displays residual plots for all conditions in the HWT and EWT when data were 
plotted as a function of the ratio requirement. For the HWT, data points were consistently above 
but close to the best fit line at low ratio requirements. At higher ratio requirements, I observed 
clusters of data points above the best fit line in the HWT for the M05 and M10 conditions. For the 
EWT, data points at low ratio requirements were clustered above the best-fit curve and generally 
demonstrate an increasing trend. The trend of increasing distance from the best-fit line at lower 
prices for the M05 and M20 conditions peaked closely to derived Pmax. At prices above Pmax, data 
points in the EWT were more evenly distributed above and below the curve fit.  
Figure 9 depicts a comparison of the HWT and EWT AtD curves for each incentive 
magnitude separately. Responding in the hypothetical and experiential work tasks decreased at 
almost imperceptibly similar rates for all magnitude conditions. This is supported by the results 
of the Extra sum-of-squares F-tests which were not significant for any of the conditions, M05, 
F(1, 26) = 0.43, p = .52, M10, F(1, 26) = 2.4, p = .13, M20, F(1, 27) = 0.3, p = .59. The 
overlapping AtD curves suggest a high degree of correspondence in responding between the 
hypothetical and experiential AtD preparations. For the remaining AtD indices, I observed a 
systematic pattern in which derived indices for each condition were similar but slightly lower in 
the EWT than the HWT (Table 2). For example, in the M05 condition derived Pmax was 9.95 and 
9.02 in the HWT and EWT, respectively. However, I observed some inconsistencies when 
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comparing empirical measures between the HWT and EWT. To illustrate, despite empirical Pmax 
being markedly higher in the HWT for the M05 condition, Omax was lower. Empirical Pmax, and 
Omax values were nonetheless similar in the HWT and EWT for the M10 and M20 conditions.  
Figure 10 displays AtD curves for the three magnitude conditions in the HWT (top panel) 
and EWT (bottom panel) with the percentage of participants completing the requirement plotted 
as a function of unit price. Responding on the HWT was relatively more inelastic in the M05 
condition (α = 1.5 × 103) than the M10 (α = 1.9 × 103) and M20 conditions (α = 3.4 × 103). Three 
separate Extra sum-of-squares F-tests were conducted to evaluate whether the differences in 
elasticity were statistically significant. Results indicate responding was significantly more 
inelastic in the M05 condition than the M20 condition, F(1, 27) = 37, p < .0001. I also found 
statistically significant differences in elasticity between the M10 and M20 conditions with greater 
elasticity in the M20 condition, F(1, 27) = 35, p < .0001. However, differences in  between the 
M05 and M10 conditions did not reach significance, F(1, 28) = 2.9, p = .099. Accordingly, the 
associated empirical and derived demand indices were highest in the M05 condition and lowest in 
the M20 condition. Essential value was 2.36 in the M05 condition, 1.86 in the M10 condition, and 
1.04 in the M20 condition. Derived Pmax, expressed as the number of work units per $0.01, was 
1.92, 1.52, and 0.85 for the M05, M10, and M20 conditions, respectively. Derived Omax was 55.78 
in the M05 condition, 44.03 in the M10 condition, and 24.61 in the M20 condition. Similar to when 
the data were fitted using the ratio requirement, empirical values for Pmax were somewhat lower 
and Omax values were higher than the derived values for all conditions.  
I observed a similar pattern for the EWT. Responding in the M05 condition was the most 
inelastic relative to the other conditions (α = 1.6 × 103) followed by the M10 condition (α = 2.3 × 
103). The M20 condition was the most elastic (α = 3.6 × 103). Extra sum-of-squares F-tests 
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revealed statistically significant differences in elasticity among all conditions; M05 and M10, F(1, 
24) = 14, p = .0011; M05 and M20, F(1, 26) = 69, p < .0001; M10 and M20, F(1, 26) = 26, p < 
.0001. Like the HWT, derived demand indices were highest in the M05 condition, (EV = 2.21; 
Pmax = 1.80; Omax = 55.90) followed by the M10 condition (EV = 1.54; Pmax = 1.25; Omax = 36.38), 
and lowest in the M20 condition (EV = 0.98; Pmax = 0.80; Omax = 23.24). Similarly, empirical 
Omax values were highest in the M05 condition and lowest in the M20 condition, however, 
empirical Pmax was lowest in the M10 condition.  
Predictive validity. The experiential work task breakpoint plotted as a function of HWT 
breakpoint is shown in Figure 11 for each incentive magnitude. For the predictive validity 
graphs, data points falling within the gray shaded area indicate the participants had a higher 
breakpoint on the HWT than the EWT; that is, they completed less work when given the 
opportunity than they originally indicated. Data points falling in the white portion indicate a 
higher breakpoint on the EWT task; these participants completed more work than they indicated 
they would on the HWT. Data points located along the intersection of the white and gray regions 
indicate perfect correspondence between breakpoint on the HWT and EWT. The size of the data 
point symbols reflects the number of participants whose data are represented by that value 
(smallest points represent a single participant, largest points equal to 10 participants). Results of 
Spearman rank-order correlations indicated a significant positive correlation between responding 
on the HWT and EWT for all three conditions; M05, rs(99) = .47, p < .0001; M10, rs(95) = .59, p < 
.0001; M20, rs(95) = .57, p < .0001.  
I observed a slightly lower correlation in the M05 condition that may be a function of the 
relatively greater proportion of participants completing more work in the EWT than the HWT. 
Fifty-one percent of participants in the M05 condition (n = 51) completed more work in the EWT 
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than they indicated on the HWT as compared with 38% (n = 36) and 40% (n = 38) of participants 
for the M10 and M20 conditions, respectively. The M10 condition had the highest percentage of 
participants with perfect correspondence on the HWT and EWT with 33.7% (n = 32). This value 
was followed by the M05 condition (n = 29, 29.3%). The M20 condition had the fewest 
participants with perfect correspondence (n = 23, 24.2%).  
To evaluate predictive validity at the aggregate (or organizational) level, I calculated the 
percentage change in work completed, and corresponding cost, from the HWT to the EWT 
(Figure 12). I observed more variability at ratio requirements above 25, possibly as a result of the 
lower number of participants continuing to respond at these higher ratios. At requirements below 
25, I observed a higher percentage change in the M05 condition relative to the other conditions 
with the M10 and M20 conditions generally remaining stable near zero. These data reveal that the 
predictive validity of the HWT at the aggregate level was sufficient for the M10 and M20 
conditions up to and including a work requirement of 25 units. 
Cost-benefit analysis. Lastly, Figure 7 displays the amount of money paid and work 
units completed to assess the relative costs and benefits at each ratio requirement among 
conditions in the EWT. Work completion was nearly identical through ratio 4, but costs differed 
substantially. Thus, in instances where Pmax is equal to or less than 4, it would be wise to select 
the M05 condition for use (similar productivity at a relatively lower cost). Beginning at ratio 8, 
the expenditure curves diverge with participants in the M20 condition completing more work at 
each ratio than the M05 or M10 conditions. Participants in the M05 and M10 conditions completed 
roughly an equal number of work units at all prices; however, cost in the M05 condition was 
always lower except for two ratio requirements (32 and 48) wherein cost was equivalent. 
Mirroring decisions made in an organization from a cost-benefit perspective, it would not be 
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ideal to select the M10 condition for use in an incentive program. Although participants in the 
M20 condition completed the most work units for 11 of the 15 ratio requirements, the cost was 
also substantially higher for all ratios. Opting to use the largest incentive magnitude may 
therefore depend on whether the organizational goals are more in line with maximizing output or 
minimizing cost, in which case the largest and smallest incentive magnitudes would be preferred, 
respectively.  
Overall, the results of Experiment 1 indicate responding on the HWT and EWT was 
sensitive to incentive magnitude and participant responses on the HWT were in general 
agreement with observed responding on the EWT. Rates of delay discounting derived from the 
MCQ were not significantly correlated with responding on the EWT. However, the absence of a 
significant relation between delay discounting and breakpoint does not indicate that discounting 
does not influence work-related behavior. As evidenced by the findings of Sigurdsson et al. 
(2013), discounting measures may yield valuable insight to decision-making in the workplace. 
Instead, findings of Experiment 1 provide support for the notion that elasticity derived from the 
exponential demand equation may provide a more useful quantitative model than discounting for 
researchers interested in the amount of behavior maintained by a reinforcer. Although BAS-RR 
scores were significantly correlated with EWT breakpoint, the effect was minimal at best and it 
is unlikely BAS-RR alone would provide sufficient information of value to organizational 
leaders designing incentive systems to justify its use.  
The traditional breakpoint analyses generally revealed a linear relation in the direction 
expected based on the reinforcer magnitude literature, with higher breakpoints in the larger 
incentive magnitude conditions. However, differences in breakpoint among magnitude 
conditions were often small (particularly when compared to the increase in incentive amount) 
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and failed to reach significance in several instances (i.e., between the M10 and M20 conditions in 
the HWT and EWT and between the M05 and M10 conditions in the EWT). When using unit price 
to equate the benefit across conditions, the relation between breakpoint and magnitude was 
reversed. Consistent with the results of Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Reed et al. (2016), I observed 
systematic decreases in unit price breakpoint with increasing incentive magnitudes. The finding 
that unit price breakpoint was lower in the higher incentive magnitude conditions does not 
suggest higher magnitude incentives produce less work output. As observed in the cost-benefit 
analysis (Figure 7), larger incentives resulted in the completion of more work units. However, by 
equating costs and benefits, unit price reveals important information; namely, increases in 
responding were not proportional to increases in incentive magnitude. Therefore, the M05 
condition resulted in a more efficient use of resources.  
Although there were slight differences among conditions, accuracy was high for all 
incentive magnitudes. It is possible, however, that high levels of accuracy observed in all 
conditions were a result of the contingencies for completing the practice trial. That is, unlike the 
work units in the EWT, the practice trial required participants to provide an accurate response to 
continue to the next section. Therefore, participants who initially provided an inaccurate practice 
trial response experienced an error message presented in red text that delayed survey progression 
and required additional effort to correct the response before proceeding to the HWT. If the 
consequences for inaccurate responding on the practice trial functioned as punishment and 
decreased the frequency of inaccurate responses in the EWT, a punishment contingency could 
account for high levels of accuracy observed. It is unclear if removing the contingency for 
accurate responding on the practice trial would influence accuracy in the EWT.  
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For the AtD analyses, I observed a similar pattern of responding for the HWT and EWT. 
Overall, the percentage of participants completing the ratio requirement decreased systematically 
as a function of the number of work units required to earn the incentive for both the HWT and 
EWT. The data were well accounted for by the exponential model of demand with R2 values of 
.87 or above for all conditions (range: .87 to .98). Although this finding is promising, as 
mentioned previously, careful inspection of residuals may provide insight into AtD analyses not 
captured by R2. Residual plots for the present experiment suggest the empirical data differ in 
small but relatively systematic ways from derived estimates of consumption (percentage of 
participants working) represented by the best-fit curve. 
Depending on whether price was expressed as the ratio requirement needed to earn the 
incentive or the ratio requirement divided by incentive size (i.e., unit price) the order of 
conditions differed. When using the ratio requirement, elasticity was greatest in the M05 
condition and lowest in the M20 condition for both the hypothetical and experiential tasks, with 
the opposite relation observed when using unit price to fit the exponential demand equation. 
Though I observed general correspondence between empirical and derived demand measures 
supporting previous research reporting strong correlations between the two metrics (e.g., Murphy 
& MacKillop, 2006), the inconsistency obtained with Pmax in the M05 HWT condition raises 
some concern regarding the utility of empirical measures for informing real-world interventions. 
Therefore, the future of translational applications of demand curve analyses would benefit from 
the identification and evaluation of a simple and consistent method for improving the accuracy of 
empirical measures.  
Regardless, AtD findings replicate similar analyses completed by Henley, DiGennaro 
Reed, Reed et al. (2016) and provide further support for the importance of evaluating reinforcer 
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dimensions to improve incentive delivery and continued investigation of the HWT. Additionally, 
the similarity in measures of elasticity and AtD indices (derived and observed; e.g., EV, Omax) 
between the HWT and EWT for all incentive magnitudes supports previous research evaluating 
the correspondence between hypothetical and experiential demand preparations (e.g., Amlung & 
MacKillop, 2015) and extends this literature to work-related behavior and workplace reinforcers.  
Responding on the HWT was generally a good predictor of actual work performance, 
particularly at the aggregate level. However, responding on the EWT may have been influenced 
by responses on the HWT completed minutes prior and separated only by a single screen 
containing instructions for the EWT. As such, sequence effects may have influenced responding 
and would benefit from explicit empirical investigation in future research. The influence of 
sequence may be mitigated to a degree by separating the HWT and EWT by a distractor task.  
Given the demographic diversity of mTurk Workers, information regarding participants’ 
employment history and experience receiving incentives in paid positions outside of mTurk may 
provide insight to observed response patterns. Previous employment information and history 
with incentive receipt information may also serve to provide a more complete understanding of 
the frequency with which incentives are delivered outside of behavior analytic service delivery 
organizations documented by DiGennaro Reed and Henley (2015). Relatedly, HIT completion 
serves various functions for mTurk Workers. Ipeirotis (2010) reported nearly 70% of mTurk 
Workers in the United States complete HITs as a “fruitful way to spend free time” whereas 
approximately 15% use mTurk as a source of primary income and just over 60% use mTurk as a 
secondary source of income. Quite possibly, the degree to which participant responding persists 




Experiment 2: Incentive Probability 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine parametric effects of varying levels of 
probabilistic incentives on performance of mTurk Workers engaged in a simulated work task 
within a behavioral economic demand framework. Experiment 2 extends the findings of 
Experiment 1 by examining a second reinforcer dimension and is one of the first OBM studies to 
conduct a parametric evaluation of incentive probability. Conditions included a 90%, 50%, and 
10% probability of earning incentives in the EWT.  
Method 
Participants. To recruit participants, I posted a HIT to the mTurk platform containing 
inclusionary criteria, a brief study description, compensation amount, and a link to the survey. 
Sample size was determined by conducting a power analysis using an effect size of .25, an alpha 
error probability of .05, and power of .95. The analysis indicated I would need a total sample size 
of 252 participants (84 per group) to detect differences in performance if they exist (G*Power 
version 3.1). Because the data were likely to deviate from normality based on Experiment 1, I 
increased the sample size by approximately 15% informed by recommendations for conducting 
power analyses with nonparametric methods (Motulsky, 2017). Workers were required to meet 
four criteria for inclusion: (1) reside in the United States, (2) have greater than 1,000 previously 
approved HITs, (3) have a 95% or above approval rate on previously completed HITs, and (4) 
submit a unique access code within 4 hr of selecting the survey link. Rather than post three 
identical HITs with unique survey links (as was done in Experiment 1), I posted one HIT and 
programmed the Qualtrics® hosted survey (www.qualtrics.com) to randomly assign participants 
to a condition. The information contained in the HIT (Appendix I) differed slightly from 
Experiment 1 to: (1) adjust the HIT description from evaluating “attitudes about life events and 
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monetary rewards” to “monetary reinforcement in the workplace,” (2) the statement indicating 
participants will have the opportunity to earn bonuses was removed to decrease the likelihood of 
selection bias, (3) include a statement indicating the project is personally funded based on 
correspondence with and online information from mTurk Workers regarding best practices for 
posting a HIT, and (4) extend HIT completion time from 3 hr to 4 hr to ensure participants with a 
high breakpoint had sufficient time to complete the task. To make certain I would not need to 
exclude data for participants who completed the study multiple times, the HIT was also 
programmed to ensure Workers could not participate more than once. Workers who agreed to 
participate and submitted a unique access code—provided following study completion—served 
as participants.  
Simulated work task. The work task (Appendix C) and PR schedule (1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, 
15, 20, 25, 32, 48, 64, 96, 128, 256) were identical to Experiment 1. However, I adjusted the 
target values from Experiment 1 to exclude values equal to -100 and 100, the highest and lowest 
values on the visual analog scale range. Excluding target values of -100 and 100 prevented 
participants from providing an accurate response when quickly sliding the manipulandum to the 
end of the scale, a relatively low effort response compared to target values for which this was not 
possible. Therefore, target values ranged from -99 to 99 with the exception of zero but the visual 
analog scale ranged from -100 to 100.  
Experimental conditions. I used a between-groups design to evaluate the effects of 
incentive probability. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions that 
differed in the probability of receiving incentives in the EWT. Conditions included a 90% 
probability (P90), 50% probability (P50), and 10% probability (P10) of earning incentives. 
Incentive magnitude for each condition was yoked to equal $0.20 if the probability of incentive 
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receipt was 100%, thereby equating amount of compensation across conditions and isolating the 
effects of probability. Thus, the incentive equaled $0.22, $0.40, and $2.00 for the P90, P50, and 
P10 conditions, respectively. I yoked the incentive amount to a $0.20 incentive to increase total 
compensation based on Worker feedback in Experiment 1.  
Procedures. The study contained four sections presented in the following order: (1) 
practice trial, (2) HWT, (3) demographic, employment, and incentive survey, and (4) EWT.  
Practice trial. After selecting the study link from the mTurk HIT and reviewing an 
information statement, participants completed the practice trial. The practice trial included 
instructions for completing the simulated work task (Appendix J) and provided participants with 
three opportunities to perform the simulated work task. The practice trial was increased from one 
work task in Experiment 1 to three work tasks in the present experiment to give participants 
experience with the repetitive nature of the work—similar to what participants experience at 
ratio requirements above one—prior to completing the HWT and EWT. Unlike Experiment 1, 
participants were not required to provide accurate responses to the practice opportunities. 
Although a lack of feedback regarding inaccurate responding may also influence the likelihood 
of inaccurate responding, the contingency for correct responding in Experiment 1 was removed 
to avoid inflating response accuracy on the EWT.  
Hypothetical work task. Instructions for the HWT were adjusted to include a statement 
indicating that there are no right or wrong responses. This information is frequently included in 
hypothetical demand assays—including the HWT evaluated by Henley, DiGennaro Reed, 
Kaplan et al. (2016). The question phrasing at each ratio requirement for the HWT was adjusted 
slightly from Experiment 1 to reflect changes in the independent variable. For example, the P50 
condition at a ratio value of 20 read, “Would you complete 20 slider questions in exchange for a 
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5 in 10 (50%) chance of receiving a 40 cent bonus paid in 1 day?” Information about the duration 
to incentive receipt (i.e., one day) was included to control for delay to reinforcement, assessed in 
Experiment 3. Additionally, I phrased the delay as the number of days to minimize changes in 
wording between Experiment 2 and 3. For each of the 15 ratios in the PR schedule, participants 
either selected yes or no indicating whether they would or would not complete the ratio 
requirement if provided the opportunity. The survey presented the HWT on a single page with 
the instructions positioned at the top of the page and questions for each ratio requirement 
presented in an ascending order. An important difference from Experiment 1 is that the survey 
required participants to provide a response to all 15 ratio requirements rather than ending after 
the first ratio at which a participant select no. This change was implemented to evaluate the 
consistency of responding as price increases. Observed inconsistencies could suggest a problem 
with the HWT. Appendix J provides instructions and question phrasing for the HWT. 
Demographic, employment, and incentive survey. To better understand participants’ 
experience in the workplace, self-reported motivation for completing mTurk tasks, and history 
receiving incentives, participants completed a demographic, employment, and incentive survey 
following the HWT (Appendix K). The demographic, employment, and incentive survey also 
functioned as a distractor task before participants proceeded to the EWT. The survey items 
pertaining to participant demographic information were: (1) age, (2) gender, (3) ethnicity, (4), 
state of residence, (5) highest level of education completed, and (6) combined annual household 
income. Several demographic items unrelated to the independent variable included in 
Experiment 1 were removed from the current study to minimize HIT completion time (i.e., 
disability and smoking status). One participant in the P90 condition reported an age of three. 
Because this value is likely not possible, this participant was excluded from analyses containing 
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age. I also included three questions specific to mTurk employment, including: (1) hours per week 
spent on mTurk, (2) reason for completing mTurk tasks, and (3) amount of money earned per 
week on mTurk. When asked about the average amount of income earned per week on mTurk, 
three participants (P90 = 1; P10 = 2) provided a range rather than a single value. In these instances, 
I recoded their reported weekly mTurk income to equal the average of the range (e.g., 150-200 
was recoded as 175). Questions regarding employment at their most recent paid position outside 
of mTurk included: (1) tenure, (2) number of promotions received, (3) occupation category, and 
(4) reason for leaving last paid position. Participants who reported that they have not held a paid 
position in the last 10 years when asked about tenure, were redirected to the next section (i.e., 
EWT directions). Finally, participants indicated whether monetary and/or non-monetary 
incentives (referred to as “other gifts”) were available at their most recent paid position and, if 
so, how often these incentives were made available.  
Experiential work task. After the demographic, employment, and incentive survey, 
participants reviewed the EWT instructions and began the task. Similar to the HWT, I adjusted 
the phrasing for each ratio requirement in the EWT to reflect changes in the independent 
variable. For example, the P50 condition read, “Would you like to complete 20 slider questions in 
exchange for a 5 in 10 (50%) chance of earning a 40 cent bonus paid in 1 day?”  Unlike 
Experiment 1, the study did not end when participants select no for a ratio requirement. This 
change was made for the same reason as stated in the HWT. As a result, if participants selected 
yes for a given ratio, the survey displayed the corresponding number of work units, with each 
work unit presented on a separate page and numbered in the same manner as Experiment 1 (i.e., 
Question X of Y). After completing the ratio, or if the participant selected no for the previous 
ratio requirement, the survey presented the same question for the subsequent ratio in the 
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sequence. This format continued until participants responded to all 15 ratio requirements at 
which point the survey displayed a unique access code and a free response text box for 
participants to provide feedback, as desired.  
Each ratio requirement completed in the EWT had an equal probability of being selected 
to receive the incentive and varied according to the probability condition to which the participant 
was assigned (90%, 50%, or 10%). For example, a participant assigned to the P50 condition who 
completed the first four ratios had four separate opportunities each with a 50% probability of 
receiving a $0.40 incentive. 
Payment. Participants received a base pay of $0.25 for completing the practice trial, 
HWT, demographic, employment, and incentive survey, and providing yes/no responses to the 
15 questions that preceded each ratio requirement in the EWT (i.e., “Would you like to 
complete…?”). All participants received base pay and total incentives accrued 1 day following 
study completion. Average completion time for the entire study, including the EWT, was 11 min 
and 41 s (range: 2 min 45 s to 2 hr 18 min 39 s). Participants in the P90, P50, and P10 conditions 
earned an average of $1.08 (SD = 0.42), $1.21 (SD = 0.66), $1.26 (SD = 1.48), respectively. 
To randomly determine whether participants received the incentive for each ratio 
completed, I used Microsoft Excel’s random between function (described in Experiment 1). For 
each ratio requirement a participant completed in the EWT, I generated a random number 
between 1 and 100. Participants received an incentive if the random value was less than or equal 
to the value of the probability for the condition to which the participant was assigned. Said 
another way, to receive an incentive for a completed ratio the random value was required to be 
less than or equal to 90, 50, and 10 for the P90, P50, and P10 conditions, respectively. For example, 
a P10 participant who completed the first four ratio requirements in the EWT had four 
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opportunities to receive $2.00 (each with a 10% probability). If the random numbers were 10, 9, 
88, and 53, the participant received $4.00 in incentives because the first two values are less than 
or equal to 10.  
Data analyses. Like Experiment 1, I examined whether participant demographic 
variables were evenly distributed among the conditions using a series of Chi-Square and one-
way ANOVAs. For all data analyses, nonparametric tests were used for data that deviated 
significantly from normality assessed using a D’Agostino and Pearson omnibus normality test. 
Unless otherwise indicated, all statistical analyses were two-tailed.  
Experienced probabilities. Because probability was determined by random values, it was 
possible for the experienced probability to deviate from the programmed value across ratios. 
Therefore, I also calculated the observed probabilities for the three conditions by dividing the 
number of participants in each condition who received the incentive by the total number of 
participants who completed the response requirement and multiplying by 100 to obtain a 
percentage for each ratio value. I then used a one sample t-test for each condition to compare 
whether experienced probabilities differed significantly from the programmed value.  
Breakpoint. I identified the highest ratio requirement participants indicated willingness to 
complete in the HWT or completed in the EWT (i.e., breakpoint). Any participant whose 
responding did not break during the HWT or EWT was assigned a value of 256, the highest ratio 
requirement assessed. Responding for three participants in the HWT for both the P90 and P50 
conditions and five participants in the P10 condition did not reach a breakpoint and were assigned 
a breakpoint value of 256. I did not use unit price breakpoint for any analyses. For the HWT and 
EWT, a Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA was used to examine breakpoint among the P90, P50, 
and P10 conditions with post-hoc comparisons when warranted. To evaluate within-subject 
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differences in breakpoint between the HWT and EWT, I used a Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-
rank test for each probability condition.  
 Spearman rank order correlation analyses were conducted to evaluate the relation 
between EWT breakpoint and education, income, employment tenure, and number of promotions 
received. Additionally, point biserial correlations were used to evaluate the relation between 
EWT breakpoint and reasons for completing mTurk tasks.  
Accuracy. Accuracy was defined and calculated in the same manner as Experiment 1. I 
also evaluated the percentage of accurately completed work units during the practice trial.  
Analog to demand. To calculate elasticity, I used the same procedures and parameter 
values for Q0 and k as Experiment 1. I also used the same methods for calculating empirical and 
derived AtD measures. However, I only used ratio requirement values as opposed to unit price in 
fitting the percentage of participants to the exponential demand equation. Extra sum-of-squares 
F-tests were used to compare elasticity among probability conditions and between the HWT and 
EWT within each probability condition.  
Predictive validity. Correlation analyses were identical to Experiment 1. However, 
because the number of participants who received the incentive at each ratio was probabilistic, the 
number of incentives delivered in the EWT (i.e., cost) was no longer a direct function of the 
number of participants who completed the ratio requirement. Thus, although percentage change 
for work output was calculated identically to Experiment 1, I also calculated percentage change 
from projected cost in the HWT to observed cost in the EWT. Percentage change in cost was 
obtained by multiplying the incentive amount (P90, $0.22; P50, $0.40; P10, $2.00) by the product 
of the number of participants who indicated willingness to complete the ratio in the HWT and the 
probability associated with that condition (P90, .90; P50, .20; P10, .10). After obtaining the 
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difference between amount paid at each ratio in the HWT and EWT, I divided the resulting value 
by the cost in the HWT and multiplied by 100.  
Cost-benefit analysis. To compare expected aggregate costs and benefits for the three 
incentive probabilities, I plotted the total number of work units completed (i.e., a work function) 
against the amount paid at each ratio requirement for the EWT as well as the percentage of 
maximum possible output.  
Results and Discussion  
A total of 304 Workers completed all study procedures and submitted access codes to the 
mTurk HIT. Participants were excluded from analyses if responding was inconsistent in the 
HWT or EWT. Inconsistent responding was defined as having at least one instance in which a 
participant reached a breakpoint and subsequently indicated willingness to complete (HWT) or 
completed (EWT) a higher ratio requirement. Because it is unclear which price should signify 
the breakpoint, participants were excluded from analyses rather than assigned a breakpoint value. 
This criterion for identifying and excluding inconsistent responding differs from the method 
employed in more recent behavioral economic demand research as outlined by Stein, Koffarnus, 
Snider, Quisenberry, and Bickel (2015). At the individual level, the present experimental 
preparation generated binary data that effectively restricted any change in consumption to 100%. 
Binary measures of consumption are not sensitive enough to be amenable to much of Stein and 
colleagues’ recommendations that are primarily based on the degree to which consumption 
changes.  
Fourteen participants were excluded based on inconsistent responding on the HWT (P90 = 
4; P50 = 3; P10 = 7), two were excluded due to inconsistent responding on the EWT (P50 = 1; P10 
= 1), and three participants displayed inconsistent responding on both the HWT and EWT and 
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were subsequently excluded (P90 = 2; P50 = 1). A total of 19 participants were excluded (6.25%) 
and data for 285 participants were retained for analysis (P90 = 95; P50 = 95; P10 = 95). 
Demographic, employment, and incentive survey. Participant information separated by 
condition are reported in Tables 3, 4, and 5, for demographic information, mTurk employment 
characteristics, and non-mTurk employment and incentive history, respectively. Participants 
ranged from 19 to 72 years with a mean age of 36 years (SD = 11.05) with males accounting for 
a slightly greater percentage of participants than females (nmale = 154, 54.0%; nfemale = 131, 
46.0%). Similar to Experiment 1, participants were primarily Caucasian (n = 236, 82.8%) and 
reported living in 43 of the 52 states and territories in the United States with the highest 
concentration of participants living in California (n = 34, 11.9%), Pennsylvania (n = 18, 6.3%), 
and Texas (n = 18, 6.3%). Education ranged from less than a high school diploma (n = 2, 0.7%) 
to doctoral (n = 3, 1.1%) and professional degrees (n = 3, 1.1%) with a four-year college degree 
reported with the highest frequency (n = 100, 35.1%). A combined annual household income of 
less than $30,000 per year was reported with the highest frequency (n = 62, 21.8%) followed by 
an income in the $30,000 to $39,999 range (n = 50, 17.5%). A series of Chi-Square analyses 
revealed that conditions did not differ significantly for gender, χ2(2) = 0.54, p = .77, ethnicity, 
χ2(12) = 7.28, p = .84, education, χ2(14) = 18.72, p = .18, or income, χ2(8) = 9.06, p = .34 (using 
the same aggregating procedure as Experiment 1). Additionally, a one-way ANOVA indicated 
the conditions did not differ significantly in participant age, F(2, 282) = 0.20, p = .82.  
On average, participants reported spending 16.69 hr per week completing HITs on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (range: 1 to 100 hr, SD = 13.5). Average weekly income earned on 
mTurk ranged from $1.50 to $1000 with a mean of $91.19 per week (SD = 13.49). To 
standardize mTurk income, I divided the reported average income by the average number of 
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hours spent on mTurk per week to obtain participants average hourly mTurk wage, which 
equaled $6.39 (range: $0.15 to $50.00, SD = 5.61). The survey also asked participants to indicate 
their reason(s) for completing mTurk tasks. Because participants were asked to indicate all the 
applicable reasons, the sum of percentages is greater than 100. The most frequently endorsed 
reason for completing mTurk HITs was as a secondary source of income (n = 208, 73.0%) 
followed by a fruitful way to spend free time (n = 157, 55.1%). Besides one participant who 
indicated “other” (i.e., “to pay for insurance required by the ACA [obamacare]”), participants 
reported completing HITs because they are currently unemployed or only employed part-time 
with the lowest frequency (n = 35, 12.3%).  
With respect to current or previous employment outside of mTurk, nearly one quarter (n 
= 67, 23.5%) indicated being employed between 1 and 3 years at their most recent paid position. 
Participants also frequently reported tenure durations of 3 to 5 years (n = 54, 18.9%) and 5 to 10 
years (n = 56, 19.6%). Participants who reported not having held a paid position outside of 
mTurk in the last 10 years (n = 11, 3.9%) were redirected to the end of the demographic, 
employment, and incentive survey and not asked any further questions related to employment 
outside of mTurk. Thus, their responses are not included in the data presented below or in the 
data for the corresponding questions presented in Table 5. Even though three quarters of 
participants have held their position for 1 year or longer, nearly half of the sample reported never 
having received a promotion at their current place of employment (n = 123, 44.9%) and another 
28.5% have only received one promotion (n = 78). Participants reported a wide range of 
occupations with office/administrative support (n = 42, 15.3%), sales (n = 34, 12.4%), and 
computer/mathematical (n = 32, 11.7%) positions reported with the highest frequency. Accepting 
a new job at a different company was the most endorsed reason for leaving their last paid 
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position (n = 95, 34.7%). Participants selected the remaining reasons for leaving their last paid 
position with a similar frequency (range: 10.9 to 14.6%).  
Approximately half of the participants indicated they did not receive monetary and/or 
non-monetary incentives at their most recent paid position (n = 152, 53.3%). Of the participants 
who received incentives, monetary and non-monetary goods were used with a similar frequency 
(monetary, n = 78, 27.4%; non-monetary, n = 74, 26.0%). With respect to how often incentives 
were available to employees—regardless of incentive type—twice yearly was reported with the 
highest frequency (n = 40, 32.8%).  
Experienced probabilities. Although the experienced probabilities were generally 
similar to the programmed values at the aggregate level, I observed some deviations in 
experienced probabilities from the programmed levels (Figure 13). However, one sample t-tests 
indicated the experienced probabilities did not differ significantly from 90% for the P90 
condition, t(11) = 0.44, p = .67, from 50% in the P50 condition, t(10) = 1.58, p = .15, or from 
10% for the P10 condition, t(12) = 0.22, p = .83. Probabilities in the P90 condition ranged from 
66.7% at a ratio requirement of 48 to 100% at ratio values 25, 32, and 64 with a mean probability 
of 88.53% likelihood of receiving the incentive. Experienced probabilities for the P50 condition 
were generally higher than 50%, ranging from 41.7% at ratio 20 to 100% at ratio 48 (M = 
57.54%). Experienced probabilities for the P10 condition were, on average, slightly less than 10 
(M = 9.35%, range: 0 to 33.3%). Differences from the programmed probabilities were slightly 
more pronounced at higher ratio requirements during which fewer participants continued to 
respond.  
Breakpoint. Figure 14 displays breakpoints in the HWT and EWT for all three 
probability conditions. For the HWT, median breakpoint was 12 for the P90 and P50 conditions 
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and 15 for the P10 condition. Breakpoint for all conditions in the HWT ranged from 0 to 256 
work units. Results of a Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA indicated breakpoint did not differ 
significantly among probability conditions, H(2) = 1.14, p = .57. Median breakpoint in the EWT 
was 8 for the P90 (range: 0 to 64) and P10 (range: 1 to 96) conditions and 4 for the P50 condition 
(range: 0 to 48). There was no significant difference in breakpoint among any of the conditions 
in the EWT, H(2) = 0.21, p = .90. A Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-rank test indicated 
significant differences in breakpoint between the HWT and EWT for all three conditions (P90: W 
= -2382, p < .0001; P50: W = -2077, p < .0001; P10: W = -2758, p < .0001), with higher 
breakpoints observed in the HWT than the EWT in all cases. Of the variables assessed in the 
demographic, employment, and incentive survey, only one question was significantly correlated 
with EWT breakpoint, rpb = .19, p < .001 (i.e., completing mTurk HITs because participants find 
the tasks to be fun).  
Accuracy. Accuracy was high and stable for all three conditions through a ratio 
requirement of 15 after which I observed a decrease for the P90 and P10 conditions (Figure 15). 
Decreases in accuracy at ratios greater than 15 also coincided with increases in variability in 
participant accuracy. Increased variability is likely a function of the relatively fewer number of 
participants continuing to respond at higher requirements; with fewer opportunities, inaccurate 
responses have a disproportionately large effect on percentage accuracy as compared to lower 
response requirements with greater proportions of the participant sample responding. Median 
accuracy for the P90 condition was 90.22% (range: 66.67 to 100%) and 91.84% for the P50 
condition (range: 85.27 to 100%). Accuracy was lowest in the P10 condition with a median of 




Of the 95 participants in each condition, 27, 29, and 27 participants inaccurately 
completed at least one work unit in the P90, P50, and P10 conditions, respectively. Of those, just 7 
(P90), 7 (P50), and 6 (P10) participants accurately completed less than 50% of work units as 
compared to the 82, 83, and 82 participants who accurately completed at least 90% of work units 
in the P90, P50, and P10 conditions, respectively. Closer inspection of inaccurate responses 
revealed they were typically due to participants matching the inverse of the target number (e.g., 
65 for the target -65) or missing the target value by a few integers rather than sliding the 
manipulandum without attempting to match the target number.  
Analog to demand. Figure 16 shows AtD curves for the three probability conditions in 
the HWT and EWT with the percentage of participants plotted as a function of the ratio 
requirement (i.e., price). Overall, the percentage of participants completing the ratio requirement 
decreased systematically as a function of the number of work units required to earn the incentive 
for both the HWT and EWT.  
Hypothetical work task. The top panel of Figure 16 portrays the percentage of 
participants indicating willingness to complete the ratio requirement on the HWT for all three 
probability conditions. Aggregate responding was idiosyncratic in terms of incentive probability. 
Specifically, the P10 condition was the most inelastic, followed by the P90 condition, with the P50 
condition being the most elastic. The observed difference in elasticity between the P90 and P50 
conditions was less pronounced, F(1, 28) = 2.0, p = .17, than the difference between the P10 
condition and either the P90, F(1, 28) = 13 p = .0011, or P50 conditions, F(1, 22) = 28, p < .0001.  
Elasticity, R2, and all values for Pmax and Omax are listed in Table 6. Except for empirical 
Pmax, the remaining derived and empirical demand indices for the HWT followed the same 
pattern as elasticity noted above. That is, all metrics were highest in the P10 condition (derived 
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Pmax, 40.21; derived Omax, 1195.21; empirical Omax, 1280.00), followed by the P90 condition 
(derived Pmax, 24.04; derived Omax, 697.21; empirical Omax, 800.00), with the lowest values in the 
P50 condition (derived Pmax, 20.61; derived Omax, 597.61; empirical Omax, 768.00).  
Empirical Pmax, however, was equal in the P50 and P10 conditions with a value of 256 and 
lowest in the P90 condition (empirical Pmax, 20.00). Examination of the work functions for the 
HWT plotted in Figure 17 suggests empirical metrics may be influenced by the number of 
participants who did not reach a breakpoint. I observed a pronounced increase in the number of 
participants who exhibited this pattern of persistent responding in the HWT in the present 
experiment, particularly in the P10 condition, which may explain the discrepancies between 
derived and empirical Pmax. One solution to addressing instances in which empirical metrics are 
inflated because of persistent responding may be to disregard the tail end of the expenditure 
curve (e.g., the last three prices). In doing so, empirical Pmax would equal 20, 20, and 48, in the 
P90, P50, and P10 conditions, respectively, which more closely approximate the derived Pmax 
values for each condition. Although certainly not without its limitations, this adjustment may be 
one approach worth considering for addressing such discrepancies when attempting to make 
decisions in applied settings. 
Experiential work task. Analog to demand curves for the EWT are shown in the bottom 
panel of Figure 16. Responding in the EWT was largely undifferentiated among probability 
conditions. An Extra sum-of-squares F-test revealed elasticity did not significantly differ among 
any of the conditions, F(2, 33) = 1.2, p = .31, and thus is plotted with a simpler model in which a 
single global curve is fit to all the data. Although I observed differences in derived demand 
indices among conditions with the largest values in the P50 condition (derived Pmax, 9.62; derived 
Omax, 278.88) followed by the P10 condition (derived Pmax, 8.24; derived Omax, 239.04), and 
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lowest in the P90 condition (derived Pmax, 7.80; derived Omax, 226.12), these differences were 
small (Table 6).  
Figure 18 illustrates work functions for the probability conditions in the EWT. The 
ordering of the values of the empirical indices differed from that observed with the derived 
indices. Relative to the other conditions, empirical Pmax was still highest in the P50 condition but I 
observed equal values for the P90 and P10 conditions. Although empirical Pmax was highest in the 
P50 condition, empirical Omax was lowest in this condition.  
Residual plots for all conditions in the HWT and EWT are shown in Figure 19. Residuals 
for the P90 and P50 conditions in the HWT followed a similar trend. The data were slightly above 
the best-fit curve with a modest increase up to a ratio requirement of 10, which was followed by 
a subtle decrease and subsequent increase at derived Pmax. Residuals at prices near Pmax were 
generally close to the best-fit line for these conditions. At higher ratio requirements, data for the 
P90 and P50 conditions fell below the best fit line and rapidly increased along the right tail of the 
figures. Data for the P10 condition generally followed a similar trend. However, derived Pmax was 
more closely aligned with the point at which the residuals were negative and furthest from the 
best-fit curve.  
For all conditions in the EWT, residuals at low prices demonstrate a positive increase in 
distance from the best-fit curve as price increases. This trend was observed until the price 
denoted by derived Pmax. After Pmax, the pattern of residuals for each probability condition in the 
EWT differs. Residuals at prices above Pmax were somewhat clustered below the best-fit curve in 
the P90 condition, but generally well scattered, particularly when compared to the data for the 
lower half of the prices. Apart from the highest price, data in the P50 condition largely remained 
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above the best-fit curve. After Pmax, data for the P10 condition decreased steeply and 
subsequently increased to levels observed at Pmax.  
Figure 20 separates AtD curves by probability condition to facilitate comparisons of 
elasticity between the HWT and EWT. Inspection of the curves reveals that differences between 
the HWT and EWT were pronounced, with higher demand in the HWT than the EWT in all 
cases. Results of three separate Extra sum-of-squares F-tests revealed differences in elasticity 
were significant for all conditions, P90, F(1, 25) = 95, p < .0001, P50, F(1, 24) = 32, p < .0001, 
P10, F(1, 26) = 118, p < .0001.  
Predictive validity. Figure 21 displays the results of correlation analyses between the 
HWT and EWT breakpoint using the same graphing conventions as Experiment 1. Results of 
Spearman rank-order correlations showed a significant positive correlation between responding 
on the HWT and EWT for all three probability conditions; P90, rs(95) = .48, p < .0001; P50, rs(95) 
= .49, p < .0001; P10, rs(95) = .51, p < .0001.  
Figures 22 and 23 depict the percentage change in work output and cost from the HWT to 
the EWT, respectively. Overall, predictive validity in terms of percentage change for work 
output and cost was low and followed a similar pattern across probability conditions. For all 
three groups, percentage change in work output was close to 0% during the first two ratio 
requirements after which I observed marked decreases in the predictive validity of the HWT as 
the ratio requirement increased. That is, participants largely overestimated the amount of work 
they would be willing to complete in the HWT, but it does not appear the probability level 
systematically influenced predictive validity. Similarly, percentage change in cost was at or 
slightly above 0% for the first two ratio requirements. After the second ratio, percentage change 
for all conditions markedly decreased to -100% at ratio requirements above 64 for all conditions. 
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Variability in the data appear to be a direct function of the probability level, with the highest 
variability observed in the lowest probability condition.  
Cost-benefit analysis. A graphic depiction of the relation between cost and work output 
(i.e., organizational benefit) is presented in Figure 18. Although more variable in the P10 
condition than the P90 and P50 conditions, cost showed a decreasing trend as the ratio requirement 
increased for all three conditions. Work output generally followed an inverted U shape. Work 
output peaked at ratio 8 for the P90 and P10 conditions with the highest output occurring at ratio 
10 for the P50 condition. Although the price at which responding in the P50 condition peaked was 
higher than the other conditions, peak output at ratio 10 was 380 work units, which is lower than 
440 work units completed in the other conditions at ratio 8. Organizational leaders wishing to 
inform an incentive arrangement based on the cost-benefit analysis results might wish to select a 
50% probability of receiving an incentive. Although peak work output is not as high compared to 
the other conditions, responding persists at higher ratio requirements in which the costs are 
substantially lower than that observed at the ratio requirement associated with peak output for the 
P90 and P10 conditions. Relative to the P10 condition, the P50 condition was less influenced by 
momentary fluctuations in the amount paid, making it easier for organizational leaders to 
accurately budget incentives. 
In sum, unlike the effects of incentive magnitude observed in Experiment 1, responding 
in the present experiment did not appear to differ systematically as a function of the probability 
of incentive receipt for most response measures. Specifically, the highest median breakpoint in 
the HWT was obtained in the lowest probability condition, and in the EWT the highest median 
breakpoint was identical in both the highest and lowest probability conditions. Comparisons of 
breakpoint among probability conditions were not statistically significant in the hypothetical or 
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experiential work tasks. Although not in the direction one might expect given programmed 
probabilities, the only conditions to yield significant differences when individual breakpoints 
were used to generate a group-level measure of elasticity (i.e., AtD) were between the P10 and 
both the P90 and P50 conditions in the HWT, with greater inelasticity in the P10 condition. This 
apparent effect was not replicated in the EWT in which  did not differ significantly among any 
of the conditions.  
Previous research in OBM has demonstrated that incentives are consistently effective 
when the probability of incentive receipt is less than 100% (e.g., Alavosius et al., 2009; Orpen, 
1974; Reed et al., 2012). Researchers have shown that incentive probabilities as low as 17% may 
still be effective at maintaining work-related behavior (e.g., Cook & Dixon, 2006). However, 
research has often failed to hold the probability constant or even report the probability 
participants experienced.  
Surprisingly, the current experiment is the first in nearly three decades to directly 
manipulate and compare the effects of varying levels of incentive probability (Evans et al., 
1988). Evans and colleagues’ experimental preparation included multiple interlocking 
probabilistic incentive arrangements in which probability and magnitude varied. Such features of 
the experimental preparation make it difficult to draw conclusions about the effects of 
probability alone on performance. Although Evans and colleagues failed to find differences in 
performance between the two probability conditions—which is consistent with the results of the 
present experiment—the disparate methodologies used to evaluate probability make it 
challenging to compare across studies.  
 One consistent finding in the present study was that individual breakpoints in the 
hypothetical task were significantly higher than their experiential counterparts for all conditions. 
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These findings, though observed for all probability conditions, also stand in contrast to much of 
the research evaluating hypothetical and experiential demand assessments (e.g., Amlung & 
MacKillop, 2015; Amlung et al., 2012). Although significant, correlation coefficients between 
breakpoint in the HWT and EWT were generally lower than Experiment 1. This decline is likely 
attributable to the relatively greater proportion of participants who overestimated the amount of 
work they would be willing to complete in the HWT. The percentage of participants in 
Experiment 1 who completed more work in the EWT than they indicated on the HWT ranged 
from 38% to 51%. This is contrasted with the current experiment in which the percentage of 
participants completing more work was 9%, 12%, and 7% in the P90, P50, and P10 conditions, 
respectively. This effect was consistently observed in comparisons between responding on the 
HWT and EWT regardless of the analysis method. That is, not only was breakpoint significantly 
lower in the EWT than the HWT in all conditions, responding was also strikingly more elastic 
and therefore more sensitive to increases in price in the EWT and percentage change from 
predicted output and cost rapidly declined as the ratio requirement increased. Similar to the lack 
of orderly changes in responding with changes in probability level, the difference in responding 
between hypothetical and experiential assessment methods stands in contrast with the findings 
from similar analyses in Experiment 1.  
One possible explanation for the lack of differentiation among incentive probabilities 
involves the procedure for equating the conditions. It is imperative to manipulate only the 
dimension of reinforcement under investigation to isolate the effect of that dimension. Because 
lower probabilities would also decrease compensation, the magnitude of reinforcement was 
increased with decreases in probability. That is, incentive amount was yoked across conditions to 
equate compensation when only 90%, 50%, or 10% of completed ratio requirements resulted in 
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incentive receipt. Controlling for magnitude can be seen by inspecting the cost-benefit analysis 
and noting the similarity in cost curves among conditions despite large differences in 
programmed probabilities. It is possible, however, that this control measure may have rendered 
the conditions functionally equivalent in the present experimental preparation and contributed to 
the lack of differentiation among conditions.  
The yoking procedure may also be considered a limitation with respect to external 
validity. That is, an important reason for using probabilistic incentive systems is to mediate 
budgetary restrictions. Organizations may not always use a higher magnitude incentive when 
implementing a probabilistic incentive system. Consequently, an important area of investigation 
may be to evaluate the extent to which responding persists at a similar level despite decreases in 
probability while holding magnitude constant. 
An interesting finding pertinent to organizational incentive systems is that the standard 
deviation in participant compensation increased with decreases in probability. Greater variability 
in compensation amounts may produce wide fluctuations in expenses and compromise the ability 
of organizational leaders to accurately predict and budget incentives. Because responding was 
similar across conditions, organizational leaders may wish to select an incentive arrangement 
with a higher probability of incentive receipt.  
 It is also possible that withholding information from participants about their receipt of an 
incentive after completing each EWT ratio may have inadvertently increased the uncertainty of 
compensation (beyond the manipulated probabilities) and influenced responding in unknown 
ways. This uncertainty may have also been influenced by participants’ individual histories 
contacting reinforcement under probabilistic schedules. For example, an individual with a dense 
or recent history receiving probabilistic outcomes may have created a self-generated rule about 
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the likelihood of his or her behavior contacting reinforcement that was higher than the 
programmed probability. Perhaps providing participants with information about whether they 
received the incentive following each ratio requirement may mitigate the effects of individual 
histories over successive requirements. Though generally versatile, the constraints associated 
with using a survey software for the present study prevented this feature from being incorporated 
into the current experimental arrangement. Future research could address this issue.  
 Experiment 3: Incentive Delay  
An extensive literature base has documented the impact of delay on reinforcer value. 
However, delay remains largely unexplored in the OBM incentive literature. The purpose of 
Experiment 3 is to examine the effects of delayed incentives on performance of mTurk Workers. 
I evaluated three incentive delays using a behavioral economic demand framework. To facilitate 
comparisons of the influence of reinforcer dimensions across experiments, the experimental 
preparation and data analyses for Experiment 3 were identical to Experiment 2 with several 
noted exceptions.  
Method 
Participants. Two hundred and ninety-six participants were recruited from mTurk using 
the same procedures as Experiment 2.  
 Simulated work task. The work task, PR schedule, and target values were identical to 
Experiment 2.  
Experimental conditions. To evaluate the effects of incentive delay, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions. Incentives were delivered after 1, 14, or 28 days 
following participation for the D01, D14, and D28 conditions, respectively  
96 
 
Procedures. The survey contained four sections presented in the following order: (1) 
practice trial, (2) HWT, (3) demographic, employment, and incentive survey, and (4) EWT.  
Practice trial. The practice trial was identical to Experiment 2.  
Hypothetical work task. The question phrasing at each ratio requirement for the HWT 
was adjusted slightly from Experiment 2 to reflect changes in the independent variable 
(Appendix J). For example, the D14 condition at a ratio value of 20 read, “Would you complete 
20 slider questions in exchange for a 20 cent bonus paid for certain in 14 days?” Information 
about the probability of receiving the incentive (i.e., for certain) was included to control for 
probability of reinforcement, assessed in Experiment 2. The remaining features of the HWT were 
identical.  
Demographic, employment, and incentive survey. After the HWT, participants 
completed the demographic, employment, and incentive survey, identical to Experiment 2. When 
asked about the average amount of income earned per week on mTurk two participants in the D14 
condition provided a range rather than a single value, which were recoded to equal the average of 
the range. One participant in the D01 condition failed to provide an average income and instead 
wrote “Not enough.” Data for this participant were excluded from analyses containing weekly 
mTurk income because I was unable to generate a usable value based on this individual’s 
response. 
Experiential work task. After the demographic, employment, and incentive survey, 
participants completed the EWT. The only change to the EWT from the previous experiment was 
that the phrasing for each ratio differed slightly to reflect changes in the independent variable. 
For example, the D28 condition read, “Would you like to complete 20 slider questions in 
exchange for a 20 cent bonus paid for certain in 28 days?”   
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Payment. Participants received a base pay of $0.25 for completing the practice trial, 
HWT, demographic, employment, and incentive survey, and providing yes/no responses to the 
15 questions that preceded each ratio requirement in the EWT (i.e., “Would you like to 
complete…?”). Participants received the $0.25 base pay 24 hr following participation regardless 
of the delay condition to which they were assigned. Therefore, participants in the D01 condition 
received base pay and incentive pay the same day. However, receipt of the incentive was delayed 
by 14 days for the D14 and 28 days for the D28 condition. Average completion time for the entire 
study, including the EWT, was 11 min and 39 s. Participants in the D01, D14, and D28 conditions 
earned an average of $1.28 (SD = 0.57), $1.15 (SD = 0.52), $1.06 (SD = .49), respectively. 
Data analyses. I completed identical analyses for breakpoint, accuracy, AtD, predictive 
validity, and a cost-benefit analysis as Experiment 2.  
Results and Discussion 
Of the 296 Workers who submitted access codes, eight were excluded for inconsistent 
responding on the HWT (D01 = 4; D14 = 3; D28 = 1), one participant in the D28 condition for 
inconsistent responding on the EWT, and two participants were excluded for inconsistent 
responding in both the HWT and EWT (D01 = 1; D28 = 1). After excluding the 11 participants 
with inconsistent responding from analyses (3.27%), 95 participants remained in each of the 
three delay conditions.  
Demographic, employment, and incentive survey. Demographic information, mTurk 
employment characteristics, and non-mTurk employment and incentive history for the remaining 
285 participants are listed by condition in Tables 7, 8, and 9, respectively. Participants ranged 
from 18 to 75 years of age (M = 32.56). Males accounted for 58.6% of the sample (n = 167) and 
females accounted for 41.4% of the sample (n = 118). The sample was predominantly Caucasian 
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(n = 238, 82.8%) and reported living in 43 of the 52 states and territories in the United States 
with the highest concentration of participants living in California (n = 33, 11.6%), Florida (n = 
22, 7.7%), and Texas (n = 19, 6.7%). All participants held a least a high school diploma or 
equivalent certification with the largest percentage of participants having received a four-year 
college degree (n = 102, 35.8%). With respect to income, more than one quarter of participants 
reported earning an average annual household income of less than $30,000 per year (n = 78, 
27.4%). A series of Chi-Square analyses revealed that conditions did not differ significantly for 
gender, χ2(2) = 1.24, p = .54, ethnicity, χ2(12) = 13.18, p = .36, education, χ2(14) = 8.67, p = .56, 
or income, χ2(8) = 6.01, p = .65. A one-way ANOVA also indicated the conditions did not differ 
significantly in age, F(2, 282) = 1.37, p = .26. 
Participants spent an average of 1 to 100 hours engaged in mTurk HITs per week (M = 
19.6, SD = 14.13) with earnings averaging $98.25 per week (range: $0.00 to $680, SD = 92.34). 
Thus, hourly wages calculated based on average weekly time and compensation ranged between 
$0.00 and $25.00 an hour with an average $5.96 per hour. The most commonly reported reasons 
for completing mTurk HITs was as a source of secondary income (n = 175, 61.4%) and as a 
fruitful way to spend free time (n = 146, 51.2%). 
Similar to Experiment 2, participants most frequently reported having held their most 
recent paid position for 1 to 3 years (n = 80, 28.1%) followed by tenure durations of 3 to 5 years 
(n = 62, 21.8%) and 5 to 10 years (n = 46, 16.1%). Five participants reported not having held a 
paid position in the previous 10 years and were excluded from subsequent data summaries 
involving employment outside of mTurk. Half of the participants reported never having received 
a promotion at their current or most recent place of employment (n = 142, 50.7%). The most 
frequently reported occupations included sales (n = 42, 15.0%), office/administrative support (n 
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= 31, 11.1%), and food preparation/serving (n = 30, 10.7%). Approximately one quarter of the 
participants reported leaving their last paid position because they accepted a new job at a 
different company (n = 74, 26.4%). None of the demographic variables assessed were 
significantly correlated with EWT breakpoint. 
Sixty-three percent of participants reported monetary and/or non-monetary incentives 
were not available at their most recent paid position (n = 180). A quarter of the participants 
indicated monetary incentives were available (n = 78) and 16% reported the availability of non-
monetary incentives (n = 46). Incentives delivered weekly (n = 26, 26.0%), monthly (n = 26, 
26.0%), and twice yearly (n = 28, 28.0%), were the most common and reported with a similar 
frequency.  
Breakpoint. Any participant whose responding did not break during the HWT or EWT 
was assigned a value of 256, the highest ratio requirement assessed. Responding for 12 
participants did not reach a breakpoint during the HWT (D01 = 4; D14 = 2; D28 = 6) and one 
participant in both the D01 and D14 conditions did not reach a breakpoint in the EWT. Figure 24 
displays breakpoint for the HWT and EWT for each delay condition separately. With a median 
of 15, breakpoint in the HWT was highest in the D01 condition (range: 1 to 256). Median HWT 
breakpoint was 10 and ranged from 0 to 256 work units for the D14 and D28 conditions. Despite a 
higher median breakpoint in the D01 condition, results of a Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA 
suggest this difference was not statistically significant, H(2) = 5.92, p = .052. In contrast, median 
EWT breakpoint was 8 for all of the delay conditions, but results of a Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of condition, H(2) = 7.42, p = .024. Based on a 
Dunn’s multiple comparison test, differences in breakpoint were significant between the D01 and 
D28 conditions, p = .02, with higher breakpoints in the D01 condition. Results of the Wilcoxon 
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matched pairs signed-rank tests indicated breakpoint was significantly higher in the HWT than 
the EWT for all three conditions, D01, W = -1360, p < .0001; D14, W = -1583, p < .0001; D28, W = 
-1487, p < .0001.  
Accuracy. Figure 25 displays the percentage of accurately completed work units across 
ratio requirements for all conditions. The D01 and D28 conditions followed a similar pattern in 
which accuracy showed an increasing trend from the practice trial up to a ratio requirement of 15 
after which both conditions remained stable near 100% accurately completed work units. 
However, accuracy was slightly higher in the D01 condition with a median of 99.17% (range: 
90.53 to 100%) than the D28 condition with a median of 95.86% (range: 93.41 to 100%). 
Accuracy was lowest in the D14 condition with a median of 85.53% (range: 35.42 to 100%). 
Percentage accuracy in the D14 condition was stable near 85% during the first half of the 
progression. Unlike the other delay conditions, responding became variable and decreased 
following ratio 12 and did not stabilize until ratio 64. Once stable, however, accuracy for the D14 
condition was 100% for the remaining ratio requirements. 
Of the 95 participants in each condition, 30, 38, and 19 participants inaccurately 
completed at least one work unit in the D01, D14, and D28 conditions, respectively. Few 
participants in the D01 (n = 5) and D28 (n = 3) conditions accurately completed more than half of 
work units. However, 14 participants in the D14 condition inaccurately completed more than 95% 
of work units. Said another way, most participants performed the work task with high accuracy 
and decrements to aggregate percentage accuracy was largely a function of a handful of 
participants who inaccurately completed nearly all of the work units. 
Analog to demand. Figure 26 depicts AtD curves for delay conditions in the HWT and 
EWT pictured in the top and bottom panels, respectively. In the HWT, responding was most 
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elastic in the D14 condition (α = 1.4 × 10-4). Elasticity was equal in the D01 and D28 conditions (α 
= 1.1 × 10-4) and did not differ significantly, F(1, 28) = 0.02, p = .88. Despite identical α values, 
I observed a significant difference in elasticity between the D14 and D01 conditions, F(1, 28) = 
4.4, p = .046, but not between the D14 and D28 conditions, F(1, 28) = 1.8, p = .19.  
Consistent with the α values from which they were derived, EV, Pmax, and Omax were 
identical in the D01 and D28 conditions and lowest in the D14 condition. Based on the work 
function for the HWT pictured in Figure 27, I observed an equal response output at more than 
one ratio requirement in the D14 condition (ratio 10 and 20). In this case, the higher price (i.e., 
higher ratio requirement) was selected for empirical Pmax. Although there may be reasons that 
favor using the lower ratio for empirical Pmax (e.g., retaining a greater portion of the workforce), 
I used the higher ratio because the purpose of this line of research is to inform organizational 
incentive systems. From an organizational perspective, both ratio requirements will produce 
equal output. However, expenses would be lower in the higher ratio requirement. The higher 
ratio would better maximize the relative costs and benefits and would likely be viewed more 
favorably by an organization. As such, the selected method serves to frame my results in a 
manner consistent with which they are likely to be used in applied settings. Therefore, empirical 
Pmax was equal to 20 in the D14 condition, this value was lower than the D01 and D28 conditions 
that were both equal to 256. Similarly, empirical Omax was lowest in the D14 condition and 
highest in the D28 condition. Although both measures generally followed a similar pattern, like 
the previous experiments, increases in the right tail of the expenditure curve led to empirical 
values that were often noticeably higher than the derived values. These increases were more 
pronounced in the conditions with a higher number of participants who did not reach a 
breakpoint (i.e., D28 and D01). Elasticity and related indices are summarized in Table 10.  
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Within the EWT, I observed a significant main effect of delay on elasticity, F(2, 37) = 11, 
p = .0002. The main effect was attributable to significant pairwise comparisons between the D01 
and D14 conditions, F(1, 28) = 17, p = .0003, and between the D01 and D28 conditions, F(1, 23) = 
17, p = .0004, with responding being the most inelastic in the D01 condition in both cases. 
However elasticity was equivalent in the D14 and D28 conditions, F(1, 23) = 0.009, p = .93. 
Figure 28 displays the work functions for the three delay conditions in the EWT. In all three 
conditions, empirical Pmax was lower than the derived values summarized in Table 10 whereas 
empirical Omax was higher than the derived value.  
As highlighted in Figure 29, residual plots follow a systematic pattern in which data 
points in the HWT and EWT were consistently clustered above the best-fit curve and slightly 
increasing at low ratio requirements. At higher ratio requirements (above derived Pmax), residuals 
in the EWT varied among conditions. Data in the D01 condition were generally well scattered 
above and below the best-fit curve line with clusters of no more than three data points above or 
below zero. Following derived Pmax, residuals decreased in the D28 condition. The D14 condition 
followed the same pattern as the D28 condition, but I observed a subsequent increase back to zero 
at the higher end of the ratio requirements. For all conditions in the HWT, residuals for ratio 
requirements higher than derived Pmax demonstrate a decreasing trend that was followed by a 
rapid increase during the highest ratios.  
Similar to Experiment 2, I observed appreciable differences in elasticity between the 
HWT and EWT with responding being significantly more elastic in the EWT for all delay 
conditions, D01, F(1, 28) = 42, p < .0001, D14, F(1, 28) = 74, p < .0001, D28, F(1, 23) = 32, p < 
.0001. These differences are shown in Figure 30. Empirical and derived demand indices were 
markedly lower in the EWT than the HWT within each delay condition.  
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 Predictive validity. To examine the relation between breakpoint on the hypothetical and 
experiential work tasks, Figure 31 plots EWT breakpoint as a function of HWT breakpoint, 
separated by delay condition. Results of three separate Spearman rank-order correlations 
revealed a significant positive relation between responding on the HWT and the EWT for all 
three conditions, D01, rs(95) = .45, p < .0001; D14, rs(95) = .62, p < .0001; D28, rs(95) = .42, p < 
.0001. Despite significant correlations in all three delay conditions, participants frequently 
overestimated the amount of work they would complete (i.e., higher breakpoint in the HWT than 
EWT). At the aggregate level, frequent overestimations of work output resulted in marked 
decreases in percentage change in all conditions (Figure 32). Similar to Experiment 2, more than 
half of the participants in each condition overestimated how much they would complete in the 
EWT (range: D28, 51.58% to D01, 55.79%). I observed perfect correspondence in breakpoint 
between the HWT and EWT in approximately one quarter of participants in each condition (D01, 
25.26%; D14, 24.21%; D28, 24.21%).  
Cost-benefit analysis. Figure 28 displays the relation between the work function on the 
left y-axis and cost on the right y-axis at each ratio requirement for all three conditions. Because 
work output was generally higher in the D01 condition, cost was also higher. However, work 
output and cost in the D14 and D28 conditions were generally equivalent through ratio 32. 
Between ratio requirements of 8 and 25, work output in D01 condition decreased slightly but 
remained relatively stable while cost decreased drastically. Thus, if it is feasible to deliver the 
incentive following a 1 day delay, selecting the D01 condition at a ratio requirement of 25 would 
appear to maximize benefits while minimizing cost. Several constraints in the workplace (e.g., 
payroll processing) may limit the feasibility of delivering monetary reinforcement after only one 
day. Perhaps—because of the wide range of possibilities—non-monetary incentives such as 
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access to a preferred parking spot or allowing an employee to bring his or her dog to work may 
be amenable to relatively immediate delivery. It remains to be seen, however, if delayed non-
monetary reinforcers result in response patterns similar to that found with monetary incentives in 
the present experiment. I observed numerous points of overlap between the D14 and D28 
conditions for curves depicting both work output and cost despite the delay between the 
conditions. Two points of Figure 28 suggest the D14 condition may yield favorable results for an 
organization. First, at ratio values of 10 and 12, work functions for the D14 and D28 conditions 
diverge with greater output in the D14 condition. Second, by ratio 48, all participants in the D28 
condition reached a breakpoint, whereas several participants in the D14 condition continued to 
respond at ratio 256.  
 In contrast with Experiment 2, I observed some differences in responding among 
incentive delay conditions. Responding was highest and more inelastic in the condition 
associated with the most immediate incentive delivery (i.e., D01). Despite being consistent with 
previous research on the effects of reinforcer delay previously discussed, this effect was often 
small and not always significantly different than responding in the other conditions. For 
example, median HWT breakpoint was highest in the D01 condition, but the differences between 
the D01 condition and the other conditions was not significant. Median EWT breakpoint was 
equal among all conditions, but significantly higher in the D01 condition than the D28 condition. 
The significant differences, despite equal median breakpoint values, may be a result of the spread 
of the data, which are difficult to ascertain based on Figure 24. In fact, the highest breakpoint 
values were 96, 48, and 32, in the D01, D14, and D28 conditions, respectively. The effects of 
delays greater than one day were more variable, but never differed significantly from one another 
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for the breakpoint or AtD analyses. The present data are tentative and more research is needed to 
support the findings. Nonetheless, two findings warrant additional discussion.  
First, accuracy in the D14 condition was consistently lower than the D01 and D28 
conditions, though typically remaining above 80%. This finding differs from Experiments 1 and 
2 in which percentage accuracy was largely undifferentiated among conditions. Upon closer 
inspection of the data, the lower levels of accuracy observed in the D14 condition were likely due 
to a greater percentage of participants in that group who inaccurately completed nearly all work 
units. Unfortunately, based on the present data, it is not clear if the decreased accuracy in the D14 
condition is related to the incentive delay.  
Importantly, the determination that delays greater than one day did not drastically change 
participant responding might indicate a relative insensitivity to delay beyond a certain threshold. 
This result, if it holds in future research, may be viewed as a success from a business standpoint. 
Delays of 14 and 28 days are especially relevant to organizational incentive arrangements 
because organizational payroll systems commonly occur on a bi-weekly or monthly cycle. When 
distributed with fixed earnings, monetary incentive payouts follow similar delays. At least two 
interpretations may provide insight regarding the variables controlling such an insensitivity to 
increases in delay and suggest areas for future research.  
First, Malott (2003) argues that employee responding is not controlled by direct-acting 
contingencies because the delay to reinforcement is simply too long. Instead, indirect-acting 
contingencies control behavior. Indirect-acting contingencies mediated by rules describing those 
contingencies may moderate the effects of longer delays to reinforcement in the workplace and 
account for the data observed in the present study. It might be that participants generated rules 
that functionally equated the value of the incentive despite the delays. A function-altering effect 
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of rules in this way would likely lead to the present findings. Further research is needed to 
provide support for this interpretation.  
Second, research in delay discounting commonly finds that money is discounted less 
steeply than other commodities (e.g., Charlton & Fantino, 2008). Results of a recent study by 
Holt, Glodowski, Smits-Seemann, and Tiry (2016) suggest this may be partially due to the fact 
that money is low in terms of perishability and high in terms of fungibility. Said another way, 
money can be used over long durations (i.e., in the future) and exchanged for a wide variety of 
goods or services (i.e., generalized conditioned reinforcer). It is possible that the same relative 
insensitivity to delay may not be observed when using other incentive types. For instance, a visa 
gift-card that expires in six months may not maintain the same levels of responding as cash. 
Although a gift-card can be used to purchase many other goods and services (highly fungible), it 
is also more perishable because it expires. This can further be contrasted with other non-
monetary incentives. Providing an employee with access to a preferred parking spot for six 
months is perishable and not fungible and may result in marked decreases in responding at 
longer delays. Researchers in OBM may benefit from considering the delay discounting 
literature when making decisions about items used in an incentive arrangement. 
The findings are in general agreement with previous research evaluating the effects of 
delay on work-related behavior within a behavioral economic demand framework. Although I 
did not observe significant differences in elasticity between the D01 and D28 conditions in the 
HWT, this effect was obtained in the EWT. Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Kaplan, et al. (2016) used 
a HWT to assess delays of 1 hr and 4 weeks with undergraduate participants. They found 
significant differences in elasticity with greater inelasticity in the 1-hr delay condition. An 
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interesting feature of the present experiment that differs from Henley et al. was the use of mTurk 
workers, which may contribute to the differences in findings of the HWT.  
As previously discussed, OBM research evaluating the effects of delayed incentives is 
largely lacking. Several researchers have evaluated the effects of delay on feedback (Krumhus & 
Malott, 1980; Mason & Redmon, 1992; Reid & Parsons, 1996), the findings of which may have 
implications for the use of delayed incentives. Research on delayed feedback suggests, when 
provided the option, 100% of participants chose to receive feedback delivered immediately 
rather than delayed (Reid & Parsons, 1996). Although the present study showed similarities in 
responding among delay conditions for a brief research session, different findings may emerge if 
participant preference impacted responding over longer periods (i.e., stronger preference for 
shorter delays may be correlated with or functionally related to responding). Quite possibly, 
employee acceptability with intervention procedures may effect intervention effectiveness and 
should be considered when evaluating the relative pros and cons of an incentive arrangement. If 
the difficulties of arranging incentive delivery every other week versus every four weeks are 
roughly equivalent in a given situation, Reid and Parsons’ findings suggest that a relatively 
shorter delay should be selected. Evaluations of interactions between incentive delay and 
preference remain to be explored in future research.  
One limitation of the present experiment involves the influence of the analog preparation 
on the accuracy of the cost-benefit analyses. Specifically, procedures for processing and 
delivering incentives to participants differed from real work settings. Paying participants in the 
present study required a few minutes per participant, and in fact, required slightly less work on 
the part of the experimenter in the D01 condition because there was no need to track the passage 
of time. Delivering monetary incentives in real world settings likely requires additional resources 
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to expedite their delivery. The analog nature of the present experiment prevented me from 
quantifying and including such costs in the cost-benefit analysis. The significant increase in 
responding in the D01 condition may not be sufficient to offset the costs an organization would 
need to allocate to carry out such an arrangement.  
General Discussion 
The current experiments examined the relative efficacy of reinforcer dimensions within a 
behavioral economic demand framework and how parametric manipulations of their values 
differentially influence performance. The goal was to provide insight into potentially effective 
strategies for predicting and managing behavior in the workplace. The present studies also 
sought to evaluate the predictive validity of a hypothetical assessment. Experiment 1 tested the 
effects of three incentive magnitudes and found an orderly relation between magnitude and 
responding as well as high correspondence between responding using hypothetical and 
experiential demand assessment procedures. Experiments 2 and 3 evaluated the effects of 
parametric values of incentive probability and delay, respectively. When the magnitude of 
reinforcement was yoked, responding was comparable across multiple response measures (e.g., 
breakpoint, accuracy) regardless of probability. Results of Experiment 3 revealed small effects of 
incentive delay in favor of the more immediate incentive delivery. Observed responding for 
delays greater than one day were roughly equivalent.  
Dimensions of Reinforcement  
Although there are certainly exceptions, the results of these collective studies suggest 
reinforcer dimensions influence responding and their values should not be haphazardly selected. 
The most consistent effects of these parametric manipulations within each reinforcer dimension 
were observed between the highest and lowest values. In Experiment 1, breakpoint was 
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consistently higher and elasticity consistently lower in the M20 condition relative to responding 
in the M05 condition in both the HWT and EWT. Although few comparisons between any of the 
conditions reached significance in Experiment 2, a significant difference in elasticity between the 
P90 and P10 conditions was observed in the HWT. Lastly, EWT breakpoint in Experiment 3 was 
significantly higher in the D01 condition compared to the D28 condition. The same effect of delay 
was observed in comparisons of elasticity in the EWT.  
When comparing among dimensions assessed, the effects of incentive magnitude had the 
most consistent and discernable effect on responding with higher magnitude incentives being 
relatively more efficacious. Results of the incentive magnitude manipulations are in general 
agreement with the larger literature evaluating reinforcer amount (Fantino, 1977). Probability, 
however, yielded no significant differences between any conditions despite comparisons of 
widely disparate probability values (i.e., 10% and 90%). As briefly mentioned, yoking the 
incentive magnitude to equate the amount earned after the probabilistic contingency was applied 
may have rendered the conditions functionally equivalent. Magnitude then, may have exerted a 
relatively greater influence on responding compared to probability when associated with the 
same consequence. Although I observed some mixed effects of incentive delay, the present 
findings are in general agreement with the literature on delayed reinforcement (e.g., Chung & 
Herrnstein, 1967).  
One goal of this line of research is to identify the reinforcer dimension that competes 
most effectively with concurrent sources of reinforcement in the workplace. A greater 
understanding of the relative efficacy of reinforcer dimensions and how parametric 
manipulations of their values differentially influence performance could lead to effective 
strategies for predicting and managing employee behavior. This information can then be used to 
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maximize the effectiveness of incentive interventions. Neef and Noone Lutz (2001) provide a 
possible definition of what constitutes the most effective dimension which states, “[the] 
dimension that consistently produced the highest proportion of time allocation in relation to any 
of the other three dimensions with which it competed” (p. 58). Considering the differences in 
relative consistency and differentiation noted above, an extension of Neef and Noone Lutz’s 
definition to the current research supports an interpretation that work-related behavior may be 
more sensitive to manipulations of magnitude and delay than probability. Other researchers have 
made similar arguments (Catania, 1979; Kimble, 1961; Lattal, 2010). For example, Lattal 
suggests, “along with rate, quality, and magnitude, delay has been considered a primary 
determinant of the effectiveness of a reinforcer” (p. 129). Further research is needed to 
investigate relative contributions of these reinforcer dimensions on responding in the work 
environment. 
Accuracy 
The accuracy with which employees perform their job is of great importance to 
organizational leaders in a diverse range of fields, in part because of the tremendous impact 
inaccurate performance can have on the consumers of the goods or services organizations 
produce. For example, Makary and Daniel (2016) recently estimated more than 250,000 
Americans die each year from preventable medical errors (e.g., inaccuracies during medical 
procedures or drug administration). This finding ranks medical mistakes as the third leading 
cause of death in the U.S. and underscores the importance of identifying interventions that 
support high levels of this socially significant organizational metric.  
One important finding across all three experiments is the consistently high levels of 
accurate work completion. As evidenced by the data presented in Table 11, overall median 
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accuracy never dropped below 85% for any condition. High levels of accuracy were maintained 
despite removing the contingency for correct responding in the practice trial in Experiments 2 
and 3. This finding suggests that the contingency for accurate responding in the practice trial was 
not responsible for the high levels of accuracy in Experiment 1. The finding that accuracy 
remained high irrespective of magnitude, probability, or delay is potentially promising for 
organizations (recognizing the translational nature of the present study, of course). Additionally, 
findings of all three studies suggest that decrements in accuracy could primarily be attributed to a 
relatively small percentage of participants. From an organizational perspective, this is good news 
because it may allow for organizations to focus behavior change efforts (e.g., feedback) on a low 
number of workers. This approach would likely require fewer resources than if the entire 
workforce consistently made errors that required intervention.  
However promising, it is possible that the contingencies in place for mTurk Workers 
contributed to the high levels of accuracy observed. Requesters may reject a HIT if Workers’ 
performance is not considered acceptable. In addition to not receiving compensation for their 
work in these cases, Amazon tracks Workers’ approval rate (i.e., the percentage of completed 
HITs accepted by requesters) and allows requesters to set a minimum acceptable level when 
posting a HIT; in the present experiments, Workers were required to have at least a 95% 
approval rate. Thus, having a low approval rate results in decreased opportunities to complete 
HITs. Workers may have responded accurately to avoid rejection of their work. Future research 
may wish to evaluate whether the percentage of accurately completed work varies as a function 
of Worker approval rates. It is also possible that decreases in accuracy would emerge if measured 
over longer periods of time. Thus, the effects of reinforcer dimensions on accuracy must be 
interpreted with some degree of caution. 
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HWT Predictive Validity  
I also observed significant positive correlations between breakpoint on the HWT and 
EWT for every condition in all three experiments. The consistent correlations suggest the HWT 
is a promising method for future research evaluating the effects of reinforcer dimension and the 
application of demand curve analyses to work-related behavior. However, comparisons of 
changes in the predictive validity of the HWT across studies suggested several features of the 
experimental arrangement and methodology may have influenced the correspondence between 
the HWT and EWT. Each of these experimental features are discussed in detail below (see the 
section with a heading labeled “Experimental Preparation Influences on Predictive Validity”).  
An important point regarding the HWT is the conceptualization of this measure as having 
predictive validity. Predictive validity assesses the degree to which a measure predicts 
performance assessed at some point in the future (Crocker & Algina, 1986). Arguably, in the 
current preparation, the HWT may not be assessing predictive validity because the EWT was 
completed only a few minutes following the HWT. Unfortunately, it is unclear how long the 
duration between an initial assessment and performance measurement must be for the original 
assessment to be accurately conceptualized as having predictive validity. Because the purpose of 
the HWT is to draw inferences to behavior in the workplace, the HWT likely falls under the 
general umbrella of criterion-related validity (Crocker & Algina, 1986), but may also be 
conceptualized as concurrent validity. According to Crocker and Algina, concurrent validity is 
another type of criterion-related validity that:  
“refers to the relationship between test scores and criterion measurements made at the 
same time the test was given…a sufficient correlation between the two would justify the 
use of the test in place of the less efficient and more costly observation system” (p. 224). 
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The HWT, if proven useful, would likely function in place of less efficient methods (i.e., 
experiential demand assessments) but will be used to predict a certain level of performance in the 
future when the contingencies described in the HWT are implemented in the organization. Thus, 
both predictive and concurrent validity may be appropriate. However, only predictive validity is 
used throughout the present document for consistency.  
Alternative Predictive Measures of Performance 
One goal of the present experiments was to identify behavioral scales, demographic 
characteristics, or employment-related variables that have predictive validity for how individuals 
will respond on the EWT. In the first experiment, rates of delay discounting assessed via the 
monetary choice questionnaire were not significantly correlated with work output, and only one 
measure from the behavioral inhibition/behavioral activation scale (BIS/BAS) was significantly 
related to breakpoint. Given the limited findings from Experiment 1, the monetary choice 
questionnaire and the BIS/BAS were replaced with the demographic, employment, and incentive 
survey in Experiments 2 and 3. Unfortunately, the only variable significantly related to EWT 
breakpoint was completing mTurk HITs because participants find the tasks to be fun 
(Experiment 2 only). This finding could be interpreted as an indication that a possible relation 
exists between enjoyment of work responsibilities and output, which certainly has some face 
validity. Nonetheless, the question was specific to the completion of mTurk HITs and in its 
current form would likely not prove probative in traditional work settings. Moreover, this 
relation was not observed in Experiment 3. Identifying a measure predictive of work output 
through additional research could have implications for a number of organizational practices, 
such as personnel selection and hiring practices.  
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The paucity of research on personnel selection and hiring practices in OBM stands in 
contrast to the substantial extant literature on the topic in industrial and organizational 
psychology (DiGennaro Reed, Hirst, & Howard, 2013). Personnel selection represents a major 
responsibility that organizational leaders must effectively navigate, for which the OBM literature 
offers little guidance. The relative skill of employees can substantially impact the effectiveness 
of an organization. In fact, highly successful organizations like Google frequently allocate six-
figure salaries to employ individuals whose primary role is to identify and recruit skilled staff. 
Quite possibly, increased scholarly attention to personnel selection in OBM could generate 
methods that, when implemented in practice, reduce the frequency or intensity of initial and 
ongoing training or interventions needed to address skill and performance deficits. Identification 
of such personnel selection methods would allow organizations to re-allocate valuable resources 
from recruitment efforts to empirically supported staff training and support programs. If this 
supposition holds, higher quality staff supports could lead to improvements in a host of socially 
significant issues that plague organizations, their employees, and consumers (e.g., turnover, 
workplace injuries, compromised treatment integrity). Such endeavors, if successful, may also 
serve to increase the exposure of OBM outside of behavior analysis given the premium 
businesses place on staff selection previously noted.  
Contributions to the Literature  
In spite of several noted inconsistencies between the current findings and previous 
research, these studies contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, these studies are 
some of the only studies in OBM to systematically manipulate reinforcer dimensions in a way 
that allows for direct comparisons among parametric values. Second, the inclusion of the HWT 
to evaluate the correspondence between hypothetical and experiential demand preparations 
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supports and extends previous research by allowing for a direct comparison of responding at 
every price. Research using experiential methods to validate hypothetical purchase tasks have 
typically only provided participants with one real outcome based on their responding on the 
hypothetical task—including Amlung and MacKillop’s (2015) study on alcohol purchases 
described previously.  
A third contribution of the present experiments was the inclusion of cost-benefit analyses. 
Cost is a major factor for organizations that influences intervention acceptability and 
implementation. Cost-benefit analyses provide organizational leaders with an efficient means of 
evaluating the economic feasibility of an intervention (Wells, Reimer, & Houmanfar, 2013). 
Despite numerous calls urging the use of such analyses (e.g., Andrasik, 1979; Balcazar, Shupert, 
Daniels, Mawhinney, & Hopkins, 1989; Poling, Smith, & Braatz, 1993), Wells and colleagues 
recently reported that just 10% of experimental OBM research published between 1977 and 2011 
include cost-benefit analyses. Higher rates of reporting cost-benefit analyses may also hold OBM 
researchers accountable for developing interventions in a cost-sensitive manner, selecting only 
those interventions indicated by the function of the problem behavior.  
A fourth contribution relates to the use of demand curve analyses. Consistent with the 
law of demand, the percentage of participants who completed the work requirement was inelastic 
and highest at a price of 1 and steadily decreased and became elastic with increases in the 
number of work units required to earn the incentive. I observed similar positively accelerating 
response patterns in the HWT and EWT across all conditions and experiments. Thus, despite 
parametric manipulations of reinforcer dimensions, responding in all cases was consistent with 
behavioral economic demand theory (Hursh, 1980). This finding extends previous research 
applying behavioral economic demand curve analyses to work-related behavior and monetary 
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incentives in at least three ways. First, it evaluated a wider range of reinforcer magnitudes than 
Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Reed, et al. (2016) with the inclusion of a $0.20 incentive in 
Experiment 1. Second, Experiment 2 evaluated parametric values of incentive probability 
previously unexplored in this novel line of research. Third, these studies also included 
evaluations of incentive delay using a different work task and participant pool using an 
experiential arrangement in addition to examinations of delay using a HWT performed by 
Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Kaplan, et al. (2016).  
Experimental Preparation Influences on Predictive Validity   
As noted previously, an interesting finding across studies was the marked decrease in 
several measures of predictive validity from Experiment 1 to Experiments 2 and 3. For all 
conditions in Experiments 2 and 3, I observed significant differences in breakpoint between the 
HWT and EWT; striking differences in the AtD curves between the HWT and EWT; and 
pronounced decreases in percentage change. Results for all three analyses stand in contrast to the 
findings of Experiment 1. Despite high correlations between breakpoints, the consistent and 
pronounced differences in responding between the HWT and EWT call into question the utility 
of the HWT for use in an organization. Interestingly though, decreases in predictive validity 
measures across studies were even observed between the M20 and D01 conditions. Both 
conditions had a 100% likelihood of earning a $0.20 incentive at a relatively short delay; one day 
in the D01 condition and between one and three days in the M20 condition. The finding that 
predictive validity was high for all measures, but the same measures resulted in highly discrepant 
response patterns on the HWT despite experiencing very similar contingencies suggests this 
difference may not be a function of the reinforcer dimensions assessed in Experiments 2 and 3. 
Rather, several features of the experimental arrangement and methodology were changed after 
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Experiment 1 and may have influenced the correspondence between the HWT and EWT in 
Experiments 2 and 3. If the source of this discrepancy cannot be identified through additional 
research, and the same general level of overestimation is consistently observed, it may be 
possible to quantify the extent to which individuals overestimate work completion using 
hypothetical tasks. Organizational leaders may then account for this difference when using the 
HWT to predict work output and cost or researchers may be able to identify a method handling 
data for participants without a breakpoint to ameliorate some of the effects on predictive validity. 
Even so, the implications of this finding for research and application warrants additional 
attention. 
Decreases in predictive validity in Experiments 2 and 3 co-occurred with increases in the 
numbers of participants who did not reach a breakpoint in the HWT. The percentage of 
participants who did not reach a breakpoint in the HWT was 0.69%, 4.9%, and 4.2% in 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Because several of the dependent measures were based on 
aggregate group performance, retaining data for these participants resulted in pronounced 
increases in projected performance and contributed to the disparity between the HWT and EWT. 
Two features of the HWT presentation might have influenced responding on the HWT. First, the 
HWT ratio requirements in Experiments 2 and 3 were presented simultaneously on a single page 
rather than presenting a single ratio requirement per page in a sequential manner. Skidmore and 
Murphy (2011), although evaluating alcohol consumption with a purchase task, used a similar 
arrangement in that the prices were presented in an ascending order and shown all at once. When 
Skidmore and Murphy presented the prices in this fashion, nearly a quarter of their sample (n = 
47; 22.7%) were excluded from analyses because their R2 values when fit to the demand equation 
fell below 0.3. In 2012, Gentile, Librizzi, and Martinetti sought to address the limitations of 
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Skidmore and Murphy, including how prices were presented to participants. In their extension, 
only one price was shown at a time. No participants were excluded due to unsystematic 
responding on the purchase task or low R2 values. Although a seemingly minor variation, HPT 
research has consistently demonstrated changes in responding with minor procedural 
manipulations (e.g., Skidmore & Murphy, 2011). Thus, it is possible that presenting the HWT on 
a single page resulted in a higher number of participants who did not reach a breakpoint. It would 
be informative for future research to examine whether this difference systematically affects 
HWT responding. The fact that responding is highly sensitive to minor manipulations could be 
used as evidence against the use of hypothetical tasks as it may result in inconsistent or variable 
results. However, basic research on instructional control has also consistently demonstrated 
robust effects of minor variations on response patterns (e.g., Henley, Hirst, DiGennaro Reed, 
Becirevic, & Reed, 2016).  
It may also be the case that requiring participants to respond to every ratio requirement in 
the HWT may have influenced predictive validity. This contingency increased the number of 
overall required responses and several participants noted frustration with this experimental 
feature when given the opportunity to provide feedback following study completion. For 
example, one participant commented, “I'm not sure why you asked me at the end the same 
questions you asked at the beginning, but if you had some good reason to ask them all again, and 
all on different pages, at least you could have stopped asking me once I said no - why would 
anyone possibly be uninterested in answering 10, but be *interested* in doing *more* than 10? 
That part was just totally a waste of time.” Responses such as these—though unclear if related to 
changes in predictive validity among experiments—may have implications for the social validity 
of HWT methodology and could inform any procedures recommended for use in practice.  
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Third, decreases in predictive validity may be due to the increased time between 
completion of the HWT and EWT as a result of requiring participants to complete the 
demographic, employment, and incentive survey between the tasks. Separating the work tasks 
was intended to mitigate sequence effects of completing the HWT prior to the EWT, but may 
have inadvertently decreased predictive validity. In real work environments, however, 
assessments intended to predict subsequent job performance would likely be separated in time by 
days, weeks, months, or even years. It is important to note that psychometric studies of 
predictive validity involve varying time differences suggesting this issue is likely not responsible 
for the low predictive validity I observed. Systematic manipulation and evaluation of how delay 
between assessment and performance influences predictive validity represents a logical and 
important area for future research on this topic. In addition, the aforementioned features may also 
have contributed to the increase in the number of participants who overestimated their work 
completion and contributed to the striking differences in breakpoint and elasticity between the 
HWT and EWT for all probability and delay conditions.  
One possible feature contributing to the number of individuals who overestimated their 
responding involves the use of a PR schedule. A notable limitation of the use of the PR schedule 
in the present study involves the cumulative number of responses emitted as the ratio 
requirement increased within the session. Responding at each ratio requirement was not 
necessarily reflective of that reinforcement schedule as it may also have been influenced by each 
prior ratio presented in the session; a limitation tacted by several participants in the present 
studies. For example, when given the opportunity to provide feedback one participant noted, 
“Doing 25 sliders is not the same as doing the amount of each number up to 25.” Such responses 
raise the possibility that some participants may have been responding as if the requirement would 
120 
 
be presented in isolation when prompted to indicate their willingness to complete increasing 
requirements in the HWT. When presented consecutively in the EWT, however, the 
experimental preparation may have led to lower breakpoints than might otherwise be observed if 
the ratio requirements were not presented in a progressive fashion within session. Future research 
could assess the predictive validity of the HWT using a derivation of the PR arrangement 
wherein participants complete progressively increasing ratio requirements during different 
sessions separated in time (Jarmolowicz & Lattal, 2010). Researchers have successfully used 
modified PR schedules wherein the response requirement is increased between rather than within 
session in human operant drug self-administration studies (e.g., Bickel & Madden, 1999). The 
effects of using a PR schedule, however relevant, does not explain why overestimations 
increased in Experiments 2 and 3 when the schedule remained unchanged from Experiment 1.  
Limitations and Future Research   
In addition to those already identified, several other limitations inform areas for future 
research. As mentioned previously, nonmonetary reinforcers are a flexible means for mediating 
budgetary restrictions associated with implementing an incentive system. Recall also that 
response effort may affect the allocation of employee responding among concurrently available 
work tasks that require varying levels of effort. A logical extension, therefore, would be to 
examine parametric effects of effort and quality.  
Second, the current experimental preparation was designed to address the limitations of 
typical laboratory-based analog OBM research employing undergraduate participants in which 
limited concurrent response options capable of effectively competing with the simulated work 
task exist. Despite improvements, the preparation nonetheless differed form a real work 
environment in several potentially important ways. Additionally, because a similar preparation 
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was used, all three experiments are subject to the same limitations regarding external validity 
some of which include the duration and complexity of the work task, relative immediacy of base 
pay (24 hr), and incentive amounts. It is also likely that progressive reinforcement contingencies 
are uncommon in the workplace. As a result, the analog arrangement limits conclusions about 
how the effects may generalize to real workplaces. However, this line of research is still in the 
early stages and transitioning to an applied setting at this point may result in unintended 
consequences. A related limitation of this arrangement is that I did not have control over the 
environment in which participants completed the experimental procedures. The variability in 
environmental conditions may have obscured differences that would otherwise emerged if 
participants completed study procedures under similar settings.  
Third, despite observing consistent differences among magnitude conditions, increases in 
responding in the larger magnitude conditions were relatively modest in comparison to the 
relatively large differences in incentive amount. As illustrated by the reversed relation between 
response output and magnitude observed when using unit price, a one-unit increase in magnitude 
was met with a less than one-unit increase in response output. Small changes in behavior despite 
relatively large differences in reinforcer magnitude have been consistently documented in the 
literature since the early 1960s (Catania, 1963; Fantino & Logan, 1979), but this relation is 
typically observed in single operant arrangements. When researchers manipulate magnitude in a 
concurrent operant arrangement, however, large differences in responding emerge. Researchers 
have long commented on the advantages of concurrent operant arrangements as compared to 
single operant arrangements for examining the effects of manipulating reinforcer dimensions on 
behavior (e.g., Fisher & Mazur, 1997). Therefore, future investigations may wish to extend the 
current experimental paradigm to a concurrent operant arrangement. Extending choice 
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procedures used to evaluate reinforcer dimensions and preference in other applied settings (e.g., 
Neef et al., 1994) to evaluations of incentive arrangements in the workplace may also provide 
valuable information on the social validity of such arrangements (Schwartz & Baer, 1991).  
Results of several studies evaluating reinforcer dimensions in applied settings suggest the 
most efficacious dimension often differs for each participant (Neef et al., 1994; Neef & Noone 
Lutz, 2001). Based on these results, comparing the current findings to those obtained using 
within-subject methods may be an important contribution to the literature evaluating the effects 
of reinforcer dimensions on work-related responding. A within-subject approach may provide 
insight into how varying parametric levels within a reinforcer dimension as well as between 
dimensions may influence responding within-subject as compared to group responding. Because 
performance management interventions frequently target the behavior of individuals and groups 
any differences may help improve application technology.  
AtD Model Fits 
One final observation that warrants some discussion is the AtD model fits. Across the 
three experiments, R2 values for AtD curves were consistently high, ranging from .74 to .98 (M = 
.93). As previously mentioned, R2 may not be the most informative measure for evaluating the 
applicability and appropriateness of the exponential model of demand. Consistent with Motulsky 
and Cristopoulos’ (2006) suggestion, I carefully inspected residual plots for all AtD model fits to 
evaluate whether residuals are randomly distributed around the best-fit curve. 
Visual inspection of the residual plots for systematic deviations from the best-fit curves 
revealed an interesting pattern. In the EWT, residuals at lower prices demonstrate an increasing 
trend away from the curve fit, the peak of which closely aligns with derived Pmax. Thus, the point 
at which consumption values derived from the exponential model deviate the most in the EWT 
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occurs at the point of unit elasticity. This is also the point at which one would expect peak 
response output and has been suggested in research as the point with the greatest potential for 
applied utility.  
This discrepancy may explain some of the inconsistencies with empirical and derived 
Omax in the EWT. Because consumption at Pmax is used to quantify derived Omax, if the curve is 
consistently under-fitting the data at this point, derived Omax is calculated based on deflated 
consumption values that are not reflective of observed responding. For example, derived Omax for 
the P90 condition in the EWT was 226 work units at a price of 7.8. Despite similar derived and 
empirical Pmax values, the number of work units completed at empirical Omax is approximately 
double.  
The same extended sequence of increasing data points above the best fit line at low prices 
can also be seen in the HWT, however, the residuals at these values are more closely aligned 
with the best fit curve. This increase is followed by a stretch of negative residuals and 
subsequently a considerable positive deviation from the best fit at the highest prices. The pattern 
observed in the HWT was partially influenced by the number of individuals who did not reach a 
breakpoint. The presence of extreme values could also influence empirical and derived parameter 
estimates.  
Cursory examination of previous research using the exponential model suggests this trend 
may not be unique to the current data (e.g., Hursh, 2014; Reed et al., 2014). If MacKillop and 
Murphy (2007) experienced a similar issue, it may explain their statement “data from our 
laboratory suggest that the observed parameters are more reliable than the derived values” (p. 
229). Similar fitting issues have been noted in the delay discounting literature. For example, 
Odum (2011) suggests Mazur’s (1987) discounting equation tends to overpredict indifference 
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points at shorter delays and underpredict indifference points at longer delays. Ultimately, 
questions remain about how systematic deviations from the best fit line—particularly at Pmax—
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Experiment 1 Participant Demographic Information 
 
Demographic M05 M10 M20 
Age (years)       
 Min 20.0 20.0 21.0 
 Max 72.0 66.0 63.0 
 M 36.4 36.6 34.7 
 SD 12.0 11.8 10.8 
 n % n % n % 
Gender       
 Female 46 46.5 52 54.7 48 50.5 
 Male 53 53.5 43 45.3 47 49.5 
Ethnicity        
 Asian 3 3.0 4 4.2 6 6.3 
 Black/African American 9 9.1 4 4.2 5 5.3 
 Hispanic/Latino 2 2.0 4 4.2 3 3.2 
 Mixed 2 2.0 1 1.1 1 1.1 
 Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 2.1 
 White/Caucasian 83 83.8 82 86.3 78 82.1 
Education        
 Less than high school 1 1 2 2.1 1 1.1 
 High school/GED 13 13.1 8 8.4 12 12.6 
 Some college 18 18.2 22 23.2 33 34.7 
 2-year college degree 10 10.1 9 9.5 14 14.7 
 4-year college degree 47 47.5 39 41.1 29 30.5 
 Master’s degree 7 7.1 11 11.6 6 6.3 
 Doctoral degree 2 2.0 1 1.1 0 0.0 
 Professional degree (JD, MD) 1 1.0 3 3.2 0 0.0 
Income        
 Less than 30,000 37 37.4 22 23.2 31 32.6 
 30,000 – 39,999 18 18.2 13 13.7 17 17.9 
 40,000 – 49,999 6 6.1 12 12.6 11 11.6 
 50,000 – 59,999 9 9.1 18 18.9 10 10.5 
 60,000 – 69,999 7 7.1 5 5.3 7 7.4 
 70,000 – 79,999 5 5.1 4 4.2 4 4.2 
 80,000 – 89,999 5 5.1 6 6.3 4 4.2 
 90,000 – 99,999 1 1.0 3 3.2 2 2.1 








 ADHD 2 2.0 2 2.1 2 2.1 
 Learning disability 0 0 1 1.1 0 0 
 Physical disability 5 5.0 8 8.4 5 5.3 
 Other 1 1.0 1 1.1 3 3.2 
Smoking status       
 Yes – currently  19 19.2 16 16.8 22 23.2 
 Yes – previously  21 21.2 25 26.3 28 29.5 






Experiment 1 HWT and EWT Analog to Demand Indices and Model Fits 
 
 Ratio Requirement 
 M05 M10 M20 
Indices HWT EWT HWT EWT HWT EWT 
 .00029 .00032 .00019 .00023 .00017 .00018 
EV 12.19 11.05 18.61 15.37 20.80 19.64 
Pmax Derived 9.95 9.02 15.18 12.54 16.97 16.03 
Pmax Empirical 128.00 8.00 10.00 8.00 20.00 20.00 
Omax Derived 308.40 279.48 440.34 363.76 492.15 464.80 
Omax Empirical 384.00 416.00 470.00 480.00 640.00 620.00 
R2 .87 .97 .95 .97 .98 .97 
 Unit Price 
 .0015 .0016 .0019 .0023 .0034 .0036 
EV 2.36 2.21 1.86 1.54 1.04 0.98 
Pmax Derived 1.92 1.80 1.52 1.25 0.85 0.80 
Pmax Empirical 25.60 1.60 1.00 0.80 1.00 1.00 
Omax Derived 55.78 52.29 44.03 36.38 24.61 23.24 
Omax Empirical 76.80 83.20 47.00 48.00 32.00 31.00 














Experiment 2 Participant Demographic Information 
 
Demographic P90 P50 P10 
Age (years)       
 Min 19.0 19.0 22.0 
 Max 64.0 65.0 72.0 
 M 36.0 36.0 35.0 
 SD 10.8 11.0 11.4 
 n % n % n % 
Gender       
 Female 46 48.4 44 6.3 41 43.2 
 Male 49 51.6 51 53.7 54 56.8 
Ethnicity        
 Asian 5 5.3 8 8.4 8  8.4 
 Black/African American 6 6.3 2 2.1 3  3.2 
 Hispanic/Latino 3 3.2 3 3.2 3  3.2 
 Mixed 2  2.1 2 2.1 2  2.1 
 Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 2.1 
 White/Caucasian 79 83.2 80 84.2 77 81.1 
Education        
 Less than high school 0 0.0 2 2.1 0 0.0 
 High school/GED 10 10.5 15 15.8 5 5.3 
 Some college 29 30.5 28 29.5 25 26.3 
 2-year college degree 8 8.4 15 15.8 16 16.8 
 4-year college degree 35 36.8 27 28.4 38 40.0 
 Master’s degree 9 9.5 7 7.4 10 10.5 
 Doctoral degree 2 2.1 0 0.0 1 1.1 
 Professional degree (JD, MD) 2 2.1 1 1.1 0 0.0 
Income        
 Less than 30,000 21 22.1 27 28.4 14 14.7 
 30,000 – 39,999 14 14.7 16 16.8 12 21.1 
 40,000 – 49,999 12 12.6 11 11.6 13 13.7 
 50,000 – 59,999 13 13.7 8 8.4 11 11.6 
 60,000 – 69,999 11 11.6 11 11.6 5 5.3 
 70,000 – 79,999 4 4.2 6 6.3 7 7.4 
 80,000 – 89,999 6 6.3 2 2.1 5 5.3 
 90,000 – 99,999 5 5.3 2 2.1 4 4.2 




 Table 4 
 
Experiment 2 Amazon Mechanical Turk Employment 
 
Variable P90 P50 P10 
Average hours per week on mTurk       
 Min 2.0  1.0  1.0  
 Max 100.0  80.0  72.0  
 M 15.6  19.2  15.2  
 SD 14.0  14.2  12.0  
Average weekly mTurk income         
 Min 1.5  5.0  5.0  
 Max 1000.0  700.0  500.0  
 M 79.9  114.4  79.3  
 SD 109.8  103.3  78.8  
Hourly wage (hours/income)       
 Min .15  .75  1.0  
 Max 25.0  50.0  40.0  
 M 5.6  6.8  6.7  
 SD 4.2  6.7  6.0  
  n % n % n % 
Reason for completing mTurk tasks       
 Unemployed or employed part-time 10 10.5 12 12.6 13 13.7 
 Fruitful way to spend free time 59 62.1 46 48.4 52 54.7 
 Like to participate in research 33 34.7 28 29.5 28 29.5 
 Primary income 12 12.6 23 24.2 15 15.8 
 Secondary income 73 76.8 68 71.6 67 70.5 
 Tasks are fun 29 30.5 27 28.4 22 23.2 
 To kill time 17 17.9 15 15.8 21 22.1 












Experiment 2 Employment and Incentive Information at Most Recent Paid Position 
 
 P90 P50 P10 
Variable n % n % n % 
Job tenure        
 No paid position in past 10 years 5 5.3 3 3.2 3 3.2 
 0 – 3 months 4 4.2 9 9.5 6 6.3 
 3 – 6 months 5 5.3 3 3.2 6 6.3 
 6 months – 1 year  10 10.5 8 8.4 7 7.4 
 1 – 3 years 20 21.1 20 21.1 27 28.4 
 3 – 5 years 17 17.9 21 22.1 16 16.8 
 5 – 10 years  22 23.2 17 17.9 17 17.9 
 10 – 20 years  6 6.3 9 9.5 11 11.6 
 20+ years 6 6.3 5 5.3 2 2.1 
Promotions received       
 0 40 44.4 43 46.7 40 43.5 
 1 22 24.4 29 31.5 27 29.3 
 2 14 15.6 11 12.0 14 15.2 
 3 5 5.6 7 7.6 8 8.7 
 4 4 4.4 1 1.1 1 1.1 
 5+ 5 5.6 1 1.1 2 2.2 
Occupation         
 Architecture/engineering 1 1.1 2 2.2 7 7.6 
 Art and design 4 4.4 3 3.3 2 2.2 
 Building, grounds cleaning, and maintenance  2 2.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 Business and financial operations 9 10.0 5 5.4 2 2.2 
 Community and social service  1 1.1 1 1.1 1 1.1 
 Computer/mathematical  9 10.0 12 13.0 11 12.0 
 Construction/installation/repair 2 2.2 3 3.3 3 3.3 
 Education/training/library 6 6.7 7 7.6 9 9.8 
 Entertainer/performer  1 1.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 Farming/fishing/forestry  1 1.1 0 0.0 1 1.1 
 Food preparation/serving  8 8.9 12 13.0 6 6.5 
 Healthcare practitioner or technician  5 5.6 4 4.3 3 3.3 
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 Healthcare support 3 3.3 4 4.3 7 7.6 
 Legal occupations 1 1.1 3 3.3 1 1.1 
 Life science 0 0.0 2 2.2 3 3.3 
 Management  3 3.3 5 5.4 5 5.4 
 Media and communications 3 3.3 1 1.1 2 2.2 
 Military and protective service  1 1.1 0 0.0 2 2.2 
 Office/administrative support 18 20.0 11 12.0 13 14.1 
 Personal care and service  0 0.0 1 1.1 0 0.0 
 Physical science 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 Production/manufacturing 1 1.1 2 2.2 0 0.0 
 Sales 11 12.2 11 12.0 12 13.0 
 Social science 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 Transportation  0 0.0 3 3.3 2 2.2 
Reason for leaving last paid position        
 Accepted a new job at a different company 41 45.6 28 30.4 26 28.3 
 Internal promotion 11 12.2 14 15.2 10 10.9 
 Decided not to work outside of the home 3 3.3 16 17.4 11 12.0 
 Laid off or otherwise terminated 13 14.4 9 9.8 14 15.2 
 Prefer not to answer 12 13.3 14 15.2 14 15.2 
 Other 10 11.1 11 12.0 17 18.5 
Incentive availability         
 Yes – monetary incentives 28 29.5 29 30.5 21 22.1 
 Yes – other gifts  24 25.3 24 25.3 26 27.4 
 No  51 53.7 49 51.6 52 54.7 
Incentive frequency       
 Daily  3 7.7 4 9.3 1 2.5 
 Weekly 7 17.9 2 4.7 12 30.0 
 Monthly  10 25.6 10 23.3 7 17.5 
 Quarterly  3 7.7 6 14.0 4 10.0 
 Twice yearly  14 35.9 15 34.9 11 27.5 
 Annually  0 0.0 3 7.0 1 2.5 









Experiment 2 HWT and EWT Analog to Demand Indices and Model Fits 
 
 P90 P50 P10 
Indices HWT EWT HWT EWT HWT EWT 
 .00012 .00037 .00014 .0003 .00007 .00035 
EV 29.46 9.56 25.25 11.79 50.51 10.10 
Pmax Derived 24.04 7.80 20.61 9.62 40.21 8.24 
Pmax Empirical 20.00 8.00 256.00 10.00 256.00 8.00 
Omax Derived 697.21 226.12 597.61 278.88 1195.21 239.04 
Omax Empirical 800.00 440.00 768.00 380.00 1280.00 440.00 






Experiment 3 Participant Demographic Information 
 
Demographic D01 D14 D28 
Age (years)       
 Min 19.0 19.0 18.0 
 Max 75.0 67.0 64.0 
 M 33.6 32.9 31.2 
 SD 10.3 11.4 8.0 
 n % n % n % 
Gender       
 Female 35 36.8 41 43.2 42 44.2 
 Male 60 63.2 54 56.8 53 55.8 
Ethnicity        
 Asian 6 6.3 14 14.7 7 7.4 
 Black/African American 7 7.4 8 8.4 10 10.5 
 Hispanic/Latino 6 6.3 2 2.1 6 6.3 
 Mixed 2 2.1 2 2.1 0 0.0 
 Other 1 1.1 0 0.0 1 1.1 
 White/Caucasian 73 76.8 69 72.6 71 74.7 
Education        
 Less than high school 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 High school/GED 15 15.8 18 18.9 11 11.6 
 Some college 26 27.4 31 32.6 26 27.4 
 2-year college degree 15 15.8 8 8.4 11 11.6 
 4-year college degree 34 35.8 29 30.5 39 41.1 
 Master’s degree 5 5.3 8 8.4 6 6.3 
 Doctoral degree 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 Professional degree (JD, MD) 0 0.0 1 1.1 2 2.1 
Income        
 Less than 30,000 27 28.4 27 28.4 24 25.3 
 30,000 – 39,999 17 17.9 15 15.8 21 22.1 
 40,000 – 49,999 11 11.6 8 8.4 12 12.6 
 50,000 – 59,999 14 14.7 14 14.7 7 7.4 
 60,000 – 69,999 6 6.3 4 4.2 6 6.3 
 70,000 – 79,999 3 3.2 7 7.4 6 6.3 
 80,000 – 89,999 3 3.2 4 4.2 6 6.3 
 90,000 – 99,999 8 8.4 5 5.3 4 4.2 






Experiment 3 Amazon Mechanical Turk Employment 
 
Variable D01 D14 D28 
Average hours per week on mTurk       
 Min 2.0  1.0  2.0  
 Max 70.0  80.0  100.0  
 M 19.1  19.0  20.7  
 SD 13.6  14.7  14.1  
Average weekly mTurk income         
 Min 0.00  5.0  2.0  
 Max 500.0  680.0  500.0  
 M 83.1  92.4  119.3  
 SD 76.8  97.5  98.3  
Hourly wage (hours/income)       
 Min .5  .7  .0  
 Max 25.0  20.0  25.0  
 M 6.5  5.8  5.8  
 SD 4.7  4.3  5.4  
  n % n % n % 
Reason for completing mTurk tasks       
 Unemployed or employed part-time 11 11.6 16 16.8 16 16.8 
 Fruitful way to spend free time 48 50.5 47 49.5 51 53.7 
 Like to participate in research 26 27.4 19 20.0 28 29.5 
 Primary income 22 23.2 21 22.1 25 26.3 
 Secondary income 61 64.2 62 65.3 52 54.7 
 Tasks are fun 29 30.5 21 22.1 26 27.4 
 To kill time 17 17.9 14 14.7 15 15.8 












Experiment 3 Employment and Incentive Information at Most Recent Paid Position 
 
 D01 D14 D28 
Variable n % n % n % 
Job tenure        
 No paid position in past 10 years 1 1.1 2 2.1 2 2.1 
 0 – 3 months 4 4.2 4 4.2 6 6.3 
 3 – 6 months 6 6.3 4 4.2 6 6.3 
 6 months – 1 year  12 12.6 16 16.8 9 9.5 
 1 – 3 years 21 22.1 30 31.6 29 30.5 
 3 – 5 years 28 29.5 13 13.7 21 22.1 
 5 – 10 years  17 17.9 14 14.7 15 15.8 
 10 – 20 years  4 4.2 5 5.3 5 5.3 
 20+ years 2 2.1 7 7.4 2 2.1 
Promotions received       
 0 48 51.1 52 55.9 42 45.2 
 1 25 26.6 24 25.8 32 34.4 
 2 15 16.0 10 10.8 12 12.9 
 3 5 5.3 3 3.2 4 4.3 
 4 1 1.1 1 1.1 2 2.2 
 5+ 0 0.0 3 3.2 1 1.1 
Occupation         
 Architecture/engineering 1 1.1 1 1.1 0 0.0 
 Art and design 2 2.1 3 3.2 2 2.2 
 Building, grounds cleaning, and maintenance  0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.1 
 Business and financial operations 9 9.6 11 11.8 9 9.7 
 Community and social service  3 3.2 0 0.0 2 2.2 
 Computer/mathematical  7 7.4 8 8.6 10 10.8 
 Construction/installation/repair 4 4.3 6 6.5 1 1.1 
 Education/training/library 10 10.6 9 9.7 7 7.5 
 Entertainer/performer  1 1.1 1 1.1 0 0.0 
 Farming/fishing/forestry  0 0.0 1 1.1 2 2.2 
 Food preparation/serving  13 13.8 8 8.6 9 9.7 
 Healthcare practitioner or technician  3 3.2 9 9.7 3 3.2 
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 Healthcare support 1 1.1 5 5.4 6 6.5 
 Legal occupations 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 2.2 
 Life science 1 1.1 1 1.1 1 1.1 
 Management  3 3.2 3 3.2 3 3.2 
 Media and communications 2 2.1 1 1.1 2 2.2 
 Military and protective service  2 2.1 1 1.1 0 0.0 
 Office/administrative support 13 13.8 7 7.5 11 11.8 
 Personal care and service  1 1.1 0 0.0 2 2.2 
 Physical science 1 1.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 Production/manufacturing 1 1.1 2 2.2 1 1.1 
 Sales 16 17.0 11 11.8 15 16.1 
 Social science 0 0.0 1 1.1 1 1.1 
 Transportation  0 0.0 4 4.3 3 3.2 
Reason for leaving last paid position        
 Accepted a new job at a different company 23 24.5 26 28.0 25 26.9 
 Internal promotion 19 20.2 9 9.7 18 19.4 
 Decided not to work outside of the home 9 9.6 13 14.0 10 10.8 
 Laid off or otherwise terminated 16 17.0 8 8.6 13 14.0 
 Prefer not to answer 13 13.8 18 19.4 18 19.4 
 Other 14 14.9 19 20.4 9 9.7 
Incentive availability         
 Yes – monetary incentives 20 21.1 25 26.3 33 34.7 
 Yes – other gifts  15 15.8 13 13.7 18 18.9 
 No  66 69.5 60 63.2 54 56.8 
Incentive frequency       
 Daily  1 3.6 2 6.1 2 5.1 
 Weekly 11 39.3 7 21.2 8 20.5 
 Monthly  8 28.6 4 12.1 14 35.9 
 Quarterly  2 7.1 4 12.1 3 7.7 
 Twice yearly  6 21.4 12 36.4 10 25.6 
 Annually  0 0.0 3 9.1 0 0.0 





Experiment 3 HWT and EWT Analog to Demand Indices and Model Fits 
 
 D01 D14 D28 
Indices HWT EWT HWT EWT HWT EWT 
 .00011 .00023 .00014 .00032 .00011 .00032 
EV 32.14 15.37 25.25 11.05 32.14 11.05 
Pmax Derived 26.23 12.54 20.61 9.02 26.23 9.02 
Pmax Empirical 256.00 8.00 10/20.00 8.00 256.00 8.00 
Omax Derived 760.59 363.76 597.61 261.45 760.59 261.45 
Omax Empirical 1024.00 496.00 600.00 416.00 1536.00 408.00 









Percentage of Accurate Responding at Each Ratio Requirement for All Conditions and 
Experiments 
 
Ratio M05 M10 M20 P90 P50 P10 D01 D14 D28 
PT    88.07 89.82 92.63 90.53 77.89 94.39 
1 90.43 92.47 91.40 91.40 94.57 93.68 92.55 86.67 93.41 
2 96.74 94.38 94.44 90.22 91.21 93.48 94.94 85.16 95.68 
4 97.53 96.91 98.40 93.75 94.33 95.33 97.59 87.34 93.93 
8 99.28 96.46 98.63 91.59 92.02 95.45 98.99 85.82 97.06 
10 99.76 97.33 98.27 89.09 94.74 91.71 98.89 85.64 95.86 
12 99.36 96.15 98.67 93.23 91.67 83.97 99.34 85.42 95.08 
15 99.63 94.55 98.95 90.77 93.70 85.78 99.51 80.33 99.65 
20 99.23 93.89 95.65 85.00 91.67 71.22 99.13 77.50 99.58 
25 99.50 90.55 98.29 75.00 87.56 0.00 98.29 68.50 98.67 
32 100.00 98.44 99.15 66.67 85.27 33.33 100.00 35.42 100.00 
48 100.00 100.00 98.21 66.67 100.00 50.00 100.00 50.00  
64 100.00 100.00 96.35 100.00  50.00 99.22 100.00  
96 98.96 98.96 94.79   49.48 100.00 100.00  
128   98.44    100.00 100.00  
256   94.14    100.00 99.61  
Median 99.36 96.46 98.27 90.22 91.84 84.88 99.17 85.53 95.86 
 
Note. Experiment 1 did not have the opportunity to provide inaccurate responses in the practice 


































Figure 2. Median breakpoints in the HWT and EWT for the M05, M10, and M20 conditions. Error 
bars represent interquartile range. Statistically significant differences are denoted by * p < .05, 






























Figure 3. Median unit price breakpoints (work units per $0.01) in the HWT and EWT for the 
M05, M10, and M20 conditions. Error bars denote interquartile range. Statistically significant 


























Figure 4. Experiment 1 percentage of accurately completed work units. Horizontal lines 
represent group medians across all ratio requirements and correspond to the data paths denoting 













































Figure 5. Analog to demand curves for the M05, M10, and M20 conditions in the HWT (top panel) 
and EWT (bottom panel). The y-axis depicts the percentage of participants in each incentive 
magnitude condition who indicated willingness to complete (HWT) or completed (EWT) the 
ratio requirement. The x-axis depicts the ratio requirement needed to earn the incentive. Vertical 




Figure 6. Work functions for the M05, M10, and M20 conditions in the HWT for Experiment 1.  
 























Figure 7. Cost-benefit analysis of the EWT for Experiment 1. The number of work units 
completed is depicted by the grey data points and scaled to the left y-axis. Cost in dollars per 





































Figure 8. Residuals (distance from best-fit curve) from AtD curves in the EWT (left panel) and 
HWT (right panel) in Experiment 1. Residual plots for the M05, M10, and M20 conditions are 
displayed in the top, middle, and bottom panels, respectively. Vertical lines represent derived 






















































Figure 9. Experiment 1 analog to demand curves for the HWT and EWT separately. Vertical 
lines represent derived Pmax. 


































































Figure 10. Analog to demand curves for the M05, M10, and M20 conditions in the HWT (top 
panel) and EWT (bottom panel). The y-axis depicts the percentage of participants in each 
incentive magnitude condition who indicated willingness to complete (HWT) or completed 
(EWT) the ratio requirement. The x-axis depicts unit price (ratio requirement/incentive amount). 























































Figure 11. Predictive validity of the HWT in Experiment 1. The size of the data point symbols 
reflects the number of participants whose data are represented by that value. 
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Figure 12. Experiment 1 percentage change in predicted work output and corresponding cost 
from the HWT to observed output and cost in the EWT. The gray horizontal line indicates a 0% 
change, or perfect aggregate correspondence. Data above the gray horizontal line indicate an 
increase in the amount of work completed and higher costs associated with the EWT than were 
predicted. Data points below the line indicate less work completed and a lower cost observed in 








































Figure 13. Experienced probabilities across ratio requirements for Experiment 2. Grey horizontal 
lines indicate the programmed probabilities for the P90, P50, and P10 conditions (from top to 
bottom), respectively. Asterisks denote the first ratio requirement at which fewer than ten 
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Figure 14. Median breakpoints in the P90, P50, and P10 conditions. Error bars denote interquartile 























Figure 15. Experiment 2 percentage of accurately completed work units. Horizontal lines 
represent group medians across all ratio requirements and correspond to the data paths denoting 










































Figure 16. Experiment 2 analog to demand curves for the P90, P50, and P10 conditions in the 
HWT (top panel) and EWT (bottom panel). The y-axis depicts the percentage of participants in 
each incentive probability condition who indicated willingness to complete (HWT) or completed 
(EWT) the ratio requirement. The x-axis depicts the ratio requirement needed to earn the 
incentive. Vertical lines correspond to derived Pmax. 
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Figure 18. Cost-benefit analysis of the EWT in Experiment 2. Number of work units completed 
is denoted by the grey data points and scaled to the left y-axis. Cost in dollars per ratio 





Figure 19. Residuals (distance from best-fit curve) from AtD curves in the EWT (left panel) and 
HWT (right panel) in Experiment 2. Residual plots for the P90, P50, and P10 conditions are 
displayed in the top, middle, and bottom panels, respectively. Vertical lines represent derived 



























































































Figure 20. Experiment 2 analog to demand curves for the HWT and EWT separately. Vertical 
lines represent derived Pmax.  
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Figure 21. Experiment 2 predictive validity of the HWT. The size of the data point symbols 
reflects the number of participants whose data are represented by that value. 
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Figure 22. Percentage change in predicted work output from the HWT to observed output in the 
EWT for Experiment 2. The gray horizontal line indicates a 0% change, or perfect aggregate 
correspondence. Data points below the line indicate less work completed in the EWT than 






















Figure 23. Percentage change in predicted cost from the HWT to observed cost in the EWT for 
Experiment 2. The gray horizontal line indicates a 0% change, or perfect aggregate 
correspondence. Data points below the line indicate the cost of incentive payments was less in 






















































Figure 24. Median breakpoints in the D01, D14, and D28 conditions. Error bars denote 






















Figure 25. Experiment 3 percentage of accurately completed work units. Horizontal lines 
represent group medians across all ratio requirements and correspond to the data paths denoting 












































Figure 26. Analog to demand curves for the D01, D14, and D28 conditions in the HWT (top panel) 
and EWT (bottom panel). The y-axis depicts the percentage of participants in each incentive 
magnitude condition who indicated willingness to complete (HWT) or completed (EWT) the 
ratio requirement. The x-axis depicts the ratio requirement needed to earn the incentive. Vertical 
























































Figure 28. Cost-benefit analysis of the EWT in Experiment 3. Number of work units completed 
are denoted by the grey data points and scaled to the left y-axis. Cost in dollars per ratio 







Figure 29. Residuals (distance from best-fit curve) from AtD curves in the EWT (left panel) and 
HWT (right panel) in Experiment 3. Residual plots for the D01, D14, and D28 conditions are 
displayed in the top, middle, and bottom panels, respectively. Vertical lines represent derived 
































































































Figure 30. Experiment 3 analog to demand curves for the HWT and EWT separately. Vertical 
lines represent derived Pmax.  
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Figure 31. Predictive validity of the HWT in Experiment 3. The size of the data point symbols 




Figure 32. Percentage change in predicted work output and corresponding cost from the HWT to 
observed output and cost in the EWT for Experiment 3. The gray horizontal line indicates a 0% 
change, or perfect aggregate correspondence. Data points below the line indicate less work 
completed and a lower cost observed in the EWT than predicted by the HWT.  
  


















Appendix A  
 
Literature search procedures, conducted on November 5, 2015.    
n =
• Keyword Anywhere: Employee OR Staff 
136,120
• Keyword Anywhere: Reinforcer OR Incentive
73,193
• Keyword Anywhere: Performance OR Behavior
1,162
• Published in Scholarly Journal
806
• Written in English
784
• Abstract search: excluding correlational studies, editorials, literature reviews, 
commentaries, staff or simulated staff not participants, incentives not IV, DV not 
measurable behavior
75
• Method search:comparison of a dimension under study (i.e., probability, delay, effort, 
magnitude, rate, quality)
6







Experiment 1 Amazon Mechanical Turk HIT.  
 
































Monetary choice questionnaire.  
 
For each question below, please select the option that you would prefer. 
 
Which would you rather have: 
$54 tonight $55 in 117 days 
$55 tonight $75 in 61 days 
$19 tonight $25 in 53 days 
$31 tonight $85 in 7 days 
$14 tonight $25 in 19 days 
$47 tonight $50 in 160 days 
$15 tonight $35 in 13 days 
$25 tonight $60 in 14 days 
$78 tonight $80 in 162 days 
$40 tonight $55 in 62 days 
$11 tonight $30 in 7 days 
$67 tonight $75 in 119 days 
$34 tonight $35 in 186 days 
$27 tonight $50 in 21 days 
$69 tonight       $85 in 91 days 
$49 tonight $60 in 89 days 
$80 tonight $85 in 157 days 
       $24 tonight $35 in 29 days 
$33 tonight $80 in 14 days 
$28 tonight $30 in 179 days 
$34 tonight $50 in 30 days 
$25 tonight $30 in 80 days 
$41 tonight $75 in 20 days 
$54 tonight $60 in 111 days 
$54 tonight $80 in 30 days 
$22 tonight $25 in 136 days 






Behavioral inhibition system/behavioral activation system scale. 
 
 
Please respond to the following statements by indicating the degree to which you either Agree or Disagree. 
 
A person's family is the most important thing in life.e 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or nervousness.a,f 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
I go out of my way to get things I want.b 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it.d 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun.c 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
How I dress is important to me.e 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized.d 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit.a 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
When I want something I usually go all-out to get it.b 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun.c 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
It's hard for me to find time to do things such as get a haircut.e 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
If I see a chance to get something I want I move on it right away.b 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
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I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me.a 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
When I see an opportunity for something I like I get excited right away.d 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
I often act on the spur of the moment.c 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty "worked up."a 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
I often wonder why people act the way they do.e 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly.d 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something important.a 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
I crave excitement and new sensations.c 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" approach.b 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
I have very few fears compared to my friends.a,f 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
It would excite me to win a contest.d 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
I worry about making mistakes.a 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
aBehavioral inhibition scale. 
bBehavioral activation scale – drive.  
cBehavioral activation scale – fun seeking. 
dBehavioral activation scale – reward responsiveness. 
eFiller question.  





Experiment 1 demographic questionnaire.  
 
What is your current age? 
 
 






 Black/African American 
 Hispanic/Latino 
 Asian 
 Native American 




In what state do you currently reside? 
[drop down list]  
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Less than High School 
 High School / GED 
 Some College 
 2-year College Degree 
 4-year College Degree 
 Masters Degree 
 Doctoral Degree 
 Professional Degree (JD, MD) 
 
What is your combined annual household income? 
 Less than 30,000 
 30,000 – 39,999 
 40,000 – 49,999 
 50,000 – 59,999 
 60,000 – 69,999 
 70,000 – 79,999 
 80,000 – 89,999 
 90,000 – 99,999 
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 100,000 or more 
 




If yes, please specify: 
 Learning disability 
 Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder 
 Physical disability 
 Other 
 
Are you currently, or have you ever been a smoker? 
 Yes - Currently 
 Yes - Previously 






Experiment 1 practice trial, HWT, and EWT instructions and ratio wording. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS AT START OF EACH SECTION: 
  
PRACTICE TRIAL  
In the following section you will be asked whether or not you would be willing to complete a 
given number of "slider questions" to earn a 5/10/20 cent bonus if given the opportunity. To 
continue please complete the practice slider question according to the instructions below: 
 
Please move the slider to match the number indicated to the left. Once the numbers match, press 
the next button to continue 
HWT 
For each question below, please indicate whether you would complete the number of slider 
questions indicated to receive the bonus.  
 
Please answer honestly, thoughtfully, and as if you were actually in this situation.  
 
EWT 
Next, you will have the opportunity to complete slider questions to earn real bonuses paid after 
you complete the study. 
 
Each section will begin with a statement indicating the amount of the bonus and the number of 
questions that must be completed to earn the bonus. You will then be asked if you would like to 
complete the section. If you select "no" the survey will end. 
 
If you would no longer like to continue after beginning a section, you may exit the survey by 
closing your browser or returning to the mTurk website. If you exit the survey before finishing 
the section you will not receive the bonus for the section. Thank you for taking the time to 
complete the survey. 
 
 If you wish to receive bonuses, you must wait to submit your unique access code until 
you are finished. Be sure to write the code down. 
 If you no longer wish to continue, copy your unique access code found below and 
submit it through the Amazon Mechanical Turk survey page.  
 
WORDING FOR EACH RATIO: 
 
HWT 
Would you complete 1 slider question in exchange for a 5/10/20 cent bonus? 
 
EWT  
You can earn a bonus of 5/10/20 cents by completing 1 question in this section. Would you like 





Scoring for the Monetary Choice Questionnaire.  
 
Response Option   
Smaller-sooner Larger-later k Magnitude 
$34 tonight $35 in 186 days 0.00016 Small 
$54 tonight $55 in 117 days 0.00016 Medium 
$78 tonight $80 in 162 days 0.00016 Large 
$28 tonight $30 in 179 days 0.0004 Small 
$47 tonight $50 in 160 days 0.0004 Medium 
$80 tonight $85 in 157 days 0.0004 Large 
$22 tonight $25 in 136 days 0.001 Small 
$54 tonight $60 in 111 days 0.001 Medium 
$67 tonight $75 in 119 days 0.001 Large 
$25 tonight $30 in 80 days 0.0025 Small 
$49 tonight $60 in 89 days 0.0025 Medium 
$69 tonight  $85 in 91 days 0.0025 Large 
$19 tonight $25 in 53 days 0.006 Small 
$40 tonight $55 in 62 days 0.006 Medium 
$55 tonight $75 in 61 days 0.006 Large 
$24 tonight $35 in 29 days 0.016 Small 
$34 tonight $50 in 30 days 0.016 Medium 
$54 tonight $80 in 30 days 0.016 Large 
$14 tonight $25 in 19 days 0.041 Small 
$27 tonight $50 in 21 days 0.041 Medium 
$41 tonight $75 in 20 days 0.041 Large 
$15 tonight $35 in 13 days 0.1 Small 
$25 tonight $60 in 14 days 0.1 Medium 
$33 tonight $80 in 14 days 0.1 Large 
$11 tonight $30 in 7 days 0.25 Small 
$20 tonight $55 in 7 days 0.25 Medium 







Experiments 2 and 3 Amazon Mechanical Turk HIT.  
 









Experiments 2 and 3 practice trial, HWT, and EWT instructions and ratio wording. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS AT START OF EACH SECTION: 
  
PRACTICE TRIAL  
The task in this HIT involves matching numbers on a slider scale. Below you have three opportunities to 
practice before you begin. Please move the slider to match the number indicated on the left of the slider 
scale. Then press the “next” button to continue. 
 
HWT 
For each question below, please indicate whether you would complete the indicated number of slider 
questions to receive the bonus if given the opportunity.  
 
There are no right or wrong responses. Please answer honestly, thoughtfully, and as if you were actually 
in this situation.  
 
EWT 
Next, you will have the opportunity to complete slider questions to earn real bonuses paid after you 
complete the study. 
 
Each section will begin with a statement indicating the amount of the bonus and the number of slider 
questions that must be completed to earn the bonus. You will then be asked if you would like to complete 
the section. 
 
If you exit the survey before finishing the section, you will not receive the bonus for that section. 
 
WORDING FOR EACH RATIO: 
 
HWT 
Experiment 2 - Probability: Would you complete 1 slider question in exchange for a 9 in 10 (90%) / 5 
in 10 (50%) / 1 in 10 (10%) chance of receiving a 22 cent / 40 cent / 2 dollar bonus paid in 1 day?  
 
Experiment 3 - Delay: Would you complete 1 slider question in exchange for a 20 cent bonus paid for 
certain in 1/14/28 day(s)?  
 
EWT  
Experiment 2 - Probability: Would you like to complete 1 slider question in exchange for a 9 in 10 
(90%) / 5 in 10 (50%) / 1 in 10 (10%) chance of earning a 22 cent / 40 cent / 2 dollar bonus paid in 1 day? 
 
Experiment 3 - Delay: Would you like to complete 1 slider question in exchange for a 20 cent bonus 









Experiments 2 and 3 demographic, employment, and incentive survey.  
 
What is your current age? 
 
 






 Black/African American 
 Hispanic/Latino 
 Asian 
 Native American 




In what state do you currently reside? 




What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Less than High School 
 High School / GED 
 Some College 
 2-year College Degree 
 4-year College Degree 
 Master’s Degree 
 Doctoral Degree 
 Professional Degree (JD, MD) 
 
What is your combined annual household income? 
 Less than 30,000 
 30,000 – 39,999 
 40,000 – 49,999 
 50,000 – 59,999 
 60,000 – 69,999 
 70,000 – 79,999 
 80,000 – 89,999 
 90,000 – 99,999 
 100,000 or more 
 
Approximately how many hours do you spend on Mechanical Turk a week? 
 
 
Why do you complete tasks in Mechanical Turk? Please check all that apply: 
 Fruitful way to spend free time and get some cash (e.g., instead of watching TV) 
 For "primary" income purposes (e.g., gas, bills, groceries, credit cards) 
 For "secondary" income purposes, pocket change (e.g., for hobbies, gadgets, going out) 
 To kill time 
 I find the tasks to be fun 
 I am currently unemployed, or have only a part time job 
 I like to participate in research 
 Other: ____________________ 
 





How long were you employed at your most recent paid position outside of Mechanical Turk in 
the past 10 years?  
 I have not had a paid position in the past 10 years 
 0-3 months 
 3-6 months 
 6 months - 1 year 
 1 - 3 years 
 3 - 5 years 
 5 - 10 years 
 10 - 20 years 
 20+ years 
 










Which occupational category best describes your employment? 
 Architecture/Engineering (e.g. architect, landscape architect, surveyor, cartographer, 
engineer, drafter) 
 Art and Design (e.g. fine artist, animator, graphic/floral/interior designer, multimedia artist, 
set/exhibit designer, art director) 
 Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance (e.g. landscaper, tree-trimmer, building 
cleaner, janitor, pest control) 
 Business and Financial Operations (e.g. financial specialist, budget analyst, event planner, 
agent, buyer, claims adjuster, real estate assessor, human resources specialist, accountant) 
 Community and Social Service (e.g. mental health counselor, social worker, guidance 
counselor, clergy, health educator, probation officer) 
 Computer/Mathematical (e.g. computer programmer, network/database administrator, 
mathematician, statistician, software/web developer, user support) 
 Construction/Installation/Repair (e.g. mason, carpenter, electrician, pipefitter, building 
inspector, equipment repair, electronics installer, mechanic) 
 Education/Training/Library (e.g. teacher, adult educator, teaching assistant, librarian, curator, 
archivist) 
 Entertainer/Performer (e.g. actor, producer, director, musician, dancer, athlete, coach) 
 Farming/Fishing/Forestry Worker (e.g. farm/greenhouse/fishing/forestry worker, agricultural 
inspector) 
 Food Preparation/Serving (e.g. cook, bartender, food server, caterer, dishwasher, host) 
 Healthcare Practitioner or Technician (e.g. physician, nurse, veterinarian, 
physical/occupational/recreational therapist, nutritionist, EMT, laboratory technician) 
 Healthcare Support (e.g. medical/dental/veterinary assistant, massage therapist, home health 
aide) 
 Legal Occupations (e.g. lawyer, legal assistant, paralegal, title examiner) 
 Life Science (e.g. biologist, ecologist, zoologist, biochemist, conservation/plant/soil scientist, 
forester) 
 Management (e.g. managers of: operations, marketing, public relations, human resources, 
advertising, finance, hotels, restaurants, etc.) 
 Media and Communications (e.g. writer, editor, reporter, announcer, interpreter, media 
equipment technician, photographer, film/video/TV operator, public relations specialist) 
 Military and Protective Service (e.g. military officer, infantry, police officer, firefighter, 
security guard, lifeguard, ski patrol, animal control, game warden) 
 Office/Administrative Support (e.g. financial/billing/file/mail clerk, bookkeeper, teller, 
receptionist, administrative assistant, data entry processor, library assistant, legal secretary) 
 Personal Care and Service (e.g. hairstylist, fitness trainer, usher, childcare worker/nanny, 
recreation worker, travel/wilderness/river raft/kayak guide, nonfarm animal caretaker/trainer) 
 Physical Science (e.g. physicist, chemist, astronomer, hydrologist, geoscientist) 
 Production/Manufacturing (e.g. assembler, machinist, textile worker, woodworker, plant 
operator, photo processor, welder, printing worker, baker, butcher) 
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 Sales (e.g. retail management, cashier, sales/advertising representative, travel agent, real 
estate broker, telemarketer) 
 Social Science (e.g. clinical/counseling/school psychologist, economist, survey researcher, 
anthropologist, sociologist, historian, political scientist, regional planner) 
 Transportation (e.g. truck/bus/taxi/ambulance driver, material mover, sailor, pilot, flight 
attendant, railway worker) 
 
What was the reason for leaving your last paid position? 
 I accepted a new job at a different company 
 I was promoted in the same company 
 I decided not to work outside of the home 
 I was laid off or otherwise terminated (seasonal work, employer downsizing, dismissed) 
 I prefer not to answer 
 Other (please specify): 
 
Excluding an annual pay increase or holiday bonus, did you receive incentives or rewards in the 
form of money or other gifts (preferred parking spaces, time off, lunch, water bottles, etc) at your 
most recent paid position? Mark all that apply. 
 Yes, I received monetary incentives 
 Yes, I received other gifts 
 No 
 





 Twice yearly 
 Annually 
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
